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The number of asylum seekers rose sharply in the 1980s. The result was a 
political backlash and a public debate characterized by strongly held opinions, 
often based on questionable interpretations of a very slim body of evidence. 
This Report by CEPR Research Fellow Tim Hatton performs a valuable service by 
setting the record straight. Hatton examines the evolution of asylum seeking 
over the past thirty years, applying the same tools and approaches that have 
been used by economists to study the broader issue of international migration. 
Of course perspectives from outside economics are important as well, and 
Hatton, an economic historian by training, takes into account the historical 
context as well as the political economy dimension of asylum seeking.
Hatton begins with the 1951 Refugee Convention, noting that its generosity 
(by today’s standards) owed much to the Cold War, which generated asylum 
seekers who were viewed with sympathy in Europe and North America. 
The difficulties, in some sense, began with the end of the Cold War, which 
coincided with a sharp rise in the number of refugees and a shift in their 
countries of origin. The result was a strong political backlash against asylum 
seekers. Even though the number of asylum seekers fell after 1992, animosity 
towards refugees remains, and policies to reduce their numbers became much 
tougher, especially after 2001. These policies have worked, in the sense that 
they have reduced the number of asylum seekers. Hatton’s careful analysis 
reveals, however, that these tougher policies accounted for only a third of 
the fall in numbers, with most of this coming through border controls and 
restricting eligibility, not reductions in the living standards of asylum seekers.
Though the number of asylum seekers has fallen, policy-makers must still 
confront a range of difficult issues. One of the knottiest is how to coordinate 
policies between the poor countries where refugees first arrive and the 
developed countries that are their ultimate destination. As Hatton notes, there 
is no simple solution to this problem, but he argues strongly that there is 
considerable scope for policy coordination among developed countries, in 
Foreword
particular the EU. In Chapter 11 of the Report he examines how a common 
asylum policy might be introduced and implemented among the Member 
States of the EU, looking at issues that range from harmonizing the process of 
determining refugee status to burden sharing among the Member States.
Social science research can seldom tell us precisely which policy to adopt, but 
it can play an invaluable role by providing a framework for debate, setting out 
the available evidence and ensuring that this evidence is interpreted correctly. 
Tim Hatton’s Report achieves each of these goals and will provide a strong 
foundation for serious debates on asylum in the years to come.
We are grateful to Tim for his work in preparing the Report. Thanks are also 
due, of course, to the CEPR Publications Team, Samantha Reid and Anil 
Shamdasani, who produced the Report with their customary speed and 
professionalism. 
Stephen Yeo 
Chief Executive Officer, CEPR 
London, 10 June 2011
This report presents an analytical account of the arrival in the developed world 
of hundreds of thousands of people fleeing persecution and seeking asylum. 
It explains the socioeconomic factors that lie behind trends in the number of 
asylum claims by source and destination. But most important, it analyses the 
political economy of asylum policies, with a view to understanding the social 
forces underpinning policy developments in the last two decades. Above all, I 
hope that this account will be a useful background for those interested in the 
future development of asylum policy.
This report is part of a programme of research under the title Politics, 
Economics and Global Governance: The European Dimensions (PEGGED), 
which is coordinated by the Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR) and 
generously supported by the Seventh Framework Programme for Research and 
Technological Development (Contract No. SSH7-CT-2008-217559).
The following chapters synthesise my previous published work, and combine 
it with new material, in the hope that this will provide a broader analysis of 
the social and economic processes that underpin trends in asylum. Chapters 5, 
6 and 8 are based on my article in the Economic Journal (2009) while Chapter 
9 is a reworking of my article (with Audrey Lim) in Agenda (2005). I am 
grateful for permission to reproduce material from these publications. Other 
chapters draw less directly on articles that appeared in Economic Policy (2004) 
and the National Institute Economic Review (2005). In the process of expanding 
and updating the quantitative analysis, I have drawn on a variety of other 
sources and I am especially grateful to Monty Marshall and Pieter Bevelander 
for providing me with data from their own research. I am grateful to Alison 
Booth and Giovanni Facchini for valuable comments on an earlier draft and 
to Mathias Skillingstad for able research assistance.
Preface

1 The Challenge of Asylum
Every year hundreds of thousands of people apply for political asylum, seeking 
sanctuary in the stable, safe and secure countries of the West. Most of them 
come from poor or middle income countries that are in the grip of civil or 
international conflicts, countries that systematically persecute minorities, or 
in which human rights abuses are commonplace. But those who, one way or 
another, manage to reach OECD  countries are a small fraction of all who flee 
from persecution across international borders or who seek refuge elsewhere 
within their own country. While it is only the tip of the iceberg of human 
suffering and misery, the asylum system has become a major source of 
controversy in the Western countries that are the main focus of this report. 
As such it raises a number of challenges. One challenge is that faced by the 
asylum seekers themselves in overcoming the obstacles to gaining some form 
of sanctuary. Another is the challenge they present to host populations who, 
while harbouring humanitarian ideals, nevertheless feel threatened by what 
seems to be an endless stream of unwanted migrants with dubious claims for 
protection. But perhaps the greatest challenge is that faced by policymakers 
seeking to strike a balance between adherence to international obligations 
(and often a genuine desire to exercise compassion) on the one hand, and 
on the other hand by the media-fuelled popular clamour for much tougher 
policies.
Over the last 30 years the number of asylum applicants has soared and this has 
led to intense political controversy and what might be described as a policy 
backlash. Against this background, there have been claims and counterclaims 
about the motivations of asylum seekers and the treatment they have received 
at the hands of the authorities. These have often involved generalisations 
based on one or a few prominent cases or situations. Sometimes they have 
been based on interpretations of the wider evidence that are, to say the least, 
questionable. This report aims to provide an account that is grounded in the 
quantitative evidence and that is, at least in that sense, objective. It is about 
how the number applying for asylum has evolved, and how those trends can 
be understood in terms of the conditions faced by refugees in source and 
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destination countries. It examines the political economy of asylum policies, 
how those policies have developed, and the social forces that underpin them. 
And it evaluates the effects of policy on the total number of asylum seekers and 
on the reception that they face. While the aim is to understand rather than to 
judge, the report concludes with an overall evaluation of asylum policies and 
asks if there are opportunities for politically feasible policies that would better 
serve refugees and host populations.
While this report rests heavily on my own previous research, it also draws 
in large measure on the research of many others. Nevertheless, the approach 
taken here differs from the existing mainstream literature in a number of 
ways. There is a long and venerable tradition of research into issues related to 
refugees – a literature that provides rich and detailed description of situations 
that generate refugees, the conditions faced by particular groups of refugees, 
and the development of policy towards them. There is also what might be 
described as a ‘grey’ literature – a large body of reports and websites that have 
been produced by official bodies and pressure groups engaged in one way or 
another with refugee issues. Much of this material, including the academic 
literature, is written in a barely suppressed tone of moral outrage. I have done 
my best to avoid that here. Instead I take the approach and use the methods 
that have been developed in the literature on the economics of international 
migration. Surprisingly, only in the last few years have such methods been 
used to analyse many of the parallel issues that arise in the context of asylum 
seekers and refugees. But quantitative analysis alone does not give the full 
picture, and in order to understand the present we must also appreciate the 
past. As far as possible I have attempted to embed the analysis presented here 
in the historical context. In my view it is vital to understanding the political 
economy of asylum.
The structure of the rest of this report is as follows. Chapter 2 outlines 
the development of refugee policy during the 20th century. It focuses on 
international initiatives and particularly on the events that shaped the 1951 
Refugee Convention and the legal framework for asylum that evolved from it. 
The chapter shows that, through a series of stages, and for a variety of historically 
contingent reasons, a refugee regime emerged with key characteristics that 
shape asylum policy right up to the present. It provided, in principle, unlimited 
access to the asylum procedure for applicants with a well founded fear of 
persecution who are present on a country’s territory, whether or not they are 
there legally. Against the background of the Cold War, this system spread and 
expanded in generosity, especially to those fleeing communist regimes. But 
it came under severe pressure when the Cold War ended and as the nature of 
asylum flows changed and their total volume swelled.
Chapter 3 presents the aggregate data collected by the United Nations High 
Commissioner for Refugees on the number of asylum applications to the 
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developed countries since the early 1980s. It illustrates the steep rise in the 
1980s to a peak of three-quarters of a million in 1992 followed by a decline, 
especially after 2002. It also shows how the patterns differed between source 
regions and destination countries. Chapter 4 asks if the patterns observed in 
asylum applications and refugee numbers are paralleled in indices of conflict, 
violence and human rights abuses. Not surprisingly there is a fairly strong 
correspondence with civil war and terror, but much less with political regimes 
and civil rights. The chapter also examines how the changing characteristics 
of civil conflict impinge on refugee flows. This is followed in Chapter 5 with 
an econometric analysis of the number of asylum applications generated by 
56 of the most strife-prone countries over the years since the early 1980s. The 
key findings are that high levels of terror and low living standards are the key 
explanatory forces. But these are not enough to fully explain the ‘big surge’ in 
applications during the 1980s – for which other explanations must be found.
Chapter 6 turns to the evolution of asylum policies in the major OECD 
countries. One measure of policy is the proportion of asylum applicants that 
gain some form of recognition as refugees. For the developed world as a whole 
this proportion fell from over 50% in 1982 to less than 20% a decade later 
and so the surge cannot be explained by more generous asylum policies. 
The chapter describes in some detail the key elements in the policy backlash 
that began in the late 1980s. For the period since the late 1990s I present 
a quantitative index of policy for 19 countries that is based on changes in 
the rules governing asylum policy rather than simply on recognition rates. 
This reveals that there was a further increase in the toughness of policy in 
the first decade of this century. Chapter 7 examines public opinion towards 
asylum seekers and asylum policy, based on surveys such as the European 
Social Survey. It looks at which sections of the population hold positive or 
negative views on several dimensions of policy, and why. I ask what underlies 
the apparently negative trend in public attitudes towards asylum seekers and 
I explore the link between public opinion, politics, and the policy backlash.
In Chapters 8 and 9 I examine the effects of tougher asylum policies on the 
number of asylum claims. Looking across 19 OECD countries I find that 
tougher policy did indeed reduce asylum applications, particularly between 
2001 and 2006. However, the tightening of policy only explains about a third 
of the decline in applications over that period – a more modest effect than 
governments might claim. That effect came mainly through enhanced border 
controls and tougher processing procedures rather than through clamping 
down on the living conditions of asylum seekers. Chapter 9 looks at one 
prominent case of a policy backlash – the escalation of tough policies by 
the Australian government in the aftermath of the attempt to land asylum 
seekers rescued by the MV Tampa in 2001. This is one of the clearest examples 
of how the deterrent effects on asylum policy work. And it also illustrates 
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the importance of enforcement and publicity in underpinning the deterrent 
effects of policy.
In Chapter 10 I ask what happens to asylum seekers once their claim has 
been resolved. Those who do obtain the right to stay often suffer considerable 
disadvantage compared with other immigrants, especially in the labour 
market. As they are not principally labour migrants, refugees are typically 
less well matched to host country conditions and they may be further 
disadvantaged by the trauma they have suffered and the asylum process itself. 
But there is evidence of assimilation and rehabilitation, even though it may 
be a long process. Not surprisingly, little is known about those whose asylum 
claims have been rejected except that many of them remain as undocumented 
migrants. Most of these live a shadowy existence of multiple disadvantage, 
and often without access to basic services.
Chapter 11 turns to policy. I first ask if the key instrument that underpins 
asylum policy, the 1951 Refugee Convention, should be scrapped or amended. 
I argue that it is not as obsolete as some would argue but that it cannot be 
expected to provide solutions to some of the wider challenges, for which it 
was never designed. Principal among these challenges is fostering greater 
cooperation between the poor countries of first asylum and the rich countries 
of the OECD, something for which the solution is far from obvious. However 
there is scope for greater cooperation on policy in the developed world and 
especially among the countries of the European Union. I examine the potential 
benefits of harmonising and centralising asylum and refugee policy both on 
a theoretical level and in terms of practical politics. I conclude that there is 
potential for further developing EU policy not only in the interests of refugees 
but also in the interests of EU citizens.
I would like to reiterate that my principal objective is not simply to mount a 
critique of asylum policies past and present and then to roll out a manifesto 
for policy reforms. Rather, it is to present an account that rests on two themes. 
One is that it is grounded firmly on quantitative analysis rather than on loose 
arguments about the causes of asylum flows, the behaviour of asylum seekers, 
and the effects of policy. The other is that it is based on a realistic approach to 
the political economy of asylum policy and one that recognises the political 
constraints faced by policymakers. Only against this background can we have 
sensible and rational discussions of how to develop new and better policies.
2 The Evolution of Refugee 
Protection
Seeking asylum is not new. For centuries those facing oppression and 
persecution have sought refuge in places where they would receive protection 
and where they could live in peace and toleration. From the flights of the 
Huguenots in the late 16th and late 17th centuries to the Russian and 
Eastern European Jews escaping the pogroms in the late 19th century, exile 
was often associated with religious persecution. In the 19th century political 
dissidents sometimes fled across borders, as in the European revolutions of 
1848, but never in great numbers (Marrus, 1985, ch. 1). With few exceptions 
they moved without hindrance. But as the 20th century progressed, exile 
became increasingly associated with war and terror. With the development of 
immigration controls that required passports and visas, international borders 
became less porous. As a result, the opportunities for refugees to flee to liberal 
democracies became more restricted. Mass displacements in the European 
wars and other major conflicts set the scene for international coordination in 
policy towards refugees.
2.1 Refugee policy to 1951
The First World War and its aftermath created displacements of Europeans on 
an unprecedented scale, as newly created or reorganised states sought to create 
more homogeneous populations through ethnic ‘unmixing’.1 Those displaced 
included 2 million Poles, a million Germans and hundreds of thousands of 
Magyars fleeing the former Russian and Austro-Hungarian empires. They were 
followed in the early 1920s by mass displacements of Greeks and Armenians, 
each numbering more than a million. In response to these emergencies, in 
1921 the newly established League of Nations created a High Commissioner 
1 This trend was already evident before the First World War in the Balkan conflicts that attended 
the disintegration of the Ottoman Empire, notably the exchange of populations between Greece, 
Serbia, Bulgaria and Turkey. The term ‘unmixing’ is attributed to Lord Curzon who was the British 
Foreign Secretary at the time of the Lausanne Treaty of 1923 (Marrus, 1985, p. 41).
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for Refugees, with a specific mandate to assist the large number of Russians 
driven out by revolution, war and famine, many of whom had been 
deprived of their citizenship and had therefore become stateless. This first 
internationally coordinated effort involved issuing identity certificates (which 
became internationally recognised as travel documents) and negotiating the 
exchange, repatriation and resettlement of refugees.2
In the 1930s, resettlement efforts, particularly of a growing number of Jewish 
refugees from Germany and Austria, became increasingly difficult as the Great 
Depression spread and immigration policies became ever more restrictive.3 
In 1933 the League of Nations created a High Commissioner for Refugees 
from Germany. Formal conventions were drafted under the League’s auspices 
in 1933 (covering Russians and Armenians) and in 1938 (covering refugees 
from Germany and Austria) but they received little international support.4 
According to one historian, ‘as the scale of the Jewish refugee problem grew, 
any will to resolve it faded. Despite the limited international recognition of 
the rights of refugees granted at the time, states were unwilling to extend new 
legal protections to refugees, particularly when these would limit the right of 
sovereign nations to deport or exclude aliens’ (Loescher, 2001, p. 31).5
The Second World War created even greater challenges. By 1945 there were 
over 30 million displaced persons in Europe, not counting the 13 million 
ethnic Germans expelled mainly from Czechoslovakia, Poland and the Soviet 
Union. It is estimated that the Soviet Union alone deported more than 3 
million members of different ethnic minorities. The early postwar years also 
witnessed other large scale displacements in South Eastern Europe as well as 
a number occurring occurring outside Europe. Most notable among the latter 
was the 14 million refugees created by the partition of India in 1947. Another 
was the mass displacement of Palestinians that attended the creation of the 
State of Israel in 1948, which was itself partly the result of the resettlement 
failures of the 1930s.
In 1943 the allied powers (including the USSR) set up the UN Relief and 
Rehabilitation Administration (UNRRA), which facilitated the repatriation of 
about 7 million refugees. At the instigation of the United States, and over the 
objections of the Soviet bloc, it was replaced in 1947 by the International 
2 The travel documents were known as Nansen Passports after the first High Commissioner, the 
Norwegian polar explorer Fridtjof Nansen, see Skran, 1995, pp. 102–22.
3 These developments are described in detail by Skran, 1995, pp. 195–223; see also Marrus, 1985, 
ch. 3, and Loescher, 2001, ch. 2.
4 The 1933 Convention was ratified by only eight states and the 1938 Convention by only three. 
A 1938 conference at Evian (France) called by US President Franklin Roosevelt also garnered 
little support for resettlement places for Jewish refugees although it did establish an independent 
refugee agency, the Intergovernmental Committee on Refugees.
5 For the same reason, refugees fleeing fascist regimes in Spain, Italy and Portugal received little 
international support although nearly half a million found temporary refuge in France.
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Refugee Organisation (IRO).6 Although the IRO had wider powers for the 
documentation, relief and relocation of refugees, its mandate was temporary 
and it was supported by a limited number of countries. Not for the last time 
refugee policy represented an East–West compromise. As with the earlier 
organisations, the initial focus was on repatriation rather than resettlement. But 
the resolution that created the IRO did provide against forced repatriation, and 
for the first time fear of persecution became a criterion for refugee eligibility.7 
Many of the refugees from the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe did not want 
to return8 – something that became a powerful symbol of Western superiority 
over communism. Ultimately the IRO resettled more than a million European 
refugees, principally to the United States and Canada, South America and 
Australia. By contrast very few were repatriated.
Between 1920 and 1950 refugee policy passed through several phases, from a 
policy directed at providing a legal status for stateless persons, to one concerned 
with the displacement of certain persecuted groups and then to protection for 
political dissidents, particularly those fleeing communism.9 For the most part 
it was concerned with specific groups or conflicts rather than being a general 
set of rules that placed wider obligations on third parties. And moreover, the 
focus gradually evolved from repatriation to resettlement.
2.2 The 1951 Refugee Convention
In 1949 the United Nations established the Office of the UN High 
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) to commence in 1951 with a mandate to 
provide protection for refugees and to assist governments in finding solutions 
to refugee problems.10 This too represented a compromise, this time between 
the United States, which wanted a temporary agency with limited scope, 
powers and funding, and the continental Europeans who favoured a wider 
remit, with the Soviet bloc largely sidelined. It was shortly followed by what 
has become the key instrument in international refugee policy, the 1951 UN 
Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees.11 Following on the heels of the 
6 The development of international institutions prior to the Refugee Convention is described in 
UNHCR, 2001b, ch. 1.
7 See Hathaway, 1984, pp. 374–6; Loescher, 2001, p. 38.
8 This stands in contrast to the 1920s when the governments of the refugees’ homelands were 
often unwilling to let them return. But it is not surprising given that so many of those who were 
repatriated in the mid-1940s ended up in Stalin’s labour camps.
9 The legal evolution is described by Hathaway (1984) in terms of three phases: juridical, social and 
individualistic.
10 The statute that defined the functions of the UNHCR was adopted in UN General Assembly 
Resolution 428(V) on 14 December 1950.
11 26 states participated in the conference, which was held in Geneva from 2 to 25 July 1951. The 
Convention entered into force on 22 April 1954.
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1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights,12 it focused on key elements of 
freedom, on the individual rather than the group, and on resettlement rather 
than on repatriation.13
The two key clauses of the Refugee Convention14 are Article 1 (A2), which 
defines a refugee as a person who:
owing to well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, 
nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside 
the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to 
avail himself of the protection of that country; or who, not having a nationality 
and being outside the country of his former habitual residence as a result of such 
events, is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it.15
And Article 33 (1), which provides that:
No Contracting State shall expel or return (‘refouler’) a refugee in any manner 
whatsoever to the frontiers of territories where his life or freedom would be 
threatened on account of his race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular 
social group or political opinion.16
Reflecting the political compromise that underlay it, the Convention was 
circumscribed in three ways. First, it originally applied only to those who were 
displaced before 1 January 1951 and it allowed signatories the option to admit 
as refugees only those who were displaced in Europe. Second it explicitly 
excluded more than 6 million displaced Palestinians for whom a separate 
agency, the UN Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA), had been established 
in 1949 (and which exists to this day). And third, it covered only those 
displaced across national borders, and not those displaced within the borders 
of the country where they experienced persecution (it also excludes military 
personnel and those who have committed war crimes or other serious crimes). 
On the other hand, the UNHCR was given operational authority to assist those 
12 Article 14 (1) of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights states: ‘Everyone has the right to seek 
and to enjoy in other countries asylum from persecution.’
13 By contrast the UNHCR Statute Chapter 1 (2) provides that ‘The work of the High Commissioner 
shall be of an entirely non-political character; it shall be humanitarian and social and shall 
relate, as a rule, to groups and categories of refugees.’ Loescher et al. (2008, p. 11) point out that 
eligibility was implicitly placed on an individual basis during the time of the IRO, because of its 
recognition of the right of the individual not to be repatriated against his or her will.  Boswell 
(2000) argues that the principle of universal liberalism that underlies the individual treatment of 
asylum seekers dates back to the 19th century.
14 The full text of the Convention and the subsequent Protocol can be found at: www.unhcr.org/
pages/49da0e466.html.
15 This definition also appeared in the UNHCR Statute, Chapter 2 (6).
16 The non-refoulement clause was not original in 1951. It was foreshadowed in Article 3 of the 1933 
League of Nations, Convention Relating to the International Status of Refugees, see www.unhcr.
org/refworld/pdfid/3dd8cf374.pdf.
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displaced more recently and outside Europe, although its initial term was for 
three years only.
The framing of the Convention profoundly shaped refugee policy in the decades 
that followed. One aspect is that it is based on individual rights rather than 
the circumstances of a class or group of individuals – a feature that goes back 
to the IRO. As a result, each claim for refugee status must be considered on its 
individual merits by the signatory country to which the individual has applied. 
Although the Convention does not provide the right to permanent residence 
in the country of asylum, it does encourage host countries to ‘facilitate the 
assimilation and naturalization of refugees’ (Article 34). In a number of clauses 
it further provides that individuals who are granted refugee status must be 
accorded the same legal rights and access to employment, education, housing 
and social security as nationals. The right to family reunification is not explicit 
but is implicit in the non-discrimination provisions and in the preamble.
Most important of all are three interlocking elements that are relevant to 
asylum policy right up to the present. One is that a signatory state must 
provide access to procedures to determine whether or not a person claiming 
asylum qualifies as a refugee on the Convention’s definition. So, in principle, 
there is no limit to the number of genuine refugees that a state is liable to 
accept. Second, while there is nothing in the Convention that requires the 
asylum seeker to be present on the territory of the state in question in order to 
claim asylum, this essentially follows from the non-refoulement clause. Thus, to 
avoid refoulement, asylum seekers present on the territory must have their cases 
considered under the Convention – something that would not apply to those 
outside the territory.17 Third, under Article 31 of the Convention, states must 
not penalise an asylum claimant because of illegal entry or illegal presence in 
the country. Thus illegal entry is not a bar to claiming asylum and in principle 
it does not prejudice admission into the procedure for determining refugee 
status or the outcome of that process.
2.3 Post-1951 expansion
During the early postwar years a series of refugee crises around the world was 
met by a range of different initiatives and organisations. These included the 
UNRWA (1949), which focused on resettling Palestinians, the UN Korean 
Reconstruction Agency (UNKRA) (1950), which focused on rehabilitation 
in the Korean peninsula, as well as the Intergovernmental Committee for 
European Migration (ICEM) (1951) and the United States Escapee Program 
17 This follows from the fact that an asylum applicant must be afforded refugee protection unless or 
until their claim is rejected, see Hathaway, 2005, pp. 303–4.
10 Seeking Asylum: Trends and Policies in the OECD 
(1952), which focused on refugees from the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. 
These all used different definitions of what it meant to be a refugee and on what 
terms refugees would be accepted. As part of its Cold War strategy the United 
States backed these international initiatives.18 From the 1950s US support 
swung increasingly towards the funding of UNHCR projects in countries with 
liberal asylum policies. This was particularly important in the refugee crisis 
created by the Soviet suppression of the Hungarian uprising of 1956, which 
killed 3,000 and drove another 200,000 into exile.19
Despite its support for certain international initiatives, the United States did 
not sign the Refugee Convention, and instead developed its own domestic 
refugee resettlement programme. Against the background of the restrictive 
immigration policy established in the 1920s, this involved a series of legislative 
measures combined with ad hoc responses to refugee crises.20 These initiatives 
were seen as an extension of foreign policy and they were focused on those 
fleeing communism – something that was enshrined in the 1948 Displaced 
Persons Act and the 1953 Refugee Relief Act (Bockley, 1995–6). Between 1956 
and 1968 over 233,000 were admitted, most of whom were from communist 
countries and very few of whom had spontaneously migrated to the United 
States (Loescher, 2001, p. 55). Hence Cubans were favoured over Haitians 
and Eastern Europeans over Latin Americans. Even after a refugee quota was 
incorporated into immigration policy, the bulk of refugees were admitted 
on the basis of executive orders and the overwhelming majority were from 
communist countries.21 The United States finally incorporated the terms of 
the Refugee Convention formally into its domestic legislation in the Refugee 
Act of 1980.22
In the 1960s the focus of international refugee assistance shifted to conflicts 
in the third world. In Africa there were independence struggles starting with 
18 It is notable that there was no support for the massive but strategically unimportant displacements 
in the Indian subcontinent.
19 UNCHR involvement in a post-1950 displacement was justified on the grounds that the root 
cause of the uprising was the establishment of the communist regime in 1947–8. This rationale 
similarly applied in the ‘Prague Spring’ of 1968. Interventions outside Europe could not be 
justified in this way, but beginning with the assistance to refugees flooding into Hong Kong in 
the years following the founding of the People’s Republic of China, the UNHCR used its ‘good 
offices’ to provide assistance and coordinate humanitarian efforts (Loescher et al., 2008, pp. 23–
5).  The UNHCR ‘good offices’ interventions were originally sanctioned on a case-by-case basis but 
a formal mandate was provided by the UN General Assembly in 1959.
20 These ad hoc measures were executive decisions that took the form of the use of parole by the 
authority of the Attorney General. This was originally intended to provide temporary protection 
on case-by-case basis, but it was expanded from the Hungarian crisis of 1956 to provide 
resettlement to groups of refugees chosen at the discretion of the executive.
21 Refugees were first brought into immigration policy as a new preference group in the 1965 
Amendments to the Immigration and Nationality Act (of 1952), with a quota of up to 10,200. The 
legislative background from 1948 up to the 1980 Refugee Act is described by Anker and Posner 
(1981–2). Of 615,500 refugees admitted between 1968 and 1980, 99% were from communist 
countries (Bockley, 1995–6, p. 272).
22 Although the USA is not a signatory to the Convention it did accede to the 1967 Protocol (see 
below), but its provisions were not incorporated into US law until the 1980 Act.
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Algeria (1959–62) and including the Portuguese colonies (Angola, Guinea 
Bissau and Mozambique) and Rhodesia, among others. In countries where 
independence came relatively quickly there were often extended post-colonial 
civil wars that created substantial cross-border displacements. Of particular 
importance were displacements in West Africa (from Ghana, Nigeria), in 
East Africa (from Ethiopia, Sudan), in the Great Lakes region (from Burundi, 
Rwanda) and above all from the Congo. By the end of the decade the stock 
of refugees in Africa had risen to nearly a million. These refugee crises drew 
growing assistance for relief and repatriation from international organisations. 
But developed countries were reluctant to resettle refugees, first because the 
independence conflicts involved some European countries, but also because 
refugees outside Europe were not covered by the Convention.23
In 1967 a United Nations conference in New York produced a Protocol which 
radically extended the provisions of the Convention to include refugees who 
were displaced after 1950 and those who were displaced outside Europe.24 In 
1960 22 states had signed the Refugee Convention but by 1970 the number that 
had ratified either the Convention or the Protocol (which subsumed Articles 2 
to 34 of the Convention) had increased to 60. That number increased further 
to 83 by 1980, 107 by 1990, and 138 by 2000. The Convention has now been 
signed by 147 countries, a total that includes the whole of the developed world 
and most of the rest of the world.25 The growth in international cooperation 
for refugees was also reflected in the adoption by the Organisation of African 
Unity (OAU) of a separate refugee convention agreed in Addis Ababa in 1969 
(effective 1974), which defined refugees more broadly and also broadened the 
non-refoulement clause.26
The 1970s saw major refugee crises in Asia, notably during the break-up of 
Pakistan, which pushed 10 million Bangladeshis over the border into India. 
While the Bangladeshis were almost all repatriated, refugees from other 
conflicts, such as the Asians ejected from Uganda by Idi Amin and the Chileans 
fleeing the Pinochet regime, increasingly found resettlement in Western 
countries. But the largest resettlement in the West was the result of conflict 
in Indochina. Following the withdrawal of the United States from Vietnam, 
a mounting number of refugees fled from war and oppression in Vietnam, 
Cambodia and Laos, reaching a peak in 1979–81. A quarter of a million of the 
ethnic Chinese found refuge in China, and many others ended up in camps 
23 In addition, many of the people caught up in post-independence wars were displaced internally, 
such as those from Biafra, and hence would not come under the definition of a refugee.
24 The Protocol was agreed as a separate instrument rather than a set of amendments to the 
Convention which would have required the approval of all the signatories. As a result it is possible 
accede to both or either.
25 The most important countries that have not acceded to the Convention are in the Middle East, 
South Asia and South East Asia. They include countries such as Egypt, India and Indonesia.
26 In particular it defines as refugees those fleeing from public order disturbances, civil war or foreign 
occupation whether or not they could establish a well founded fear of persecution. The text of the 
African convention can be found at www.asylumlaw.org/docs/international/Africa.PDF.
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on the Thai border. A growing number fled by boat, heading for the ASEAN 
(Association of Southeast Asian Nations) countries of Indonesia, Malaysia, the 
Philippines, Singapore and Thailand. These countries were not signatories 
to the Convention and by 1979 they were refusing to accept asylum seekers 
and ‘pushing back’ boats. Throughout the 1980s the refugees in the camps 
and especially the boat people attracted international media attention and 
eventually many of them were resettled in Western countries, particularly the 
United States, Canada and Australia as well as in Europe. Of the 2.5 million 
who were displaced, 1.3 million were resettled in the West (UNHCR, 2001 b, 
p. 99).27
The growing willingness of Western countries to intervene in refugee situations 
and to provide resettlement, something that had initially been driven by the 
Cold War agenda, was increasingly underpinned by the gathering momentum 
of the human rights movement. The year 1966 saw the launch of the so-called 
UN Bill of Rights which added to the 1948 Declaration a Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights and a Covenant on Economic Social and Cultural Rights. It 
entered into force in 1976 having been ratified by 72 countries. The American 
Convention on Human Rights declared in 1969 also established a long list of 
rights, including humane treatment, fair trials, and freedom of association and 
movement. It became effective in the Americas in 1978. Building on this and 
the OAU Convention, the Cartagena Declaration on Refugees was agreed in 
Colombia in 1984, with an expanded definition of a refugee and strengthened 
provisions for refugee protection.28 The significance of these instruments for 
asylum regimes resides more in the humanitarian spirit that they represent 
than in the specific application of their provisions – something that is reflected 
in other indicators such as the trebling of funding for the UNHCR between 
1977 and 1982, the growth of refugee related non-governmental organisations, 
and the award of the Nobel Peace Prize to Amnesty International in 1977. And 
it is worth noting also the close fit between the human rights agenda and the 
definition of a refugee as a persecuted individual rather than only as part of a 
group displaced by war – cold or otherwise.
In the 1980s there were ongoing conflicts in Asia, notably in Afghanistan, 
in the Horn of Africa (Ethiopia, Somalia and Sudan) and South America 
(Nicaragua, El Salvador and Guatemala). These conflicts received widespread 
attention and some of them began to generate flows of ‘spontaneous’ asylum 
seekers. Around half a million Central Americans fled to the United States, 
although only a minority were recognised as refugees. In Europe spontaneous 
arrivals of asylum seekers fleeing the Iran/Iraq war and civil wars in Lebanon 
and Sri Lanka boosted total applications. More important still were the 
27 The decade-long crisis was eventually brought to an end in 1990 with the UNHCR-brokered 
Comprehensive Plan of Action. This struck a deal between the USA and ASEAN nations involving 
a mixture of resettlement and repatriation.
28 The text can be found at www.asylumlaw.org/docs/international/CentralAmerica.PDF.
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consequences of the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 and the dissolution of the 
Soviet Union in 1991. Together these events unleashed a refugee crisis within 
Europe on a scale not seen since 1945. The immediate impact was a surge of 
refugees from Central and Eastern Europe, with some 4 million displaced by 
the break-up of the former Yugoslavia alone. In the former Soviet Union there 
were conflicts in the Caucasus (notably in Chechnya) and the Central Asian 
republics, as well as widespread displacement of ethnic Russians.29 Not only 
did these events trigger a flow of asylum seekers into Western Europe, they also 
had the indirect effect of opening a corridor for the transit of asylum seekers 
from more distant countries in the Middle East and Asia.
By the early 1990s the refugee regime that had been built on the 1951 
Convention and that had expanded over four decades was under severe 
strain. On the one hand, the number of asylum applications had increased 
dramatically, while, on the other hand, the willingness of Western countries 
to accept refugees went into decline. This led to a policy ‘backlash’ which 
involved the tightening of asylum policies in the developed world and 
especially in Western Europe. The backlash involved enhanced border controls, 
stiffer refugee status determination procedures and tougher treatment of 
asylum seekers generally. These developments are discussed in more detail 
in Chapter 6, but on a broader level they reflect a number of forces. One is 
that, with the ending of the Cold War, refugees are no longer seen as escaping 
communism and thus any strategic value attached to them has evaporated. 
Furthermore the motivations of asylum seekers arriving spontaneously from 
a variety of countries and conflicts have become less clear and the case for 
the granting of permanent settlement is less obvious. Added to this, the rise 
in illegal immigration, coupled with the September 11, 2001 attacks in the 
United States, has exacerbated fears that asylum seekers from conflict-ridden 
countries present not only an economic burden and a social problem, but 
possibly also a security risk.
To summarize, the first half of the 20th century saw the development of a 
refugee protection regime that was profoundly influenced by the two great 
European wars. The Refugee Convention of 1951 was a product of its time and 
it was an important element of refugee policy during the Cold War. The growth 
of humanitarian concerns and awareness of refugee situations outside Europe 
led to its adoption into law and subsequent adaptation to local circumstances 
by most of the countries of the world. In the last two decades it has produced 
what some see as unintended consequences that have put asylum systems in 
Western countries under severe strain. Sixty years after the Convention was 
first agreed the applicability of the system that was built upon it is now being 
called into question.
29 For a comparison of post-Soviet displacements with earlier ethnic unmixings, see Brubaker, 1995.

3 How Many Refugees?
In this chapter I outline trends in the total numbers of asylum seekers and 
refugees and their distribution by source and destination. These are taken 
from the database of the UNHCR which, as part of its mandate, collects 
comprehensive statistics on refugees and asylum seekers. These are collected 
from individual governments as well as from the UNHCR’s own operations. It 
is worth reiterating that the main focus here is on the flow of asylum applicants 
into the developed world, although I also look at refugees worldwide.
3.1 Asylum applications
Figure 3.1 plots the time profile of the number of asylum applications to 
‘industrialized countries’ – essentially the OECD plus a few others. These are 
first instance claims. They are almost always submitted within or at the border 
of the destination country by applicants who have arrived spontaneously 
rather than having been transferred through the agency of organisations such 
as the UNHCR. Total applications increased dramatically from around 100,000 
per annum in the mid-1980s to a peak of 850,000 in 1992. After some decline 
the number reached a second peak of 600,000 in 2001. Since that time the 
number has halved, representing a return to figures last seen in the 1980s. 
One of the key issues, examined at length in Chapter 8, is to what extent the 
decline in applications after 2001 was the result of the policy backlash in the 
developed world.
The figure also shows how these applications were divided among the receiving 
regions. The overwhelming majority claimed asylum in Europe, principally 
the 15 countries of the pre-enlargement European Union. The sharp rise to 
the peak in 1992 was largely accounted for by the EU-15, as was the ensuing 
decline and subsequent fluctuation. Over the 30-year period two-thirds of all 
applications were submitted in the EU-15. Also notable is the increase after 
the mid-1990s in applications to other European countries, which account for 
16 Seeking Asylum: Trends and Policies in the OECD
more than 10% of all applications. Some countries that had previously been 
sources of asylum applications subsequently became destinations, particularly 
the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Turkey.
Figure 3.2 shows the profile of asylum applications by region of origin up to 
2006.30 Over the whole period, 37% of applicants originated in Asia, while 
17% came from Africa and another 10% came from Latin America and the 
Caribbean. Europe accounted for 28% and these originated almost entirely 
from Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union. The sharp spike in total 
applications in 1992 was largely the product of events that followed the 
collapse of the Soviet Union and the fall of the Berlin Wall. But there are also 
milder humps in applications from Africa and Asia, one in 1990–3 and one a 
decade later.






















Sources: 1980–1: UNHCR, 2001a, Table V.1, V.2; 1982–2005: UNHCR, Statistical Yearbook, 2001 and 2005, 
Table C1; 2006–9: UNHCR, ‘Asylum Levels and Trends in Industrialized Countries, 2009’, Table 1.
30 Figures for the last few years are not available by source region.
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Source: 1980–1: UNHCR, 2001a, Table V.4, V.5; 1982–2005: UNHCR, Statistical Yearbook, 2001 and 2005, 
Tables C2; 2006: UNHCR, ‘Asylum Levels and Trends in Industrialized Countries, 2006’, Table 1.
Table 3.1 shows annual applications for 19 leading destination countries in 
five-year periods from 1987–91 to 2002–6. Together they account for 95% 
of all applications received by industrialised countries over the two decades, 
and they form the basis for the analysis of asylum policies over the period 
1997–2006 in Chapter 8. Among these countries, the largest number of 
applications was received by Germany with 27% of the 19-country total. This 
was followed by the US with 14%, the UK with 10% and France with 8%. There 
are some notable differences in the trends between countries. Thus Austria and 
Germany, both until recently on the EU’s eastern border, show very different 
patterns. In Austria the numbers fell from 1987–91 to 1992–6 but rose in each 
subsequent five-year period, whereas in Germany the pattern was exactly the 
opposite. In the UK the numbers increased until 1997–2001 and then fell, 
whereas in France the number fell to 1992–6 and rose thereafter. In the 1990s 
there was a surge in asylum applications to relatively new destinations such as 
Ireland and Italy as well as to countries that would later join the EU: the Czech 
Republic, Hungary and Poland.
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to 2002–61987–1991 1992–1996 1997–2001 2002–2006
Australia 7,381 10,470 4,015 –61.7
Austria 19,835 7,795 17,807 26,432 48.4
Belgium 9,460 16,547 27,355 15,730 –42.5
Canada 35,003 26,448 30,821 28,176 –8.6
Czech Republic 1,553 8,059 6,504 –19.3
Denmark 4,377 9,176 10,301 3,615 –64.9
France 45,128 24,044 33,547 51,541 53.6
Germany 146,189 226,461 92,992 41,448 –55.4
Hungary 283 7,232 2,826 –60.9
Ireland 419 6,639 6,587 –0.8
Italy 2,376 14,305 11,770 –17.7
Netherlands 15,534 31,949 39,773 13,734 –65.5
Norway 5,636 4,946 11,086 10,421 –6.0
Poland 1,213 3,796 6,248 64.6
Spain 5,571 9,345 7,490 5,665 –24.4
Sweden 24,963 31,008 14,911 25,875 73.5
Switzerland 25,906 18,771 29,919 16,356 –45.3
UK 27,994 38,900 76,340 52,488 –31.2
US 63,694 129,571 44,223 35,913 –18.8
Total 588,186 487,066 365,345 –25.0
Source: For 1987 to 1996, UNHCR, Statistical Yearbook, 2001, Annexes C1 and C2; for 1997 to 2006: 
UNHCR, Statistical Yearbook, 2005 and UNHCR, ‘Asylum Levels and Trends in Industrialized Countries, 
2006’. 
Of particular relevance to what follows later are the diverse trends in 
applications over the last two five-year periods. As shown in the last column of 
the table, between 1997–2001 and 2001–6 total applications in these countries 
declined by 25%. Against this benchmark the fall of 31% for the UK hardly 
seems dramatic. But there is wide variation in the trends for other countries. 
Applications fell by more than 60% in Australia, Denmark, Hungary and the 
Netherlands, while they increased by more than 50% in France, Poland and 
Sweden and by nearly 50% in Austria. This diversity in trends could be the 
result of the country’s specific location, the source country composition of its 
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applicants, or of changes in labour market conditions. But it could also be the 
result of differences in asylum policies – something that will be investigated 
in Chapter 8.




















Source: 1982–2004: UNHCR, Statistical Yearbook, 2001 and 2004, Annex C29; 2005–6: UNHCR Statistical 
Yearbook, 2006, Tables C8–C10.
A key element of asylum policy, and the most important issue for asylum seekers, 
is the outcome of the refugee status determination procedure. Figure 3.3 shows 
the time profile of decisions on refugee status for industrialized countries as 
a whole since 1982. These are decisions on first instance applications and 
they exclude applications that were withdrawn or lapsed before a decision 
was taken and they also exclude the results of appeals. Over the period from 
1982 to 2006 the proportion of decisions that resulted in recognition under 
the definition of the Refugee Convention was 18%. A further 10%, while not 
qualifying as Convention refugees, were allowed to stay on humanitarian 
grounds, sometimes on less favourable terms. The total recognition rate 
(Convention plus humanitarian, as a share of all decisions) fell from over 50% 
in 1982 to less than 20% in 1990 before rising again. In recent years it has 
hovered around a quarter. Even accounting for those that were successful on 
appeal (about 5% of all cases), around two-thirds of all claims end in rejection. 
The question of what happens to those who are unsuccessful and those who 
are successful is taken up again in Chapter 10.
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3.2 The stock of refugees
Figure 3.4 plots the UNHCR’s estimates of the total stock of refugees by the 
continent in which they are located from 1970 to 2009.31 In the early 1970s 
the total was a little over 2 million – similar to the numbers in the 1950s 
and 1960s. It then climbed steeply to a peak of 18 million in 1992, after 
which there is an uneven decline to less than 9 million in 2009. Although 
the number has fallen steeply since the early 1990s it is still three and a half 
times that of the early 1970s. On a per capita basis the trend would be rather 
less steep. Relative to the world’s population the number of refugees increased 
from 0.7 per thousand in 1970 to 3.4 per thousand in 1990 and then fell to 1.4 
per thousand in 2009.























Source: 1970–99: UNHCR, 2001 b, Annex 3; 2000–2005: UNHCR, Statistical Yearbook, 2005, Table A5; 
2006–9: calculated from UNHCR, Global Trends: Refugees, Asylum-Seekers, Returnees, Internally 
Displaced and Stateless Persons, 2006–9 , Table 1 .
Perhaps the most striking feature is the similarity between the time profile of 
the stock of refugees and the flow of asylum applications to the developed 
countries that was illustrated in Figures 3.1 and 3.2. This is a strong indication 
that the flow of asylum applications to industrialised countries is driven by 
the same forces that underpin the ups and downs of refugee displacements 
worldwide. However, the overall trend in asylum applications is somewhat 
31 The UNHCR includes as refugees those who are recognised under the Refugee Convention (or 
the OAU Convention), those granted protection on humanitarian grounds and those granted 
temporary protection in the case of a large-scale influx. It does not include asylum seekers with 
cases pending or internally displaced persons. Those permanently settled in safe countries usually 
cease being counted as refugees after about ten years.
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steeper. In 1980 the flow was 2% of the stock, increasing to 4.7% in 1992 and 
then reaching another peak of 5.5% in 2002. To some degree this reflects a 
growing ability to seek refuge further afield. But it is also driven by two other 
factors. One is the spillover into Western Europe from the turmoil in Eastern 
Europe and the former Soviet Union. The other is that repatriation rates for 
refugees increased sharply after the end of the Cold War, something that made 
an important contribution to the decline in the refugee stock during the 1990s.
A second striking feature of the figure is that, despite the increase in asylum 
flows to the West, around three-quarters of the world’s refugees are located 
in Asia and Africa – regions where an even greater share of them originated. 
Although refugees are by definition outside their country of origin, most 
of them do not get very far and the majority are located in neighbouring 
countries. According to the UNHCR more than half of the refugees counted in 
2008 were in ‘protracted refugee situations’. About 30% of refugees, particularly 
those in Africa, are located in camps, sometimes under appalling conditions 
where they lack basic necessities and where there is little security. As a result 
the refugee burden still falls disproportionately on some of the world’s poorest 
countries.
This is illustrated in Table 3.2 which compares some of the poorer countries 
carrying the greatest refugee burdens with the major OECD refugee hosts. At 
the top of the left-hand column are Syria, Iran, Pakistan and Jordan, each 
hosting more than half a million refugees. As the second column shows, for 
Syria and Jordan, this is more than 50 per thousand of the population. As the 
right-hand column shows, on a per capita basis the largest refugee hosts in 
the developed world are Germany, Norway and Sweden with more than seven 
per thousand. These figures are comparable to some of the poorer nations in 
the left-hand column. However this hardly reflects the capacity to provide 
for refugees. Accordingly, the third column in each panel reports the ratio 
of the number of refugees to the country’s GDP in millions of international 
dollars. Among the poorer countries Syria, Jordan and Chad have more than 
ten refugees per million dollars while Tanzania, Kenya and the Congo have 
more than five refugees per million dollars. By contrast the maximum among 
developed countries is around 0.2 refugees per million dollars.
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Syria 1105.7 50.47 11.71 Ger many 582.7 7.09 0.20
Iran 980.1 13.21 1.20 UK 292.1 4.74 0.13
Pakistan 765.7 9.85 1.74 United States 279.5 0.89 0.02
Jordan 500.4 79.22 16.08 Canada 173.7 5.17 0.13
Tanzania 321.9 7.36 5.99 France 160.0 2.57 0.08
Kenya 320.6 8.05 5.31 Nether lands 77.6 4.68 0.11
Chad 302.7 29.49 18.78 Sweden 77.0 8.33 0.23
China 301.0 0.22 0.04 Italy 47.1 0.79 0.03
Saudi Arabia 240.6 9.35 0.41 Switzer land 46.1 6.10 0.15
India 184.5 0.15 0.06 Austria 37.6 4.49 0.11
Sudan 181.6 4.30 2.07 Norway 36.1 7.50 0.14
Uganda 162.1 4.96 4.39 Den mark 23.4 4.28 0.11
D. R. Congo 155.2 2.35 7.52 Australia 20.9 0.98 0.03
Yemen 140.2 5.94 2.53 Belgium 17.0 1.60 0.04
Nepal 122.3 4.26 3.87 Poland 12.8 0.34 0.02
Source: UNHCR, Statistical Yearbook, 2008, Tables 1 and 25; International Monetary Fund, World 
Economic Outlook Database.
Perhaps a better measure of the ability of countries to host refugee populations 
would be to express the number of refugees as a ratio to the excess of total 
GDP over and above the amount required for a modest standard of living. 
If we were to set that level at a thousand dollars per capita per year then the 
contrast becomes even starker. The ratio of refugees per million dollars of 
‘surplus’ income is 32.3 for Tanzania, 15.6 for Kenya, 51.7 for Chad and 43.0 
for Uganda, and the figure for the Congo is negative. On the other hand, 
the figures for the developed countries in the right-hand column increase 
only slightly. This serves to further highlight the limited capacity of poor 
countries, particularly in Africa, to host refugees. And it puts into even sharper 
perspective the burdens that developed countries bear in comparison to the 
poorest countries.
4 Conflict and Persecution
As the preceding chapter illustrated, there was a secular increase in both the 
flow of asylum applications and the stock of refugees up to the early 1990s, 
followed by a somewhat uneven decline. It is possible that these trends simply 
reflect the growing ability of refugees to escape across the border and to seek 
refuge in more distant countries and continents rather than that the root 
causes of refugee flights have intensified. Here I examine the global trends in 
those conditions that form the background to refugee displacements: war and 
terror, political upheaval and human rights abuses.
4.1 War and terror
The most obvious cause of displacement is armed conflict. There are a number 
of different indicators of the prevalence and intensity of wars and they agree 
that armed conflict was on the increase until the early 1990s, after which it 
declined.34 The total number of ongoing major conflicts increased from 15 in 
1970 to 30 in 1980 and 40 in 1990 before declining to 26 in 2000. However 
these differ widely by the nature of the wars and their scope, intensity and 
duration.
One measure of the total quantum of conflict is presented in Figure 4.1. 
Each episode of conflict is given a score, ranging from 1 to 7, that reflects the 
scale of the conflict and its overall societal impact.35  A score of one denotes 
‘sporadic or expressive political violence’ – effectively low-level violence by 
small militant groups. Examples would be periodic outbreaks of violence in 
places as diverse as Northern Ireland, Pakistan or Nigeria. A score of 7 denotes 
‘pervasive warfare’ – full-scale wars that consume the entire society. Examples 
34 Theoretical and measurement issues in civil wars are surveyed in Collier and Hoefler, 2007, and 
Blattman and Miguel, 2010.
35 This index was constructed as part of a project on Armed Conflict and Intervention (see Marshall, 
1999, 2002). The coding scheme for conflicts can be found at www.systemicpeace.org/warcode.htm.
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are Vietnam 1958–75, Cambodia 1975–9, Afghanistan 1978–present, and 
Rwanda 1994. The scores are then aggregated across all episodes to give the 
total for a given year.36
The top line shows the profile of total societal impact of all types of conflict 
since 1946. Contrary to popular belief, the Cold War period witnessed a secular 
rise in violence, often associated with proxy wars, independence struggles and 
post-colonial internal conflicts. The escalating level of violence reached a peak 
between 1984 and 1992 and has since declined substantially so that by 2007 
the index had returned to levels last seen in the late 1960s. The independence 
wars of the 1960s and 1970s gave way in the 1980s to interstate wars, often 
involving recently independent states. But while interstate wars declined 
from the mid-1980s, civil wars began to decline only in the early 1990s. These 
local struggles often reflect long-standing ethnopolitical tensions that were 
unleashed by the ending of the Cold War – the most prominent case being the 
break-up of the former Yugoslavia.
























Source: Marshall and Cole, 2009, p. 5. Data kindly provided by Monty Marshall.
36 These scores do not account for year-to-year variations in intensity for a given conflict nor are 
they weighted by the size of the populations affected.
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Table 4.1 Armed conflicts for self-determination
New armed 
conflicts






1966–1970 5 15 2 0
1971–1975 11 23 0 3
1976–1980 10 31 2 0
1981–1985 7 37 0 1
1986–1990 11 43 2 3
1991–1995 20 45 9 9
1996–2000 6 38 7 7
2001–2006 8 26 15 6
Source: Quinn, 2008, Table 5.1.
What lies behind these trends can be seen in Table 4.1, which shows the 
starts and ends of conflicts for self-determination. Consistent with Figure 4.1, 
the number of ongoing conflicts reached a peak in the late 1980s and early 
1990s, as did the number of new armed conflicts. But these upheavals, often 
secessionist or irredentist outbreaks in recently emancipated multi-ethnic 
states, diminished in the 1990s. As the table shows, the number of conflicts 
either contained or settled rose dramatically from the 1990s. Some of these 
settlements have been the result of overwhelming force of arms (Tamil Nadu, 
Banda Aceh, Chechnya) and some have been settled by the creation of new 
states (ranging from the Yugoslavian successor states and Eritrea to Timor Leste 
and Southern Sudan). A wide range of conflicts have been contained through 
negotiation or mediation, leading to a sometimes uneasy peace (Quinn, 2008). 
One implication of these trends is that, with a few exceptions, post-Cold War 
conflicts are less protracted, which suggests that refugee displacements may be 
less sustained than in the past.
Violence and oppression is not only the result of war; human rights abuses 
and absence of the rule of law are often prevalent even when there is no 
outright war. An alternative index that measures human rights abuses more 
widely is the Political Terror Scale (see Wood and Gibney, 2010). This measures 
terror imposed or created by the state – something that is consistent with the 
definition of a refugee as someone in fear of persecution by state agents. It 
measures abuses against physical integrity such as extrajudicial killing, torture, 
political imprisonment, kidnapping and other forms of coercive repression. 
It attempts to capture on a five-point scale the scope, intensity and range of 
human rights abuses. Thus a score of 4 would be where ‘murders disappearances 
and torture are part of life’ and 5 would be where this extends to the whole 
society without restraint (Wood and Gibney, 2010, p. 373).
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Source: Derived from Political Terror Scale at www.politicalterrorscale.org/
download.php. This is based on a constant set of countries, constituted as at 
2009. Where countries have split, the country index before its dissolution is 
applied for that period to each successor state.
Figure 4.2 shows that the number of countries rated over 3 on this scale 
(labelled High Terror) increased from the mid-20s in the late 1970s to a peak 
of over 50 in 1993–4 before declining to an average of around 40 in the 2000s. 
The number of countries that evince extreme terror, as measured by values 
in excess of 4, show a similar pattern, rising from 6 or 7 to a peak of over 20 
followed by some decline. While they follow a similar pattern to the indices 
of warfare, they do suggest that there has been less moderation in human 
rights abuses than in outright war. Indeed, if we take the average scores rather 
than the number of extreme cases then there is even less evidence of decline. 
For middle income countries the average score falls from 2.7 in 1992 to 2.5 in 
2009 and for low income countries there is even a slight increase from 3.1 to 
3.2. However these measures must be taken with some caution as they include 
a large number of countries (and some very small countries) with very low 
levels of human rights abuse.
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4.2 Democracy and liberty























Source: Marshall and Cole, 2009, p. 11. Data kindly provided by Monty Marshall.
Terror, insecurity and human rights abuses have deeper causes, and they 
are often associated with the repressive political regimes of authoritarian 
governments. Figure 4.3 shows the percentage of all countries whose political 
regimes are classified as autocratic, democratic or transitional (anocracies). 
These data are derived from the Polity IV database where each country is 
scored according to the authority characteristics of its political institutions. 
Anocracies fall somewhere in the middle with a combination of autocratic 
and democratic characteristics; these are often polities with weak institutions 
that may be more prone to civil conflict than those that are more settled. 
Recent research shows that partial autocracy and partial democracy are the 
best predictors of conflict (Gates et al, 2006; Goldstone et al, 2010).
Figure 4.3 is based on the number of countries in each category and so it takes 
no account of the relative size and number of the countries or of different 
degrees of democracy or autocracy. The figure shows that for most of the period 
since the 1960s democracies have been in a minority; however their share 
has grown strongly since the mid-1980s. The share of autocracies strongly 
increased up to the mid-1970s after which the trend was reversed, with an 
especially sharp decline during the 1980s. Perhaps most notable is the increase 
from the late 1980s of mixed or transitional regimes, which as we have seen, 
have the potential to generate refugees.
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Source: Freedom House: www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=439. Note that the original index has 
been inverted so that higher values represent greater freedom.
A related measure is the Freedom House index of political rights and civil 
liberties, which is plotted in Figure 4.4. This is the average for all countries 
in the world, individually scored on a scale of 1 to 7 where higher numbers 
represent greater freedom. This is related to both the institutional structure 
and events and actions, including those of non-state actors. Political freedom 
relates to electoral processes, political participation and the functioning of 
government. Civil liberties relates to freedom of expression and association, 
the rule of law, and personal autonomy. Consistent with the trends observed 
in political regimes these measures also show a general increase in rights and 
freedoms since the 1970s, with sharp improvements in political rights during 
the 1980s, followed by some levelling out from the 1990s. Improvements 
in civil liberties may of course work in different directions: while they may 
reduce the incentive to leave a country, they may also widen the opportunities 
for doing so.
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4.3 Conflict and asylum





























Source: Hatton, 2009, p. F186.
The effects of conflict can be clearly seen in the profiles of asylum applications 
from individual countries. Figure 4.5 plots these numbers (using a log scale to 
aid comparability) for five particularly strife-prone nations. Applications from 
Serbia and Montenegro exhibit a steep rise during the 1980s followed by the 
peaks associated with the Bosnian war of 1992–3 and the 1988–9 conflict in 
Kosovo. Similarly the profile of Iraqi applications shows a rise during the first 
Gulf War of 1990–1 as well as a sustained flow leading up to the invasion of 
2003. There is a steep rise in applications from Afghanistan in the late 1980s, 
associated with the end of the Soviet occupation, with a further increase 
leading up to the war against the Taliban. In the years since 2006 there is 
another increase reflecting a further intensification of the war – in contrast to 
the fall in applications from Iraq, where hostilities were winding down. There 
are peaks in the early 1990s for applications from Lebanon, associated with the 
Syrian intervention, and for Ethiopia during the conflict over the secession of 
Eritrea.
These examples illustrate, not surprisingly, that major conflicts leave a very 
clear imprint on asylum applications from the countries concerned. But for 
several reasons the correspondence between conflict and refugee flights is 
far from uniform. One reason is that refugee flights often occur in bursts at 
different stages in a conflict, something that can be illustrated by the wars 
in the Horn of Africa. In the Eritrean conflict the exodus of refugees began 
in 1967, six years after the onset of guerrilla war but before the revolution 
30 Seeking Asylum: Trends and Policies in the OECD
of 1974. Refugees subsequently fled from Tigray, notably in 1984–5, not just 
because of escalating violence but also because of famine. Prior to this they 
had been reluctant as Christians to move into Muslim Northern Sudan. In the 
Ogaden conflict refugees fled not during but after the recapture of the Ogaden 
by Ethiopian forces, largely because they feared reprisals. And in 2000 renewed 
hostilities between Ethiopia and the recently independent Eritrea brought a 
sharp burst of Eritrean displacements. Many of those who were displaced had 
been refugees before and thus had less hesitation in fleeing a second time 
(Bariagaber, 2006, ch. 3).
As these and numerous other examples illustrate, the number of refugees 
generated during a conflict depends on the ethnopolitical nature of the 
conflict, whether ordinary households are targeted, and the degree to which 
the violence is generalised. In some conflicts the number of refugees generated 
is modest compared with the number of those who are internally displaced. 
Such examples occur where the conflict is far from an international border, 
where there are greater possibilities for internal flight, and where there are 
limited prospects for safety and security in neighbouring countries. For 
example, in 2000 there were around 400,000 Sudanese refugees but over 4 
million were internally displaced. For African countries more generally, the 
number of internally displaced is around three times the number of refugees, 
while for Asia and the Pacific the proportions are reversed (UNHCR, Statistical 
Yearbook, 2008, p. 68).
As noted in Chapter 3, only a small fraction of those fleeing conflict and 
persecution become asylum seekers in the OECD. For destitute refugees in camps 
in continental interiors such as those in Darfur or the Congo, it is particularly 
difficult to escape. For those with access to resources who are fleeing from 
countries that are closer to Europe or North America, or with access to air or 
sea routes, there are greater possibilities for escape. So the proportion arriving 
in the West as asylum seekers varies widely in comparison with the scale of 
the persecution and the conflicts that generated them. Nevertheless virtually 
every conflict anywhere in the world is represented in the asylum statistics 
and the determinants of the ebb and flow of these numbers are investigated 
in the next chapter.
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As the previous chapter showed, war, political turmoil, violent oppression and 
human rights abuses lie at the root of refugee flights. It is less clear precisely 
which dimensions of conflict and persecution are the most important and if 
economic and social factors also play a role. As the UNHCR recognises, ‘Many 
people leave their home countries for a combination of political, economic 
and other reasons. The mixture of motives is one factor creating a perception 
of widespread abuse of asylum systems, which is often manipulated by 
politicians and the media’ (2001b, p. 155). Such mixed motives are likely to be 
especially important among those who turn up as asylum seekers at the doors 
of the rich nations of the OECD rather than remaining stranded at their first 
port of call. While there is an extensive literature that documents and analyses 
the immediate causes that generate refugees, and sometimes the underlying 
conditions that created them, it is difficult to generalise from specific case 
studies. Neither is it possible in descriptive analysis to weigh the different 
underlying factors and relate them quantitatively to the volume of asylum 
applications. Still less clear is to what extent war, violence and socioeconomic 
trends can account for the long-term trends in applications that were observed 
in Chapter 3.
5.1 Previous studies
A number of studies have sought to assess the causes of refugee flights using 
quantitative analysis. Typically they use cross-country analysis to assess the 
relative effects of measures of conflict and socioeconomic variables. Such 
variables are sometimes seen as capturing elements of an exit–voice trade-off; 
whether to leave or instead to fight, resist or just lie low in the hope that a 
better future will emerge. One issue is the distinction between the proximate 
causes of refugee exodus, such as violence and terror, and the deeper structural 
37 This chapter closely follows Hatton, 2009, pp. F192–F195.
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conditions that give rise to these situations such as political authority, ethnic 
fractionalisation, poverty, inequality and resource endowments. A second issue 
is that some variables may be interpreted as intervening conditions. These are 
obstacles that intervene between the latent desire to escape and the ability to 
do so. For instance, people may want to escape from an authoritarian regime 
but find that repressive policies make departure more difficult.
In an important paper Schmeidl (1997) used regression analysis to explain the 
stock of refugees in over 100 countries during the 1970s and 1980s. She found 
that the most significant variables were those representing armed conflict, 
especially civil wars and genocide and politicide. In the presence of these forces, 
other variables representing political rights, civil liberties and ethnic tensions 
were generally not significant. This suggests that the conflict outcomes tend 
to overshadow the deeper causes of violence. Intervening factors (poverty, 
population density, geography) also proved to be unimportant unless they 
were interacted with some measure of conflict. But those interactions seem 
not to work in the ‘right’ direction, and Schmeidl (1997, p. 304) surmised 
that intervening conditions may be less important than some of the previous 
literature had suggested. Further research has largely confirmed those results. 
Davenport et al (2003) and Moore and Shellman (2005) provide fixed effects 
estimates for the net refugee stock, including the internally displaced, for over 
100 countries. Both studies find that conflict, genocide and protest were the 
most influential variables, as well as finding some role for political transitions 
towards democracy.
These studies focus on the (absolute) stock of refugees rather than on the flow 
of asylum seekers to the developed world. By contrast, Neumayer (2005b) 
analysed asylum applications to Western Europe by country of origin. The 
results indicate that asylum flows are largely explained by the same variables 
that generate total refugee displacements. Like Moore and Shellman (2005) he 
found that an index of political terror was highly significant, and in addition 
that autocracy had a positive effect on asylum flows. He also found negative 
effects for the level and change in origin country GDP per capita, while the 
share of prime age population and the cumulative stock of past applicants were 
positive influences. A comparison of the results suggests that some variables 
such as genocides, famines and natural disasters mainly generate internal and 
cross-border displacements rather than longer distance flights.38 On the other 
hand, economic and demographic factors seem to be more important for 
longer distance migrations.
38 However, Moore and Shellman (2006) find that civil war and high levels of dissident violence and 
government terror increase the number of refugees relative to the number internally displaced.
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5.2 A sample of countries
Previous studies have provided valuable insights but they have focused 
mainly on cross-country variation in the conditions that generate refugee 
displacements and asylum applications. While these have implications for 
trends over time, very little effort has been made to model those changes 
directly. Here I examine a set of countries that generated substantial numbers 
of asylum applications at some time between 1982 and 2006. In this analysis I 
use five-year averages to minimise possible mismatch in timing between causes 
and outcomes. The key variables that might be expected to determine asylum 
applications are presented in Table 5.1. These are unweighted averages for 48 
countries. The figures in parentheses are for 56 countries, which include from 
1992–6 onwards some of the successor states to the Soviet Union, Yugoslavia 
and Czechoslovakia. The countries and the data sources are listed in the 
appendix to this chapter.
Table 5.1 Conditions in 48/56 origin countries, 1982–2006
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Source: See appendix to this chapter.
The variables in the first two rows of the table are indicators of war and terror 
that were discussed in the previous chapter. The third row reports a measure 
of political authority derived from the Polity IV database on the characteristics 
of political regimes and transitions between regimes. This is a composite index 
ranging from −10 (strongly autocratic) to +10 (strongly democratic). There is a 
strong upward trend for these countries, moving up from moderately autocratic 
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in 1982–6 to mildly democratic in 2002–6. The Freedom House indices of 
political rights and civil liberties are reported in rows (4) and (5), where (as 
in Figure 4.4) higher numbers mean greater freedom. In these countries, as at 
the global level, both political rights and civil liberties improved substantially 
over the period, a trend that according to previous studies should have been 
reducing the number of asylum applications.
Row (6) reports the trend in GDP per capita from the Penn World Tables 
in thousands of US dollars at 2000 prices. For these countries there is little 
increase until the most recent decade. As noted earlier, higher average income 
could make asylum migration more feasible but less desirable. If the latter 
effect dominates then that might help to explain some part of the decline in 
applications since the mid-1990s, although it will not account for the earlier 
upward trend. Row (7) shows the trend in average total population which, 
by increasing the populations at risk, must have imparted a long-run upward 
trend to the absolute number of asylum seekers. Row (8) shows the share of 
population in the migration intensive age group 20–39, possibly adding a 
further upward twist to total applications.
5.3 Regression results
These variables are used to explain the source country asylum applications to 
industrialised countries. I use the UNHCR’s data on first instance applications 
to industrialised countries, which, as noted earlier, are only a fraction of all 
refugee flights. The regressions presented in Table 5.2 take as the dependent 
variable the log of asylum applications per thousand of the source country 
population for each five-year period, using 48 source countries for 1982–6 and 
1987–91 and 56 countries for later periods.39 The regressions in columns (1) 
and (2) of Table 5.2 are estimated with random effects, while columns (3) and 
(4) use fixed effects. The latter are preferred on statistical grounds as they more 
clearly identify the effects of changes over time in the explanatory variables.
In these regressions the civil rights variable was never significant, largely 
because it is highly correlated with political rights. Similarly the share of 
population aged 20–39 was never significant and so both these variables 
were dropped from the analysis. By contrast, per capita income is always 
negative and significant, indicating that the poorer a country the more asylum 
applications it generates. This effect is strong even in the presence of political 
and conflict variables that are correlated with poverty, something that confirms 
the UNHCR’s view that economic motives are relevant in refugee flights. To 
39 The log form is used because the dependent variable is bounded at zero; hence using the log 
avoids predicting a negative number of applications. Restricting the sample to a constant set of 
48 countries makes very little difference to the results in Table 5.2.
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get a sense of the magnitude of this effect, an increase of a thousand dollars in 
a country’s per capita income would reduce its asylum applications by about 
15%. That would be equivalent to the difference in per capita income between 
Mali and Somalia or between Serbia and Angola.
Table 5.2 The source country determinants of asylum applications, 

























































































R2  within 0.41 0.49 0.50 0.49
      between 0.29 0.20
      overall 0.34 0.32
Hausman test 13.7 19.2
No of observations 264 264 264 264
Note: ‘z’ statistics in parentheses.
The index of political authority is positive and significant in the first two 
regressions. At first sight this suggests that the desire to escape from autocratic 
regimes is outweighed by the difficulty of doing so. But this variable becomes 
insignificant in the fixed effects model (column 3) and so it has little influence 
on changes over time. By contrast the index of political rights has a negative 
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effect that is more robust to different specifications.40 Thus lack of political 
rights appears to be a key ingredient that generates asylum applications, as 
many observers have suggested. Unsurprisingly war has a large positive effect 
in the first two regressions. According to column (1) an increase of one battle 
death per thousand of the population increases asylum applications by nearly a 
half. However in (2) when the terror scale is added to the model the coefficient 
on war deaths becomes insignificant and in the fixed effects model (3) the 
coefficient is close to zero. Not surprisingly, the degree of terror is a more 
powerful predictor of asylum flows than the scale of war, probably because 
the threats to civilians are only indirectly captured by military casualties. This 
effect is very large: going up one level on the terror scale increases asylum 
applications on the order of two-thirds.
The somewhat more parsimonious specification in column (4) can be used to 
gauge the effects of the key variables on the rise and fall in asylum applications 
by applying the coefficients to the changes implied by Table 5.1. Here I use 
a constant set of 48 countries and I report the unweighted average effect. 
On the upswing, the modest decline in per capita income between 1982–6 
and 1992–6 increased applications by about 9 %. Over the same period 
deteriorating political rights also increased applications by 9%, while the rise 
in political terror boosted average applications by 25%. On the downswing, 
between 1992–6 and 2002–6, these variables were pushing in the opposite 
direction. The growth in GDP per capita reduced average applications by 20%, 
the improvement in political rights reduced them by 8%, while the decline in 
political terror reduced applications by 15%. If these effects are added up they 
account for a 43% increase in applications between 1982–6 and 1992–6 and 
exactly the same percentage decrease between 1992–6 and 2002–6.
There are two other important effects. The first is the dummy for Europe which 
is reported in the first two columns.41 The European countries in the dataset 
are all in Eastern Europe and the coefficient implies that these countries 
generate a level of asylum applications on the order of three times that of 
the other countries, all else the same. This is undoubtedly because of their 
proximity to the countries of the EU. One might expect that this effect would 
have increased in size from the late 1980s onwards, especially after the fall of 
the Berlin Wall. But a dummy for Europe for 1987 onwards was not significant, 
either alone or in combination with a dummy for 2002 onwards for countries 
that joined the EU in 2004. What the result in Table 5.2 does imply, however, 
is that events occurring in Europe have a disproportionately large effect on the 
total number of asylum applications to industrialised countries.
40 The political authority variable is strongly correlated with the index of political rights (the 
correlation coefficient is 0.84). When the latter is excluded from the equation the coefficient on 
political authority becomes negative but it remains insignificant.
41 Other continental dummies were insignificant and so these were excluded from the regressions.
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The other effects worth noting are the period dummies that are reported 
towards the bottom of Table 5.2. The coefficients represent the effects relative 
to the reference period 1992–6. These are all negative but only that for 1982–6 
is significant. This implies that there was a doubling or threefold increase in 
asylum applications between 1982–6 and 1987–92 for reasons that are not 
associated with any of the explanatory variables in Table 5.2. Explaining this 
phenomenon is the subject of the next section.
5.4 What accounts for the big surge?
Much attention has been paid to the ups and downs in the number claiming 
asylum from the late 1980s onwards. As we have seen, a large part of the rise 
and fall over that period can be accounted for by a few key variables. One 
reason that the effects in total were so large, especially in the 1990s, is that the 
post-Soviet upheavals took place on the doorstep of the EU. But the real puzzle 
is the sharp upward shift in asylum applications in the 1980s that was seen 
in Table 5.2. It is particularly curious as the major conflicts of the 1980s took 
place in parts of the globe that were distant from most of the developed world, 
and particularly from Western Europe.
It is possible that the surge in asylum applications was the indirect result 
of policy. One hypothesis concerns the guest-worker policies that brought 
hundreds of thousands of workers to Germany and other European countries 
in the 1960s. It is sometimes argued that the abrupt ending of these policies in 
1973/4 led prospective migrants to switch to using the asylum channel as an 
alternative means of gaining access to European labour markets .42 However, 
there are two reasons for thinking that this effect cannot have been the key 
factor. The first is that there was a decade-long gap between the anwerbestopp 
and the surge in asylum numbers. Second, the ascent of asylum applications in 
the 1980s was not confined to the guest-worker countries, or even to countries 
in Europe. Nevertheless, certain guest-worker countries were affected, notably 
Turkey and Yugoslavia. Migration from these countries to Germany fell sharply 
after the early 1970s. But then there was a steep increase in immigration from 
Turkey, associated with the military coup d’état of 1980, after which migration 
fell abruptly. Similarly, there were surges from Yugoslavia to Germany, first 
in the early 1990s when war broke out in Bosnia, and then in 1999 with the 
conflict in Kosovo. Thus asylum migration was not simply a continuation of 
the guest-worker migration under another name.43 Rather, it was that, at times 
42 See, for example, Gibney and Hanson, 2005, p. 3; Gibney, 2004, pp. 95–6. One reason why this 
hypothesis holds so much appeal is the parallel with the surge of illegal immigration from Mexico 
that followed the ending of the Bracero Program for Mexican guest-workers (see Castles, 2004).
43 Analysing immigration to Germany from Turkey and Yugoslavia, Zimmermann (1996) found that 
both the cyclical sensitivity and the persistence of the flows declined after 1973.
38 Seeking Asylum: Trends and Policies in the OECD
of conflict, refugees from Turkey and Yugoslavia fled to places where there was 
already a well established expatriate population.
Other factors were more important in accounting for the worldwide surge. As 
we have seen (Figure 4.1), the late 1970s saw an increase in interstate wars, 
in which the West and especially the United States were involved. The war 
in Vietnam is the classic example and it ultimately resulted in the migration 
of significant numbers to the United States and other countries (mainly after 
the war had ended). And as noted in Chapter 2, from the late 1960s onwards, 
the expanding scope of the refugee regime, underpinned by the developing 
human rights agenda, led to a shift in international policy towards resettling 
refugees. This was bolstered by the mass media, which increasingly brought 
the plight of boat people and other refugees into the front rooms of millions 
in Western countries.44 It is also suggested that the widening access to air 
travel and the fall in its cost were fundamental in accounting for the long-
run increase in spontaneous asylum arrivals. The arrival of unsolicited asylum 
seekers by air undoubtedly grew in importance from the 1990s, but it was 
rather less important in the 1980s when most spontaneous asylum seekers 
arrived overland or by boat.
As with all migrations from poor to rich countries, once an initial stream 
gets started it builds cumulatively through chain migration effects. Once 
having formed a beachhead at the destination, the pioneer migrants provide 
information and assistance to subsequent waves of migrants. In an earlier 
study I found that one of the most important variables that explained the 
long-run upward trend in asylum applications during the 1980s and 1990s 
was the cumulative total of past arrivals from the same source (Hatton, 2004, 
p. 33). But it is important to recognise how this works in a context where 
those escaping conflict are from poor countries and may have lost whatever 
resources they once had, and where illegal entry to Western countries was 
becoming increasingly difficult. One key influence of the importance of 
diasporas is that they provide the resources to pay for the services of people 
smugglers and for other expenses to make intercontinental travel possible.45 
The access to such networks is one factor that often distinguishes those who 
manage to gain entry to the rich countries from those who remain marooned 
in refugee camps.
44 Writing in the mid-1980s Teitelbaum observed that ‘The coming of age of satellite television has 
globalized this concern, to the point that film clips of overloaded boats being pushed out into the 
South China Sea may have caused more concern in the United States than in Malaysia’ (1984, p. 
445).
45 One compilation of reports on the costs of human smuggling (Petros, 2005) found that the 
average cost to Europe was around $10,000 from Asia and around $6,500 from Africa. However 
these costs vary widely along different routes, for different means of transport and depending on 
the provision of other services such as false documents.
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Once in place, people smuggling networks fed asylum migration from the late 
1980s onwards. Stories about Mexican ‘coyotes’ smuggling migrants across 
the US border and the longer distance activities of Chinese ‘snakeheads’ are 
well known but are only the tip of the iceberg. The evidence suggests that, 
while there exist transnational operations linked to organised crime, most 
people smuggling is done through loose and flexible horizontal networks 
which connect the different stages and modes of travel. This involves not 
just guides and transport but also accommodation at ‘safe’ staging posts, the 
supply of forged passports and visas, and the connivance of corrupt officials. 
These networks have become more professional, more businesslike, and more 
specialised as border controls and policies to apprehend migrants and prosecute 
people smugglers have developed (UNODC, 2010, ch. 8). Not surprisingly the 
costs, risks and length of time involved have increased. Many potential illegal 
immigrants end up marooned in transit countries because they have been 
abandoned, apprehended or have run out of cash for the onward journey.
Nevertheless the deep channels that have been formed underpin the persistence 
in illegal migration. Those travelling to the United States largely come through 
(and from) Mexico, with other routes through the islands of the Caribbean. 
As several studies have demonstrated, stiffer enforcement on some parts of 
the US/Mexico border has deflected illegal migrants to different crossings and 
sometimes other methods, with consequences for the composition of the 
migrants and their length of stay (Cornelius, 2001; Hanson, 2006; Massey, 
2005). As far as Europe is concerned, one key route from the Middle East runs 
through Turkey and the Balkans, while routes from Asia run through the 
republics of the former Soviet Union from the east to Ukraine and Belarus. 
These too have adapted from the former routes that led into the EU (principally 
Germany and Austria) through transit countries such as Poland and Hungary, 
before they joined the EU (IOM, 2000). Long routes stretching back to Asia 
and Africa are one reason why the regressions results in Table 5.2 suggest that 
there was an upward shift in asylum applications from all source regions in the 
late 1980s and not just in those from Eastern European countries. Similarly, 
routes across the Mediterranean from North Africa stretch back to the sub-
Saharan regions of West and East Africa (De Hass, 2008). Since 2000, migration 
into Italy and Spain from countries like Libya, Morocco and Tunisia has been 
staunched by bilateral agreements and by tougher enforcement on land and 
sea. It remains to be seen how the revolutions in North Africa will increase the 
size and persistence of these flows.
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Appendix to Chapter 5: Data Sources
Asylum Seekers. The number of asylum applications by source country was 
obtained from the UNCR Statistical Online Population Database at www.unhcr.
org/statistics.html. The 56 countries that are represented in Table 5.1 and that 
underlie the regression analysis of Table 5.2 are as follows:
Afghanistan* Colombia* Islamic Rep. of 
Iran*
Romania*
Albania* Dem. Rep. of 
Congo*




Algeria* Cuba* Lebanon Serbia & 
Montenegro*
Angola* Czech Rep. Liberia* Sierra Leone*
Armenia* El Salvador* Macedonia* Slovakia
Azerbaijan* Ethiopia* Mali Somalia*




Bulgaria* Guatemala* Moldova* Syrian Arab Rep.*
Burundi Guinea* Nicaragua Togo
Cambodia Haiti* Nigeria* Turkey*
Cameroon* Hungary Pakistan* Uganda
Chile India* Peru Ukraine*
China* Iraq* Poland Viet Nam*
Note: Countries marked with * are those also included in the analysis of annual data in chapter 8.
Index of Democracy/Autocracy. Polity IV index of Political Authority at www.
systemicpeace.org/polity/polity4.htm. The version used here is the revised 
combined polity score, which is a composite index based on five components 
reflecting institutionalised constraints on the authority of the government 
executive, the competitiveness of the political system, and the degree of public 
participation.
Political Rights and Civil Liberties. Freedom House index at www.freedomhouse.
org/uploads/fiw/FIWAllScores.xls. Details are discussed in Chapter 3.
Political Terror. Political Terror Scale provided by Mark Gibney at http://www.
politicalterrorscale.org/. The series used here is the one based on reports of the 
US State Department. Missing values are filled in either by using the alternative 
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series based on reports by Amnesty International or by interpolation or 
extrapolation.
Battle Deaths in Civil Wars. The number of battle-related deaths is calculated 
from the Uppsala/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset at: http://www.prio.no/CSCW/
Datasets/Armed-Conflict/. The measure was constructed using the ‘best’ estimate 
of deaths in all internal armed conflicts for each country/year. International 
wars are excluded because they do not necessarily imply persecution of citizens 
by the state or by a faction within the territory.
GDP Per Capita. GDP per capita in US$ at constant (2000) prices (chain series) 
from Penn World Tables 6.2 at http://pwt.econ.upenn.edu/php_site/pwt_index.
php. Data for 1982–2004 extrapolated to 2006.
Population. Total population available from the World Bank at http://databank.
worldbank.org/ddp/home.do. The share of population aged 20–39 (at five-year 
intervals) is taken from the UN Population Prospects 2006 Revision originally 
at http://esa.un.org/unpp/p2k0data.asp.
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As we saw in Chapter 2 the foundation of asylum policy is the UN Refugee 
Convention. All developed countries are signatories to the Convention and 
for those in the EU it is a condition of membership. As previously noted, the 
key clauses are the definition of a refugee as someone with a ‘well founded fear 
of persecution’ and the non-refoulement clause, which provides that a person 
cannot be forcibly returned to a country or territory where he or she may be 
at risk of persecution. Any asylum claim submitted in a signatory state must 
be considered under due process whether or not the applicant entered the 
country legally. Thus, in principle at least, the Convention provides access to 
asylum procedures and the possibility of gaining refugee status to an unlimited 
number of applicants. As we have seen, the Convention was conceived in 
circumstances rather different from today and it did not provide a detailed 
set of rules for dealing with a mass influx of spontaneous asylum seekers. As 
a result it left open many ways in which receiving countries can act to deter 
asylum applications.
6.1 Asylum policies in the 1980s and 1990s
In response to the surge of asylum applications the countries of the OECD 
instigated progressively tougher policies towards asylum seekers.47 One of the 
most important policies was to limit access to the country’s territory. In the 
late 1980s a number of countries began to strengthen their border controls in 
order to staunch the flow of illegal immigrants who, if they applied for asylum, 
would then be protected from summary removal. A number of countries, 
starting with the UK and Germany in 1987, introduced sanctions on airlines 
and other carriers, which were progressively toughened and which by the late 
46 This chapter closely follows Hatton, 2009, pp. F195–F201.
47 Detailed commentaries on the measures taken in the 1980s and 1990s can be found in Wallace, 
1999; Widgren, 1994; Zetter et al, 2003. These developments are summarised by Schuster, 2000; 
Gibney and Hansen, 2005; Hatton, 2005.
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1990s had become virtually universal. In addition several countries led by 
France introduced special airport zones, areas that were not deemed to be part 
of the country’s territory for the purposes of claiming asylum and where asylum 
seekers could be held for pre-screening and possible deportation. In the EU the 
relaxation of internal border controls under the Schengen agreement (effective 
1995) and the Maastricht Treaty (effective 1993) prompted coordination on 
tougher external border controls and the imposition of more stringent visa 
requirements on those from countries that were potential sources of asylum 
applicants. By 1993 the Schengen countries shared a joint list of 73 source 
countries, a list that exceeded 150 by 1998.48
In the EU the early 1990s saw important reforms to the processing of asylum 
applications. These followed from the 1990 Dublin Convention and the 
resolutions of a ministerial meeting in London in 1992. In Dublin it was 
agreed that, in order to prevent ‘asylum shopping’, an asylum claim would 
be dealt with by one state only, specifically the state of first entry. In London 
resolutions were made on three further issues. The first was the ‘safe third 
country’ concept, which allowed member states to reject an asylum claim if the 
applicant had transited through a country where he or she would be safe from 
persecution and could have sought asylum. The second was to designate ‘safe 
countries of origin’ where there is a presumption of no risk of persecution. The 
third element was to introduce the concept of ‘manifestly unfounded’ asylum 
claims, for which an expedited refugee status determination procedure could 
be used. Manifestly unfounded claims included those that fell into the safe 
country of origin or the safe third country categories as well as cases involving 
forged papers or evidence of criminal activity. In 1994 and 1995 EU ministers 
reached a series of further resolutions, the most important of which were on 
readmission agreements with transit countries.49
These resolutions were not initially binding on member governments but 
they were gradually incorporated into individual countries’ reforms of their 
asylum systems. Between 1991 and 1998 most EU countries introduced policy 
packages that contained some of these measures, although the degree of 
toughness and the timing differed. A variety of measures that affected the 
outcome of procedures were also introduced. Particularly contentious was the 
48 The development of border controls is discussed by Boswell, 2003.
49 These are bilateral agreements between an EU state and a non-member state that provide for an 
asylum seeker to be sent back to the non-member state through which he or she had transited. 
These agreements extended the safe third county concept outside the EU and they were initially 
criticised for opening the door to serial refoulement. They were applied to the then accession 
countries and agreed bilaterally with a number of other countries, sometimes also including 
cooperation on issues of border control and illegal immigration. Boswell (2003) describes the 
evolution of these policies within the institutional structure of the EU.
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adoption of the safe country of origin concept.50 Other measures included 
speeding up the processing of claims, limiting the right of appeal and more 
stringent enforcement of deportation in the event of an unsuccessful claim. 
Some countries placed tighter restrictions on the granting of humanitarian 
status to those denied full refugee status under the Convention. Various 
reforms were also introduced relating to the rights and living conditions for 
asylum seekers during and after the processing of their claims. During the 
1980s a number of countries permitted asylum seekers to work while their 
applications were being processed but this right was typically withdrawn, as 
in France in 1991 and Belgium in 1992. A number of countries also restricted 
access to welfare benefits, sometimes substituting in-kind subsistence for cash 
benefits and often making these available only at designated reception centres. 
Several countries dispersed asylum seekers to reception areas across a wide 
range of localities and some imposed stricter detention rules for those arriving 
illegally.
Some countries responded to growing political pressure with major revisions to 
their asylum laws. The most notable of these was Germany, where a change to 
the Basic Law (the constitution, which included a clause on the right to asylum) 
was required in order to implement more restrictive policies, and it was duly 
amended in 1993.51 In most countries the rules were tightened in a series of 
steps. In Denmark the Aliens Act of 1983 was amended in the mid-1990s and 
again in 1998 and 2002. The UK experience best illustrates the step-by-step 
toughening of asylum rules. An Act of 1993 introduced a fast-track procedure 
for applicants from safe countries of origin and a 1996 Act introduced the safe 
third country concept. The 1999 Immigration and Asylum Act established the 
National Asylum Support System under which asylum seekers were dispersed 
to centres outside London and vouchers were substituted for welfare benefits. 
The Act also speeded up the status determination process and tightened border 
security with increased powers of search and arrest for immigration officers 
and increased penalties for carriers of undocumented immigrants. This was 
followed by the 2002 Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act, under which 
appeals no longer suspended deportation and permission to work after six 
months was abolished.
This progressive toughening of policy was undertaken with minimal 
coordination among EU countries but with an eye to developments in other 
50 There were two other related and equally contentious issues. One was whether the definition of a 
refugee should relate only to persecution by agents of the state. The other was whether there is an 
alternative of internal asylum in a safe area within the source country. These two issues are related 
by the fact that if a person was persecuted by, say, rebels or bandits then it should be possible for 
them to find safety in another part of the country, whereas if they were persecuted by a national 
authority then they would not. At one time France and Germany recognized as refugees only 
those who were at risk of persecution by agents of a state, a rule that was reversed by the latter in 
2003.
51 This is described by Bosswick (2000), who describes how the original Article 16 giving the right to 
asylum was modified by a long list of qualifications.
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countries. With strongly rising asylum applications, individual governments 
feared that drastic reforms in one country would deflect asylum claims towards 
its neighbours. Within the EU this process has often been seen as a race to the 
bottom in what one observer described as ‘the common market of deflection’ 
(Noll, 2000). Some suggested that the solution lay in some form of burden 
sharing – redistributing asylum applicants from those countries with the 
largest numbers to those with the least. However, a German proposal to the 
European Council in 1994 to distribute refugees more equitably was rejected 
by other states, notably the UK.52
6.2 Asylum policy since 1997
Since the late 1990s asylum policy has been dominated by two forces. The first 
relates to developments within Europe, with the harmonisation of policies 
within the EU. The second relates to the international political backlash 
from the 9/11 attacks in the United States and the subsequent bombings 
in Australia, Britain and Spain. Harmonisation of asylum policies across the 
EU stemmed from the Treaty of Amsterdam (effective 1999), which moved 
asylum policy from the third pillar (intergovernmental cooperation) to the 
first pillar (community integration).53 This marked a shift towards centralised 
decision-making and gave the European Commission the right to propose 
legislation from 2002. The European Council meeting at Tampere (Finland) 
in 1999 reaffirmed that common EU policies would be based on a ‘full and 
inclusive’ application of the Refugee Convention, stressing that the principle 
of non-refoulement would be honoured. It planned the building of a Common 
European Asylum System (CEAS) in two stages.
The first stage of the CEAS, up to 1 May 2004, was the harmonisation of 
certain key elements of asylum policy and it laid down minimum standards in 
several different areas. The Reception Conditions Directive laid down terms for 
access to employment and training, housing and subsistence, and health and 
education services for asylum seekers while their claims are being assessed. The 
so-called Dublin II Regulation embodied a new mechanism for determining the 
state responsible for an asylum claim, backed up with a common database for 
fingerprints. The Qualification Directive established a common set of criteria 
to be used in the refugee status determination procedure. And the Asylum 
Procedures Directive covered issues such as the designation of manifestly 
unfounded claims, and rights to interviews, to legal assistance and to appeals 
52 Instead, two Council resolutions in 1995 proposed that, in the event of a mass influx of asylum 
seekers, countries should respond by offering temporary protection ‘in a spirit of solidarity’. 
However this amounted to little more than wishful thinking and the resolutions were not 
invoked even in the Kosovo crisis later in the decade (Thielemann, 2003, p. 260). Subsequent 
developments on burden sharing are discussed in Chapter 11.
53 This structure was reformed in 2009 by the Treaty of Lisbon.
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as well as common rules for granting subsidiary protection.54 These rules, the 
impact of which differ across countries depending on their pre-existing policy 
stance, have been gradually transposed into member state legislation. It should 
be noted, however, that they do not cover every aspect of asylum policy and 
that they lay down only minimum standards.
While the first stage of the CEAS fell far short of complete harmonisation, it did 
create some convergence in policy and practice. The second stage of the CEAS, 
known as the Hague Programme and originally scheduled for completion in 
2010, involved deeper cooperation in several areas. One is border control and 
surveillance, which includes the implementation of the EURODAC fingerprint 
database established in 2003 and the establishment of the FRONTEX agency 
to integrate and standardise border procedures in 2005. Another is the further 
harmonisation of rules and procedures for status determination and appeals. A 
third area is expanding common standards for reception of asylum seekers in 
areas such as rights to social security benefits, health, housing and education.55 
And a fourth is fostering integration programmes for recognised refugees, with 
support from EU refugee funds.56 Although the Hague programme has not 
been completed, a European Asylum Support Office has now been established 
to further harmonise asylum procedures, and EU-level integration is to be 
carried forward under the Stockholm programme agreed in 2009.
Against the backdrop of EU legislation, member states continued to toughen 
their national policies. In the late 1990s accession states such as the Czech 
Republic, Hungary and Poland (countries that had previously been sources 
of asylum seekers) all enacted legislation to be consistent with EU standards. 
This involved setting up mechanisms for dealing with manifestly unfounded 
applications (not implemented in Poland until 2001), adopting safe country 
of origin and safe third country rules, as well as establishing some form of 
subsidiary protection. In advance of accession to the EU, these countries also 
harmonised their visa regulations as well as strengthening their border security 
– in the case of Hungary with financial support from the EU.
Policy reforms also continued in the older member states. In Denmark the 2002 
amendment to the Aliens Act replaced the pre-existing de facto refugee status 
with a much narrower category, which did not carry the right to permanent 
residence, and also abolished the right to apply for asylum from outside 
54 The regulations laid down in the first stage of the CEAS also include the Temporary Protection 
Directive and the Family Reunion Directive, although these are generally considered to be of 
lesser importance.
55 Details of policies, resolutions and legal instruments on asylum can be found on the European 
Commission website at http://ec.europa.eu/justice_home/doc_centre/asylum/doc_asylum_intro_en.htm.
56 The European Refugee Fund, which was set up in the aftermath of the Kosovo crisis, is a common 
fund on which governments could draw for refugee integration projects and to finance emergency 
temporary protection measures in the event of a mass influx of refugees. Originally funded for 
2000–4 it was further extended and augmented by funds for implementing integration and return 
and developing external border controls.
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the country. This and other reforms introduced a number of ‘motivational 
measures’ aimed at failed asylum seekers, including detention without limit 
prior to removal. The Netherlands reacted to political pressure by introducing 
a range of new border controls in 1998. An Act of 2001 restricted the scope 
of subsidiary protection and limited the right to appeal. This was followed 
by a reorganisation of the administration of asylum applications under a 
new ministry with a commitment to speeding up processing and enforcing 
deportation procedures. In subsequent years the criteria for recognition 
were further narrowed and a tougher deportation policy adopted. A number 
of EU countries further toughened the processing of manifestly unfounded 
claims, which, according to critics, was tantamount to institutionalising a 
presumption against their validity.57 One example is Austria, which in 2004 
reduced processing times to three days, making appeals non-suspensive of 
deportation and restricting the right to apply at the border. But not all policies 
have been restrictive; a number of countries have introduced proactive 
integration policies, and some relaxed restrictions on the right to work, like 
Finland in 2006 (for asylum seekers) and Germany in 2007 (for those with 
‘tolerated’ status).
Following the 9/11 attacks, countries outside the EU also toughened their 
policies. The USA PATRIOT Act introduced tougher measures against those 
with suspected links to terrorist organisations as well as dramatically increasing 
the number of border control agents. An Act of May 2002 further strengthened 
border controls by setting up an integrated database system for entry and exit 
linked to fingerprinting and biometric monitoring. Canada also tightened 
its border security and in an Act of 2001 it introduced tougher measures, 
including detention for asylum seekers without documents. The enhanced 
security measures in North America were followed, to varying degrees, by 
other countries as a result of heightened concerns about terrorism.
One of the most dramatic shifts in policy occurred in Australia. In 1999 Australia 
introduced three-year temporary protection visas, with much reduced rights 
for onshore asylum seekers. Then in 2001, in the wake of the crisis that erupted 
over the attempt to land asylum seekers aboard the MV Tampa, a package of 
new legislation was introduced. This included the excision of a number of 
islands from Australian territory for the purpose of establishing access to the 
asylum procedure. The definition of a refugee was narrowed and applicants 
passing through safe third countries were denied eligibility for a permanent 
57 According to the European Council on Refugees and Exiles, ‘Regrettably, over the last decade, 
many European states have established expedited or accelerated procedures that appear to be 
based not only on speed but on a “culture of disbelief” whereby most asylum seekers are presumed 
to be abusing the system. Such procedural developments have severely compromised the capacity 
of states to correctly assess whether an individual needs protection. Rather than the focus of the 
procedure being on identifying persons in need of protection, it has shifted towards techniques 
devised to screen out as many applications as possible. As a result, expedited asylum procedures 
appear to be increasingly adversarial in nature’ (ECRE, 2005b, p. 16).
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protection visa. Other provisions included introducing harsher penalties for 
people-smuggling offences and limiting access to judicial review of asylum 
decisions. The effects of this draconian toughening of policy on the number 
of asylum applicants are analysed in detail in Chapter 9.
6.3 Measuring asylum policy, 1997–2006
Policy evolved differently among the refugee receiving countries of the OECD, 
although it was generally in the same direction. In the EU, member states 
introduced reforms to bring their policies in line with EU legislation. But, as 
we have seen, most of the reforms were country-specific responses to political 
pressures and alleged deficiencies in the existing systems. In order to get a 
sense of the overall trends and the differences between countries, we need 
some index of policy. The most widely cited indicator of the toughness of 
asylum policy is the recognition rate. As noted earlier, this is the proportion 
of first instance decisions (ie excluding appeals) that resulted in recognition 
under the Convention or in permission to stay on humanitarian grounds.
The left-hand panel of Table 6.1 shows the recognition rates for the same 
19 countries for which the asylum applications were reported in Table 3.1. 
On average the total recognition rate fell from more than a third in 1997–
2001 to about a quarter in 2002–6. However, there is wide variation in both 
levels and changes across these countries. The most dramatic declines were 
in the Netherlands, where the recognition rate fell by 43 percentage points, 
and in Denmark, where it fell by 35 percentage points. Other major asylum 
countries such as France and Germany, with rates that were already fairly 
low, had smaller declines. In some countries, notably Austria and Poland, the 
recognition rate increased between the two periods. It is interesting to compare 
the change in recognition rates in Table 6.1 with the percentage change in 
asylum applications that are reported over the same periods in Table 3.1. The 
correlation coefficient between these changes is 0.46, suggesting that tougher 
decisions on refugee status may have deterred asylum applications. However, 
recognition rates depend not just on the status determination procedure but 
also on the composition and possibly the volume of asylum applications.
Although recognition is a central component of asylum policy it is not the 
only component, as the preceding sections demonstrated. In order to provide 
a more comprehensive measure I have constructed a policy index based on 
major changes in a variety of dimensions of policy. While this exercise is 
inevitably rather crude, some effort was made to ensure objectivity. The major 
changes that form the index are based almost entirely on legislation rather 
than on more impressionistic evidence on the toughness of asylum policy. 
And they are based on contemporary accounts of recent legislation rather than 
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on evaluations made retrospectively in the light of the perceived effects of 
policy. The 15 components of the index are defined in the appendix to this 
chapter. Starting at zero in the first quarter of 1997, each of the components 
shifts up by one for a significant toughening of policy and down by one for a 
policy change that is more generous to asylum seekers. It is important to stress, 
however, that this is a crude measure of policy change that does not reflect 
the finer details of policy or its enforcement. Nor does it measure the absolute 
differences between countries, but merely each country’s deviation from its 
stance in 1997.
Table 6.1 Asylum recognition rates and policy stance, 1997–2001 and 
2002–2006












Australia 21.8 13.7 –8.1 1.1 7.0 6.0
Austria 22.0 40.0 18.0 –0.1 0.4 0.5
Belgium 34.9 27.5 –7.4 1.1 3.4 2.3
Canada 56.4 51.3 –5.1 –0.9 0.3 1.2
Czech Republic 5.7 5.3 –0.4 0.7 1.3 0.6
Denmark 54.7 19.8 –34.9 1.8 4.4 2.6
France 18.0 15.2 –2.7 0.0 2.4 2.4
Germany 17.4 6.7 –10.7 0.7 1.4 0.7
Hungary 25.3 34.7 9.4 0.2 1.9 1.7
Ireland 16.7 9.9 –6.8 1.0 2.4 1.4
Italy 30.1 32.5 2.4 0.4 0.7 0.3
Netherlands 75.1 32.1 –43.0 1.0 4.7 3.7
Norway 37.3 39.8 2.5 0.0 2.2 2.2
Poland 7.2 32.8 25.6 0.0 –1.0 –1.0
Spain 30.8 16.4 –14.4 0.5 2.1 1.6
Sweden 44.4 21.9 –22.5 0.0 –0.2 –0.2
Switzerland 39.3 32.4 –6.9 0.2 1.5 1.3
UK 41.8 22.6 –19.2 0.5 5.3 4.8
US 33.5 32.1 –1.4 0.0 1.9 1.9
Mean 35.0 25.4 –9.5 0.4 2.2 1.8
Source: Recognition rates from UNHCR, Statistical Yearbook, 2005, Table C14, and 2006, Table 6. For 
further details of the asylum policy index, see text and the appendix to this chapter.
The right-hand panel of Table 6.1 shows the change in the policy stance 
for each country between 1997–2001 and 2002–6 (summing over all 15 
components of the index). The last row of the table shows that the average 
policy stance toughened by 1.78 index points between the two periods. But 
again there is wide variation between countries. The index illustrates a dramatic 
A Cool Reception in the West 51
toughening of policy across the decade in Australia and the UK followed by 
the Netherlands and Denmark. In most of the other countries policy became 
mildly more restrictive and in Sweden and Poland policy became, on balance, 
more favourable to asylum seekers. The correlation coefficient between changes 
in the policy index and the percentage fall in asylum applications (Table 3.1) 
is −0.56, which is slightly higher than that between asylum applications and 
the recognition rates. The correlation of −0.48 between changes in recognition 
rates and in the broader index illustrates that shifts in policy are not fully 
captured by recognition rates alone.





















The 15 components of policy are divided into three groups, each consisting of 
five components, as listed in the appendix to this chapter. Those representing 
the ability of asylum seekers to gain access to the country’s territory are 
labelled ‘access’; those representing the toughness of the country’s refugee 
status determination procedure are labelled ‘processing’; and those relating to 
the welfare of asylum seekers during and after processing, including detention 
policy, the right to seek employment and access to welfare benefit, are labelled 
‘welfare’. Figure 6.1 displays the evolution of the unweighted 19-country 
average of these policy components. All three components show a progressive 
tightening of policy over the decade. As might have been expected, policy 
towards access and processing became especially restrictive between 2001 and 
2005. Policy towards the welfare of asylum seekers also became tougher, but 
it was a more gradual process. Whether or not this substantial tightening of 
policy had the desired effect of reducing asylum applications is the subject of 
Chapter 8. But we turn first to some of the factors that determined policy.
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Appendix to Chapter 6: Derivation of the Index of Changes in 
Asylum Policies
The different components of the index and the typical changes that they 
involve are listed in the following table:
Conditions relating to access to territory
Visa requirements
Change in the stringency of visa requirements such as 
application from abroad, biometric passports, fingerprinting.
Border controls
Excision of territory; enhanced border patrols; turning back or 
deporting undocumented arrivals.
Penalties for trafficking
Significantly enhanced apprehension of traffickers; detention/
deportation or imprisonment. 
Carrier liability
Significant change in financial or other penalties for carriers by 
land, sea or air of undocumented arrivals. 
Offshore applications
Change in the opportunity to apply for asylum from an embassy 
or consulate abroad rather than in-country. 
Conditions relating to the processing of applications and the determination of status
Definition of a refugee
Rules relating to the causes of persecution such as gender, 
persecution by non-state agents, internal flight alternative. 
Manifestly unfounded 
applications
Changes in grounds for applying the presumption of 
ineligibility, such as ‘safe country of origin’, ‘safe third country’, 
time elapsed since arrival or insufficient documentation. 
Speeding up of processing 
Typically reducing the maximum period for decisions, or a 
general decrease in processing times. 
Subsidiary status
Changing scope for granting humanitarian status to those not 
qualifying under the Convention, or significant alteration to the 
terms of such status. 
Appeals
Changes in access to appeals, changing number of levels of 
appeal, or altering the suspensive effect of appeals.
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Conditions relating to the welfare of asylum seekers
Detention
Changes in rules or practices on the detention of applicants 
during processing or for those with failed claims.
Deportation
Changes in the practices of deporting failed asylum seekers, 
including raising targets or widening the set of those eligible for 
deportation. 
Employment
Changes in the right to seek employment while an asylum 
claim is being determined, or to the waiting time for permission 
to work. 
Access to benefit
Shift from cash to in-kind benefit; access to benefit only at 
reception centres; dispersal to non-metropolitan reception 
centres. 
Family reunification
Changes in the possibility of family reunification during or after 
processing.
The asylum policy index was constructed from annual country reports on 
policy developments given in three sources. These are the OECD’s annual 
publication International Migration Outlook (Paris, OECD; formerly Trends 
in International Migration); the country reports of the European Council on 
Refugees and Exiles (at www.ecre.org/search/node/country+reports) and the 
country reports of the United States Committee for Refugees and Immigrants 
(at http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/publisher/USCRI.html). These sources were used 
to identify major changes in different of dimensions of asylum policy in order 
to create an index of policy change. The index for each component starts at 
zero in the first quarter of 1997 and increases by 1 for a significant toughening 
of policy or decreases by 1 for a significant loosening. Thus it captures the 
direction of change in policy stance rather than representing the absolute level 
relative to other countries. As far as possible the shift is dated in the quarter 
following its introduction rather than at the time it was announced.
The index is based on a subjective evaluation of announced policy changes as 
reported by country experts at the time that policy was changed. It is sometimes 
difficult from this information to assess whether or not a policy change is 
‘major’. The criterion used here is, first that the policy change is likely to affect 
a significant proportion of asylum seekers, and second, that it substantially 
alters access to asylum procedures, or the likelihood of a successful claim, or 
the material welfare of asylum seekers. Nevertheless this is a crude indicator 
of what are often subtle and complex changes in the way that asylum systems 
work, and it takes no account of how the effectiveness of policy is influenced 
by changes in enforcement or administrative practices that do not catch the 
headlines.

7 Public Opinion and Asylum 
Policy
If governments have progressively toughened their asylum policies then they 
must have done so in the belief that this is what their electors wanted. Thus 
a first step towards understanding what lies behind asylum policy is to look 
at the attitudes and beliefs of ordinary citizens to whom governments are 
ultimately answerable. In recent years economists and others have examined 
public opinion surveys in order to see who is opposed to immigration and why, 
but such analyses have not yet been extended to attitudes towards asylum 
seekers and refugees. Following from that, this chapter asks three questions. 
The first asks what opinions people actually hold about asylum seekers and 
how these relate to the individual’s personal characteristics. The second asks 
whether or not there is any evidence that attitudes towards asylum seekers 
have hardened over time, as might be inferred from the trends in policy that 
were examined in the previous chapter. The third question asks through what 
political mechanisms anti-asylum attitudes get translated into tougher asylum 
policies.
7.1 Who is against asylum seekers?
Information on attitudes to asylum seekers is relatively scarce, at least in 
comparison to that for attitudes to immigrants more generally. However, 
the first round of the European Social Survey taken in 2002 contains several 
questions about asylum (the subsequent waves do not). The survey covered 
more than 40,000 respondents aged 15 and over in 21 European countries. 
For those who answered the asylum questions, Table 7.1 shows the percentage 
that agreed or strongly agreed with the statement and the percentage that 
disagreed or strongly disagreed (the remainder are those who responded 
‘neither agree nor disagree’, or ‘don’t know’).
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Table 7.1 Attitudes from the European Social Survey 2002
Question % agree % disagree
Country has more than fair share applying for refugee status 61.6 17.2
Government should be generous in judging applications 32.2 41.8
Most applicants aren’t in real fear of persecution in own country 43.9 24.7
People applying for refugee status should be allowed to work 62.9 21.5
While case being considered keep applicants in detention centres 40.2 40.9
While case being considered govt should give financial support 45.2 31.5
Refugees should be entitled to bring close family members 48.2 32.6
Source: ESS Round 1, edition 6.2 from Norwegian Social Science Data Services at http://ess.nsd.uib.no/.
The result in the first row shows that more than three-fifths of respondents 
thought that their country was receiving more than its fair share of asylum 
seekers, while less than one-fifth thought the opposite. While people in most 
countries (with a few exceptions such as Finland, Ireland and Poland) thought 
that their country was taking more than its share, it should be remembered 
that the survey took place just after a worldwide peak in applications. There is 
a more even balance of opinion on being generous in judging applications, but 
nevertheless more than two-fifths favoured being less generous. Interestingly, 
about the same proportion believed that most applicants were not genuinely 
in fear of persecution, something that is reflected in the low recognition rates 
that were observed in Table 6.1.
The next four questions relate to policies that would fall into the ‘welfare’ 
category in the policy index described in the previous chapter. Over three-
fifths of respondents would prefer that asylum seekers be allowed to work 
while awaiting a decision. While that may reflect in part a concern that asylum 
seekers would otherwise be supported by welfare benefits, nevertheless more 
than 40% of respondents took the view that asylum seekers should be kept in 
detention and that they should be given financial assistance. Finally nearly a 
half thought that refugees should be entitled to family reunification. Overall 
these results do not suggest overwhelmingly negative attitudes towards 
refugees. On the other hand they do not seem particularly generous towards 
people who have suffered persecution.
So what types of people evince negative attitudes to asylum seekers? The 
literature on attitudes towards immigrants and immigration policy typically 
finds that anti-immigration sentiment is strongest among individuals with 
low education, among men, among older people and among those who are 
not themselves first or second generation immigrants. Is the same true for 
attitudes to asylum seekers? Table 7.2 shows the results of regressing some 
of the opinions listed in Table 7.1 on a set of individual characteristics. Here 
the dependent variable is on a scale of 1 to 5 where ‘strongly agree’ takes the 
value 5 and ‘strongly disagree’ takes the value 1. The columns in Table 7.2 
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correspond to the first six questions in Table 7.1. The regressions also include 
fixed effects by country.























































































































R2 (within) 0.017 0.015 0.014 0.017 0.013 0.017
No of obs 25914 25914 25914 25914 25914 25914
Source: ESS Round 1, edition 6.2 from Norwegian Social Science Data Services at http://ess.nsd.uib.no/. 
Regressions include 18 country fixed effects. The number of observations is reduced from the original 
mainly because of missing data for the categorical income variable, which also involves the omission of 
three countries, France, Hungary and Ireland. ‘z’ statistics are in parentheses.
Among the most interesting results are those relating to education. The 
literature on immigration interprets the universal correlation between 
low education and anti-immigrant sentiment in two ways. The first is that 
the less educated are most in fear of labour market competition from low 
skilled immigrants (Scheve and Slaughter, 2001; Mayda, 2006; O’Rourke and 
Sinnott, 2006). The other is that the more educated are more tolerant towards 
minorities and more positive about ethnic and cultural diversity (Dustmann 
and Preston, 2007; Hainmueller and Hiscox, 2007). The results for attitudes 
towards asylum seekers are somewhat mixed. In Table 7.2 education is entered 
as two dummies for the respondent’s highest level of education, where the 
omitted group is those with less than lower secondary education. Respondents 
with secondary education as their highest level are most likely to agree that 
the country has more than its fair share and they tend to agree that asylum 
seekers have no real fear of persecution. Perhaps most important, those with 
secondary and tertiary education are more likely to agree that the authorities 
58 Seeking Asylum: Trends and Policies in the OECD
should be generous in judging applications for refugee status. Thus, the more 
educated are willing to see more generous policies despite some reservations 
about the number of asylum seekers and their motivation.
Those with either secondary or tertiary education are more willing than the 
low educated  to allow asylum seekers to work, something that would be 
consistent with the notion of labour market competition. On the other hand 
those with secondary education are also more likely to want asylum seekers 
confined to detention centres. Studies of immigration opinion have also 
suggested that concerns about the fiscal costs weigh heavily with some citizens 
(Facchini and Mayda, 2009; Boeri, 2010). The fourth column indicates that 
those with higher incomes are more willing to allow asylum seekers to work, 
which would be consistent with concerns about the tax burden. However, 
in the last column the evidence suggests that those with greater education 
and higher income are more willing to see financial support provided. It is 
possible that that the low educated are more concerned about competition for 
a fixed welfare pool, but on the other hand there is no evidence that the non-
employed are strongly against giving financial support.
Among the other coefficients we find that women are somewhat more 
sympathetic than men towards refugees. They are less likely to think that 
the country has more than its fair share, that refugees have no real fear of 
persecution, or that they should be placed in detention centres. Not surprisingly 
those who are immigrants themselves are less likely than non-immigrants to 
think that the country has more than its fair share and that asylum seekers 
should be kept in detention. They are also more positive about being generous 
in judging applications and about financial support. Although they may be 
more likely than non-immigrants to face labour market competition from 
refugees, they are more willing to allow them to work.
It is worth examining the relationship between the questions on attitudes to 
asylum policy and other attitudinal variables. These are presented in Table 7.3 
as correlations as they cannot be thought of as causal. The first two rows relate 
perceptions about immigrants to the views on asylum policy examined in Tables 
7.1 and 7.2. Those who believe immigrants take jobs are also likely to think 
that the country has more than its fair share of refugees and that the processing 
of applications should be tougher. They are generally against allowing asylum 
seekers to work and in favour of providing financial support. Those who think 
that immigrants take out more in benefits than they contribute in tax exhibit 
the same pattern of attitudes towards refugees except that they are less willing 
to offer financial support. Although the correlations are not overwhelmingly 
strong, they support the view that attitudes to immigrants and attitudes to 
refugees are generally correlated in the expected direction. They also suggest 
that both labour market and fiscal concerns apply to refugees.
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The next two rows show the correlations between non-economic attitudes to 
immigrants and refugee policy. Those who believe that immigrants enrich the 
country’s cultural life are less likely to think that the country has more than 
its fair share and generally hold more positive attitudes towards refugees. On 
the other hand, those who believe that being white should been an important 
criterion for gaining admission to the country have attitudes to refugee 
policy that are generally in the opposite direction to those who value cultural 
diversity. Thus attitudes towards refugee are clearly associated with elements 
of racism and cultural insularity. This too is consistent with recent studies of 
attitudes towards general immigration.














Immig take jobs 0.26 –0.20 0.21 –0.20 0.17 0.24
Tax/benefit 
burden
0.30 –0.26 0.23 –0.17 0.20 –0.22
Enrich culture –0.34 0.23 –0.25 0.23 –0.24 –0.27
Should be white 0.20 –0.10 0.17 –0.13 0.22 –0.15
Interest in 
politics
0.16 –0.00† 0.06 –0.06 –0.10 –0.12
Political right/left 0.12 –0.13 –0.11 –0.07 0.09 –0.07
Trust people –0.17 0.07 –0.14 0.12 –0.12 0.17
Feel safe –0.13 0.02 –0.07 0.05 –0.08 0.07
Source: ESS Round 1, edition 6.2 from Norwegian Social Science Data Services at http://ess.nsd.uib.no/.
Notes: These correlations are all significant at the 0.001 level except where marked †. The correlations 
exclude non-responses and ‘don’t know’ so that the number of cases varies between 77% and 95% of 
the total sample.
The last four rows of the table display the correlations between more general 
feelings and opinions and attitudes towards asylum and refugees. Those who 
have higher levels of trust in other people tend to hold more liberal views on 
asylum policy, as do those who feel safe walking at night in their local area. 
Thus insecurity is correlated with negative attitudes towards refugees, although 
the correlations are fairly weak. Those with a stronger interest in politics are 
more likely to believe that the country has more than its fair share of refugees, 
but on other issues they are fairly neutral. And although those whose political 
preferences lie on the right are generally more negative about asylum and 
refugee policies, again the correlations are rather weak. The main message 
from these correlations is that significant changes in attitudes towards asylum 
policies are unlikely to be driven by movements along the mapping between 
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social or political attitudes and policy preferences. It is more likely to arise 
from societal shifts in the relationship between any given set of core values 
that a person holds and their attitudes towards asylum seekers and refugees.
7.2 Changing attitudes to asylum
It is widely believed that the gradual toughening of policies toward asylum 
seekers is a reflection of hardening public attitudes. So has there been a dramatic 
hardening in attitudes, and if so what explains it? These are surprisingly difficult 
questions to answer, because of the lack of opinion surveys that ask the same 
question at different points in time. Even the evidence on attitudes towards 
immigrants is generally limited to relatively recent times. Contrary to popular 
belief, it shows that there is no common trend across countries since the 1990s 
in favour of increasingly anti-immigrant attitudes. Examining opinion in 20 
countries in 1995 and 2003, Facchini and Mayda (2008, p. 667) found that 6 
became more anti-immigrant while 14 became less anti-immigrant.58 For the 
United States the long-run evidence going back to the 1950s indicates some 
slight rise in anti-immigrant sentiment up to 1993 followed by a slight decline 
(Hatton and Williamson , 2005, p. 349).
Unfortunately we have even less evidence on trends in attitudes towards 
asylum policy and refugees. Instead, studies often assert that attitudes have 
hardened, while only offering evidence for a single point in time. Survey 
evidence from Finland indicates that the proportion of respondents who 
think Finland should accept fewer refugees increased from 31% in 1996 to 
33% in 2007. However, there are signs that opinions about the characteristics 
of asylum seekers have become more negative. UK Mori polls for 1997 and 
2002 (a time when asylum applications were on the increase) shows a sharp 
increase, from 11% to 43%, in the proportion of respondents who believed 
that asylum seekers were motivated by economic reasons. Some longer run 
evidence comes from Australia. Examining Australian attitudes towards boat 
people in surveys since the 1970s, K. Betts (2001, p. 44) concludes that ‘attitudes 
to boatpeople had formed and firmed over a quarter of a century. The more 
experience Australians had of boatpeople arriving, the more unhappy about it 
they became and the less inclined to offer an open house.’
58 Facchini and Mayda (2008) use data from the International Social Survey Programme, focusing 
on the question of whether immigration to the respondent’s country should be increased a lot 
or a little or should be reduced a lot or a little. Similar evidence can be found in the World 
Values Survey for 1995 and 2005, where anti-immigrant sentiment is measured by the percentage 
of respondents who would like their country to set strict limits on immigration or prohibit it 
completely. The results show that, for 11 of the 19 OECD countries listed in Table 6.1 above, 
the average anti-immigrant sentiment fell from 48% to 44%. In some countries such as Spain 
where there was a surge of immigration, opinion clearly soured, but others such as Sweden and 
Switzerland witnessed a shift in the opposite direction.
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It seems very likely that attitudes towards asylum seekers have indeed become 
more negative over the long term. But, as with immigration generally, more 
negative attitudes can hardly be the result of changes in individual-level 
variables that are typically found to be important in cross-sectional analysis. 
Successive generations have more education and tend to hold less racist 
attitudes, so other things being equal these fundamentals should have been 
shifting opinion towards more positive and less restrictive attitudes towards 
refugees. Thus societal shifts in attitudes are pervasive and not due to changes 
in individuals’ characteristics or their core values. Clearly, a hardening of 
attitudes over the long term could simply be the result of the increase in asylum 
applications (Lahav, 2004). Some observers suggest that the link between 
asylum numbers and public opinion is tenuous because most members of 
the public have only a very vague idea of the absolute numbers involved.59 
But while people may have little idea of the absolute magnitudes involved, 
they are likely to have much stronger impressions about the trend in asylum 
applications, something that is fed by the media and by political debate.
But it is not just the numbers. One reason for the change in the climate of 
opinion towards asylum seekers rests on the sharp contrast between the 
generally positive attitudes towards genuine refugees and the strong desire 
to clamp down on illegal immigrants. This can be seen particularly clearly in 
Table 7.4. These are opinions taken from the National Identity module of the 
International Social Survey Programme for 1995, which is just after the first 
major peak in asylum numbers. The first row shows that the majority opinion 
at that time was that immigration should be reduced, except for Ireland and 
Spain which had not yet experienced a major surge of immigration. The second 
row shows that the majority opinion in most countries was nevertheless 
that genuine refugees – those who have been oppressed or persecuted in the 
origin country – should be given a safe haven. By contrast, the overwhelming 
majority wanted their country to take stronger measures against illegal 
immigration. Thus, while most respondents expressed humanitarian attitudes 
towards genuine refugees they were strongly against illegal immigrants.
59 Respondents in the ESS estimated the number of current asylum applications to be several times 
the actual number. Such overestimates are also found in surveys of attitudes to immigrants as a 
whole, although they tend to be somewhat less exaggerated (Dustmann and Glitz, 2005; Sides 
and Citrin, 2007).
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Table 7.4 Public opinion on immigration and asylum, 1995 (percentage of 
respondents)
Austria Ger many Italy Ire land Netherlands Spain Swe den UK
Reduce 
immigration











81.6 87.2 95.0 – 81.4 67.1 – 80.0
Source: ISSP National Identity Survey at http://zacat.gesis.org/webview/index.jsp?object=http://zacat.gesis.
org/obj/fStudy/ZA2880.
Notes: Percentage of respondents who agree or strongly agree with the following statements: ‘the 
number of immigrants should be reduced’; ‘refugees who have suffered political oppression in their 
own country should be allowed to stay’; ‘the country should take stronger measures to reduce illegal 
immigration’. The total number of responses on which these percentages were calculated includes those 
who ‘neither agree nor disagree’ with the statement but excludes respondents who ‘can’t choose’, ‘don’t 
know’ or refused to answer.
Of course this is only a cross-section, but over time it seems likely that these 
two contrasting elements of public opinion have become conflated. As a result, 
the widely held humanitarian instincts have been neutralised or overwhelmed 
by the strong desire to clamp down on illegal immigrants. As one study of 
opinion in the UK puts it:
There is a popular assumption that the vast majority of asylum seekers are not in 
fear of persecution and should not be claiming asylum. In part this stems from 
confusion over the legal status of an asylum seeker. Many people in the focus 
groups understood ‘genuine’ to refer to the way someone entered the UK. They 
therefore assumed that anyone entering ‘illegally’ (for example hidden in a lorry) 
is not a genuine asylum seeker. There was also generally poor knowledge about 
international issues. Virtually no participant mentioned events such as the wars in 
Iraq or Afghanistan as potential drivers of asylum. (Lewis, 2005, p. 14)
Another factor is that the issue of asylum became sharply politicised during the 
1990s. This was indirectly due to the rise in the numbers but it relied heavily 
on the way in which the statistics were translated and fed into the public 
policy debate by politicians and the media.60 In the case of the media, vivid 
events such as the deaths of asylum seekers being brought into the country 
by people smugglers or while working illegally have been used to highlight 
the negative consequences and to emphasise the link between asylum and 
60 An Australian study found that those with the most negative attitudes to asylum seekers often 
had false beliefs about the facts that strongly resonated with statements by leading politicians 
that were widely reported in the media (Pedersen et al, 2005)
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illegality.61 More often, however, the press has played to the concerns of the 
less well informed sections of the public about the apparently preferential 
treatment given to refugees in public welfare, housing and other social services. 
By presenting asylum seekers as largely non-whites and/or Muslims, it has also 
played to racism and xenophobia as well as to latent feelings of insecurity 
(Greenslade, 2005). One consequence of the systematic negative coverage is 
that the term ‘asylum seeker’ has acquired a connotation sharply at odds with 
its true meaning. It has become a category or label about which it is acceptable 
to express extreme forms of prejudice while at the same time avoiding overtly 
racist language (Lewis, 2005).
Important too, is the populist rhetoric of politicians who, by setting the tone 
of the debate, have encouraged the demonization of asylum seekers by the 
press as cheats and fraudsters, creating a momentum of opinion to support 
restrictive policies (Mulvey, 2010). The intention has often been to deflect 
public hostility towards asylum seekers and away from governments. In part 
this was response to the widely held perception, particularly in the early 1990s 
and the early 2000s, that governments were unable to control the number 
of applications or to keep track of those whose claims had been rejected. 
Interestingly, a recent study of the attitudes in four waves of the European 
Social Survey found a strong positive cross-sectional correlation between 
negative attitudes towards immigration and lack of trust in domestic politics. 
Those who were most concerned about immigration expressed distrust 
particularly in the parliament and in politicians (less so for the police and 
the legal system) (McLaren, 2010). Also interesting is that the study found 
little relation between anti-immigration attitudes and distrust in the European 
Parliament, an issue to which we shall return in Chapter 11.
7.3 What is the link to policy?
Changing public opinion is one thing, changing policy is another. While 
the determinants of public opinion are fairly well understood, at least 
for immigration if not for asylum, the links to policy are much less well 
researched.62 Clearly, opinions are transmitted to policymakers through the 
media and periodically through the ballot box. Anticipating such reactions 
61 A UK MORI poll for 2002 asked respondents to select three words most used by the media when 
referring to asylum seekers and refugees: 64% nominated ‘illegal immigrant’ as one of their 
choices, a number that far outstrips any other category; others included ‘bogus’ (22%), ‘scroungers’ 
(21%) and ‘persecuted’ (20%), see www.ipsos-mori.com/researchpublications/researcharchive/poll.
aspx?oItemId=1061. Of course it might be argued that the press simply plays to existing attitudes 
and has little effect on forming them. But Facchini et al (2009) find a causal effect running from 
coverage of illegal immigration by American by TV channels and individual attitudes.
62 One of the few papers that explore quantitatively the links between immigration attitudes 
and immigration policy is Facchini and Mayda, 2008. They find evidence that lobby groups, 
particularly trade unions, have an important effect on policy outcomes.
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policymakers may simply respond to emerging situations in a way that they 
believe will avoid or mitigate any deterioration in public approval. But as we 
have seen, opinion is mediated (or manipulated) by the press and by discourse 
among politicians and political parties. As a result the imperatives for policy 
change may not be closely correlated with trends in opinion or with objective 
circumstances but may instead reflect knee-jerk reactions to perceived crises in 
public confidence.
One reason that the factors determining asylum policy are not well understood 
is that we have few quantitative indicators of policy. One approach has been to 
look at the determinants of asylum recognition rates on the grounds that this 
is a key indicator of policy toughness. In one such study Holzer et al (2000a) 
examined the recognition probability for individual asylum seekers in different 
Swiss cantons (which run semi-independent policies). They found that the 
higher the percentage of foreigners in a canton, and the more negative public 
opinion, the lower was the recognition rate. In order to assess the national-
level determinants of policy, Neumayer (2005a) examined recognition rates 
by source country and EU destination country. Controlling for the effects of 
conflict and human rights abuses in source countries, he found that recognition 
rates were lower the larger the number of past applications and the higher the 
share of votes received by right-wing populist governments.
The political science literature identifies strong links between anti-immigration 
attitudes and the popularity of extreme right-wing parties (Knigge, 1998; 
Lubbers et al, 2002; Kessler and Freeman, 2005). While extreme right-wing 
parties appeal to those who also hold racist and xenophobic views, there is 
also evidence that they gain support from those who link immigration with 
crime, with potential competition for jobs and welfare, as well as with social 
insecurity more generally (Rydgren, 2008). In short, the array of values and 
beliefs that underpin negative attitudes towards the number of immigrants 
also underlie support for political parties with ethnonationalist platforms that 
are virulently anti-immigrant.
There was a resurgence of right-wing populist parties in several European 
countries in the early 2000s just at the time that asylum applications were 
reaching a peak. In Austria the Freedom Party (Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs, 
initially led by Jörg Haider) received sufficient support to become part of 
the ruling coalition after the 1999 election. This was followed by a major 
reform of immigration and asylum law, with tougher and faster processing 
and restrictions on the receipt of social benefits. Similarly the Danish Peoples 
Party (Dansk Folkeparti) first entered coalition government in 2001, an event 
that was followed in 2002 by the abolition of granting humanitarian status 
and cuts in welfare benefits. In the Netherlands the 2001 electoral success of 
the List Pim Fortuyn set in train tougher asylum policies (under immigration 
minister Rita Verdonk), including accelerated procedures and tougher rules 
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for deportation. Right-wing populism was revived in 2006 when the Party 
for Freedom (Partij foor de Vrijheid, led by Geert Wilders) gained sufficient 
support on an anti-immigration platform to enter the ruling coalition.
In France the influence of the Front National surged with the presidential 
election of 2002 and in Italy the Lega Nord has been part of the Berlusconi-
led governments that have been in office for most of the last decade. These 
mainstream parties have consistently supported restrictive immigration 
and asylum policies, although they also have broader agendas. Even small 
parties that are out of the mainstream have had an influence over policy on 
immigration and asylum.63 One example is the British National Party, which 
has never won a parliamentary seat,64 but which is widely credited with raising 
the salience of asylum and immigration and thus influencing the immigration 
agendas of the mainstream parties. In Flanders the 2001 surge in support for 
the Vlaams Blok (now Vlaams Belang) sent a strong message to the coalition 
from which it was excluded. In Sweden, New Democracy (Ny Democrati) 
surged in the early 1990s but then went into decline, partly because its policies 
were adopted by the mainstream parties. In Germany the National Democratic 
Party (Nationaldemokratische Partei Deutschlands) enjoyed success in the 
regional elections of 2004 after the failure of a high-profile attempt to ban it.
It is one thing to claim that extreme right-wing parties have affected the 
political agenda but it is quite another to show that this had any influence 
on policy outcomes. Apart from the analysis of recognition rates noted 
above, there is scant evidence because of a lack of quantitative indicators of 
policy. Here I use the asylum policy index developed in Chapter 6 to test the 
hypothesis that the right-wing vote matters for policy. The policy index covers 
19 countries over the years 1997 to 2006. The measure of support for the far 
right comes from the Swank database on Comparative Political Parties and 
covers 16 of the 19 countries.65 It represents the share of votes received by the 
parties noted above such as the Freedom Party in Austria, the Vlaams Blok 
and the National Party in Belgium, the Front National in France and the Lega 
Nord in Italy. Here shifts in political support come only at election times and 
then remain constant until the next election. The regressions also include the 
number of asylum applicants and the national unemployment rate, as well as 
a set of year dummies.
63 Van Spanje (2010) presents evidence of ‘contagion effects’ from extreme right parties to 
mainstream party agendas; Arzheimer and Carter (2006) find that the electoral success of extreme 
right wing parties tends to be greater when there is a grand coalition but is reduced by more 
proportional representation.
64 The BNP did win two seats in the European Parliament in 2009.
65 This can be found at www.marquette.edu/polisci/faculty_swank.shtml. Of the 19 countries present 
in the policy index the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland are not represented in the data for 
political party support.
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The results of regressions with fixed effects by country are reported in Table 
7.5 . The log of asylum applications is instrumented to allow for the effect 
of policy on applications (analysed below in Chapter 8). In the light of the 
results in Chapter 5, the instruments used represent global warfare (Figure 
4.1) and political terror (Figure 4.2). The result for the aggregate index in the 
first column shows that asylum applications and unemployment have the 
expected signs, although both are insignificant. But the share of extreme right-
wing votes is positive and significant, indicating that policy became tougher as 
right-wing votes increased. The coefficient implies that a 10 percentage point 
increase in the share of far right votes increases the policy index by 1.1 points.












































R2  within 0.39 0.54 0.09 0.16
      between 0.01 0.03 0.02 0.01
      overall 0.16 0.28 0.02 0.01
No of observations 160 160 160 160
Note: Instrumental variable fixed effects regressions for 16 countries × 10 years. Year dummies included 
but not reported. ‘z’ statistics in parentheses.
The next three regressions show how right-wing votes affect the different 
components of policy. There is a positive coefficient on access policies and on 
processing but the latter is insignificant. The strongest effect is on outcomes 
in the last column. Thus the evidence suggests that the most powerful effect 
of trends in right-wing support is on the conditions that are faced by asylum 
seekers during processing. Perhaps this is not surprising, in light of the 
debates over issues such as welfare payments, housing and above all detention 
of asylum seekers. But there is one very important caveat. This is that the 
variables in the regression explain very little of the upward trends in the policy 
indices that were illustrated in Figure 6.1, most of which are captured by the 
period dummies. Perhaps there are cumulative effects, but with limited data it 
is not possible to identify such effects and the results here must be treated as 
suggestive rather than definitive.
8 Has Policy been Effective?66
Since the end of the 1980s governments have struggled to develop effective 
policies to control the number of asylum applications, and the number of 
successful claims, against the background of hardening public attitudes 
towards asylum seekers. As we have seen the number of applications soared 
to a peak in 1992 and then, after some decline, it reached another somewhat 
lower peak in 2001. Since then the number of applications in industrialized 
countries has declined to a level last seen in the 1980s. During the 1990s 
the tightening of policy seemed to have only modest effects on bringing the 
numbers down, and governments were motivated to redouble their efforts to 
reduce the numbers to acceptable levels.
Since 2001 policy in many countries has become even tougher and, this 
time, there has been a dramatic fall in the number of applications. Not 
surprisingly governments have been quick to claim that changes in legislation 
and procedural purges have been much more successful than in the past. For 
example, in February 2003 British Prime Minister Tony Blair committed the 
government to a drastic cut in the numbers. Speaking at the Labour Party 
conference in September that year he announced: ‘We have cut asylum 
applications by half. But we must go further. We should cut back the ludicrously 
complicated appeal process, de-rail the gravy train of legal aid, fast track those 
from democratic countries, and remove those who fail in their claims without 
further judicial interference.’67 Three years later, in November 2006, the UK 
Immigration Minister Liam Byrne commented: ‘Asylum applications for the 
year to date are at their lowest level since 1993 and we intend to build on this 
progress. We have seen in the year so far more failed asylum seekers being 
removed than predicted unfounded asylum claims, but there is more still do.’68
66 This chapter closely follows Hatton, 2009, pp. F202–F208.
67 The full text of the speech was reported in the Guardian, 30 September 2003.
68 Comments on the asylum statistics for the third quarter of 2006, reported on the Home Office 
website at www.homeoffice.gov.uk/about-us/news/asylum-stats-quarterly-1106. The statement 
refers to the official target for removals to match the number of claims classified as manifestly 
unfounded.
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As we have seen in Chapter 5, there were forces other than asylum policy 
that were tending to reduce the numbers from the mid-1990s. These included 
rising incomes, declining terror and an improving political climate in many 
source countries. But there was also a hint that the numbers fell after 2001 
by more than can be accounted for by these influences alone. This chapter 
asks: How strong was the deterrent effect of policy? How much of the total 
decline in applications can it explain? And how far can differences in policy 
account for the widely varying trends in applications across different receiving 
countries?
8.1 Previous studies
A number of previous studies have analysed asylum applications from the 
perspective of re3ceiving countries in Europe and elsewhere. They have 
focused on three questions. One is the role of conditions in destination 
countries as ‘pull factors’ in asylum migration, and in particular the role of 
labour market conditions. Since asylum seekers have often been characterised 
as labour migrants in disguise, the goal has been to see if variables that are 
known to influence international migration also determine asylum flows. A 
second issue is whether or not policies that are aimed at reducing the volume 
of applications have had any effect. The experience up to the early 1990s, 
when rising applications went hand in hand with tougher policies, led many 
observers to question the deterrent effects of policy. And third, if policy does 
influence the volume of applications, would a convergence in the policy stance 
among receiving countries lead to a more equitable sharing of the refugee 
burden? This question arose from discussions in the EU about ‘burden sharing’ 
and the potential effects of policy harmonisation.
A number of different methods have been used to identify the effects of policy 
and other variables on asylum flows. Studies based on interviews with asylum 
seekers find that their choice of destination is determined by the presence of 
friends and relatives, while asylum policies and labour market conditions are 
of secondary importance (Havinga and Böcker, 1999; Robinson and Segrott, 
2002; Day and White, 2001). Those that study cross-country correlations 
generally find an inverse relationship between changes in applications and 
increases in policy restrictiveness (Vink and Meijerink, 2003; Thielemann, 
2004; Zetter et al, 2003). These are consistent with the correlation between 
policy and applications between 1997–2001 and 2002–6 noted above. Some 
studies have focused on the effects of major policy reforms in a single country 
using time series analysis. For Switzerland Holzer et al (2000b) and for Germany 
Vogler and Rotte (2000) found that specific shifts in policy had negative effects 
on applications – something that is investigated for Australia in Chapter 9.
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Several studies have analysed panel data for destinations. In one such study 
Thielemann (2006) took as the dependent variable a destination country’s 
share of total applications (adjusted by its share of population) in order to 
net out source country effects. Using a panel of 20 destination countries for 
1985–99 he found that a country’s unemployment rate negatively influenced 
its share of applications, while its foreign-born stock had a positive effect. He 
also used an index of policy made up of five components, which overall had 
a negative effect. Examining the individual components of policy he found 
that the impact of refugee integration policies was weak as compared with 
the effects of variables representing refugee status determination procedures. 
However, his analysis did not disaggregate by country of origin and therefore 
did not allow for differences across destinations in the source country 
composition of applications.
Neumayer (2004) took shares for each destination of applicants from each 
origin as the dependent variable (thus also netting out origin country 
effects) and estimated for the years 1982–99. He found significant effects for 
the level and growth rate of GDP per capita in the destination, but not for 
unemployment. In the absence of the migrant stock, variables such as colonial 
links, common language and distance were all found to be significant in the 
expected direction (consistent with the empirical evidence on migration). The 
only policy variable used was the overall recognition rate for the destination. 
This proved to be positive, suggesting that tougher status determination 
procedures act as a deterrent, but the effect on a country’s share of applications 
appears to be small. A 10 percentage point reduction in the recognition rate 
reduces a country’s share of applications by only 0.2 percentage points. 
Neumayer also found that countries with right-wing populist governments 
had lower shares of asylum applications.
In my earlier study (Hatton, 2004) I examined the level of applications to 14 
EU countries by three continents (Africa, Asia and Eastern Europe) for 1981–
99, allowing for source effects by continent. Relative income, destination 
unemployment and the cumulative stock of applications were all important 
influences. Among the source continent effects, political rights and an index of 
conflict proved to be the most important. A composite index of asylum policy, 
similar to the one presented in Chapter 6 above and based on 11 indicators, 
gave a significant negative coefficient. This implies that the tightening of policy 
that occurred over the two decades to 1999 reduced asylum claims in the EU 
by about 150,000, or about 12% of its mean level. A more detailed analysis 
of EU country shares of applications by origin in the 1990s also supported 
the negative effect of policy but provided little evidence that tougher policies 
deflected asylum seekers from one destination country to another.
To summarise, recent econometric studies find that destination country effects 
matter, particularly the migrant stock and either the change in GDP or the 
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unemployment rate. They generally find negative policy effects, although 
these vary in magnitude, and they are often dominated by other variables – a 
finding that has led some observers to conclude that policy harmonisation 
would do little to equalise the refugee burden. Finally, few of the existing 
studies provide estimates of the amount by which policy reduced applications 
and none provides an estimate for any year after 1999. Hence they cannot 
address the claims sometimes made by governments about the effectiveness of 
policy in explaining the recent decline in asylum applications.
8.2 Estimating policy effects, 1997–2006
In order to shed further light on the deterrent effects of policy I analyse asylum 
applications by source country and by destination for the years 1997–2006. 
The 19 destinations are those listed in Tables 3.1 and 6.1 and the 40 source 
countries are a subset of those used in the analysis of source country effects in 
Chapter 5. These are countries for which there were significant flows to several 
different destinations during the decade.69 In cases where the bilateral flow 
from a source to a destination is consistently small these dyads were omitted, 
leaving 637 bilateral pairs out of a possible 760. Together these account for 
80% of all applications to the 19 destination countries. The dependent variable 
used in the analysis is the log of the annual number of asylum applications 
from a given source to a given destination for the years 1997 to 2006.70
The explanatory variables used here are those that were found to be important 
in explaining asylum applications by source country in Chapter 5. These 
include the terror scale and the Freedom House index of political rights. Source 
country GDP per capita never proved to be significant and so it was dropped 
from the analysis. When examining bilateral flows it is important to take 
account of the fact that asylum seekers from a particular source country often 
concentrate on a few major destinations. As with all migration flows, this is the 
result of historic ties, such as colonial links, common language and cultural 
proximity, as well as the physical distance between source and destination. 
These effects are captured in large part by the stock of previous migrants in 
the destination country. Here I use the total stock of foreign-born from a given 
source at a given destination in 2000/1 as reported by the OECD.71 The vast 
bulk of these are ordinary migrants, although the total also includes some 
69 These countries are marked with * in the appendix to chapter 5.
70 The criterion for omitting a dyad from the analysis is when fewer than ten cases were recorded 
over the whole decade. In cases where the dyad is included but the value for a particular year is 
missing, it is entered as one before taking the log.
71 The number of foreign-born observed in each OECD country in 2000/1, broken down by country 
of birth, is taken from the OECD database on immigrants and expatriates at www.oecd.org/docume
nt/51/0,3746,en_2649_33931_40644339_1_1_1_1,00.html.
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successful asylum seekers in the years before 2000. As a measure of economic 
conditions at the destination I use the unemployment rate.
In order to test the effects of policy I use the two indicators discussed previously 
in Chapter 6. The first is the destination country’s total recognition rate – the 
proportion of asylum decisions (for applicants from all sources) that resulted 
in acceptance. This is potentially endogenous since a lower recognition rate 
may deter those applications that are least likely to result in recognition. The 
second is the policy index and its three components that were summarised in 
Figure 6.1. It is worth reiterating that these are fairly crude indicators of policy 
that may not capture in full the subtle and complex ways in which asylum 
procedures often work. A further policy-related variable  is a dummy for 2002–
6 that is interacted with the share of Muslims in the source country. Since 
the share of Muslims is a single value for each source country, in the presence 
of fixed source country effects this variable should capture any differential 
post-2001 effect for Muslims. The aim is to capture any differential effect on 
applications from Muslims in the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks, not only as a 
result of asylum policy but also more generally.
Table 8.1 reports four regressions with different fixed effects and estimation 
methods. That in the first column includes source country fixed effects and a 
dummy for each destination. Not surprisingly the migrant stock in 2000/1 gives 
a very strong coefficient with an elasticity of about one-third. This is testimony 
to the power of the ‘friends and relatives effect’ that has been identified in many 
empirical studies of migration. The destination unemployment rate (lagged 
one year) is strongly negative, supporting the view that asylum applications 
are sensitive to labour market conditions at the destination. In this case a 1 
percentage point increase in the unemployment rate reduces applications by 
about 10%. Terror and political rights both take significant coefficients that are 
similar in magnitude to those observed in Table 5.2 for aggregate flows from 
source countries. The coefficient on the total recognition rate is very small 
and insignificant, offering little support for the view that higher recognition 
rates have deterred asylum applications. On the other hand, there is evidence 
of a significant fall in applications from Muslim countries – equivalent to a 
decrease of more than a quarter for a country that was 100% Muslim.
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Table 8.1 Asylum applications and recognition rates, 1997–2006 (dependent 




































































Destination dummies Yes Yes No No
R2  within 0.46 0.48 0.06 0.02
No of observations 6339 6339 6339 6339
Note: There are 637 country pairs in the dataset but 31 observations involving Italy in 2006 are missing. 
Hence the total number of observations is 6,370–31 = 6,339. ‘z’ statistics are in parentheses.
The second and third columns show what happens with different sets of fixed 
effects. The second column includes a fixed effect for each source country by 
year. These completely absorb source country variables, which may be too 
heterogeneous to be fully captured by the variables included in column (1). The 
main result is that the recognition rate now becomes significant. Column (3) 
includes a separate fixed effect for every bilateral pair, which therefore absorbs 
the effect of the migrant stock. The coefficients on the other variables are 
very similar to those in column (1), indicating that most of the idiosyncratic 
variation across dyads is captured by the migrant stock.
The last column treats the total recognition rate as endogenous. As previously 
noted, the coefficient on the recognition rate will be biased downwards if a 
decline in the recognition rate tends to deter those who are most likely to be 
rejected. Here I use as instruments two components of the policy index that 
are closely related to the processing of applications. These are the components 
representing policy shifts on the processing of manifestly unfounded claims 
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and on the granting of subsidiary or humanitarian status.72 Using these 
instruments the coefficient on the recognition rate now becomes much 
larger and more significant. This result suggests that previous studies that 
have not accounted for the endogeneity of the recognition rate may have 
underestimated its true effect. On this estimate a fall in the recognition rate of 
10 percentage points reduces applications by 16%.
Table 8.2 Asylum applications and policy, 1997–2006 (dependent variable: log 






















































































Destination dummies Yes Yes No No
R2 within 0.47 0.48 0.10 0.05
No of obs 6339 6339 6339 6339
Note: there are 637 country pairs in the dataset but 31 observations involving Italy in 2006 are missing. 
Hence the total number of observations is 6370–31 = 6339. ‘z’ statistics are in parentheses.
72 The smaller the share of applications treated as manifestly unfounded and the greater the 
possibilities for granting some form of humanitarian status the higher should be the recognition 
rate, effects that are supported by the first stage regression.  The F statistic in the first stage 
regression is only 9.6, although the subsidiary status variable is highly significant. The Sargan test 
for overidentification gives χ2(1) = 0.9, indicating that these are valid instruments.
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The different components of the policy index are introduced directly in the 
regressions reported in Table 8.2. In the simplest fixed effects model of column 
(1), the policy components representing access and processing have strong 
negative effects, whereas that reflecting welfare is small and insignificant. The 
same result holds in columns (2) and (3), where different sets of fixed effects are 
included. Consistent with other studies this suggests that the two key elements 
of deterrence are access to the country’s territory in order to gain eligibility to 
lodge an asylum claim and the toughness of the refugee status determination 
procedure. It is interesting also that in the presence of the more comprehensive 
policy variables the Muslim effect disappears, suggesting that the coefficient 
in Table 8.1 may have been picking up the effect of access policies. In column 
(4) the total recognition rate is substituted for the processing index, using the 
two subcomponents, for manifestly unfounded claims and subsidiary status, 
as instruments. The coefficient on access remains strongly significant and the 
other coefficients are little changed. This adds further support for the view that 
recognition is an important component of deterrence but not the only one.
8.3 Policy and the fall in applications
These results suggest that asylum policy has a strong deterrent effect, and 
they contradict those who suggest that policy has been ineffective. On the 
other hand, this does not imply that the dramatic fall in applications in the 
years from 2001 was entirely due to policy, as some politicians might claim. 
So what was the effect of policy on asylum applications over the first few 
years of this century? I calculate the effects of policy using the coefficients in 
column (3) of Table 8.2. On average, across the 19 destination countries, the 
effect of tightening access to territory reduced applications by 14% between 
2001 and 2006, while tougher processing policies reduced applications by 
17%. However this does not account for all the sources of applications to each 
destination, nor does it allow for the very different weight of each destination 
within the 19-country total. To estimate the overall impact of policy I use 
the coefficients on access and processing (ignoring the insignificant effect 
of welfare) to calculate the proportionate effect of policy change for each 
destination, using total applications as the base. This assumes that the effects 
of policy on those source countries that are excluded from the regressions 
are the same as for those that are included. The proportional effects are then 
converted to absolute numbers by evaluating them at the mean of annual 
applications for 1997–2006.
The first column of Table 8.3 shows the change in total asylum applications 
between 2001 and 2006 for each of the 19 destination countries. The second 
column shows the predicted effect of the change in access policies over the 
same period, and the third column is the predicted effects of processing 
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policies. The last column shows the combined effect of the two policies taken 
together, which is different from the sum of individual policies because of 
the non-linearity of the underlying relationship. To give an example, the 
effect of tougher policies in Australia was to reduce annual applications by 
2,654 over the five-year period as compared with the actual decline of 8,865. 
While tougher policy ‘explains’ most of the decline in applications to France, 
it explains only about a quarter of the decline for Germany. For both the US 
and the UK it accounts for more than a third of the fall in applications. Thus 
the UK immigration minister can claim some but by no means all of the credit 
(if credit there is) for the reduction in asylum applications. For all 19 countries 
taken together, the effect of policy was to reduce applications by 108,000 
per annum, which accounts for a nearly a third of the drop between 2001 
and 2006. Against this background the UK does not stand out as particularly 
exceptional.
Table 8.3 The effects of policy on asylum applications, 2001–2006
Country Change in 
applications 
2001–2006





Effect of all 
policies
Australia –8,856 –1,685 –1,263 –2,654
Austria –16,785 0 –4,989 –4,989
Belgium –12,959 –3,486 0 –3,486
Canada –21,128 0 –6,653 –6,653
Czech Republic –15,074 0 0 0
Denmark –10,592 –1,126 –835 –1,826
France –23,601 –12,654 –9,596 –19,395
Germany –67,257 –10,876 –8,064 –17,636
Hungary –7,444 0 –603 –603
Ireland –6,015 –1,070 –793 –1,735
Italy 492 0 –1,564 –1,564
Netherlands –18,109 0 –4,667 –4,667
Norway –9,462 –1,740 –1,290 –2,821
Poland –309 –813 685 –239
Spain –4,179 –1,530 897 –842
Sweden 805 0 2,780 2,780
Switzerland –10,093 0 –5,219 –5,219
UK –63,750 –19,158 –7,728 –24,588
USA –33,823 –11,917 0 –11,917
Total –328,139 –66,054 –48,904 –108,054
Note: Changes in policy are converted to changes in applications using the following formula: 
Δy= y¯×[exp ( β( p 2006−p 2001))−1]
where Δy is the predicted change in applications, ¯ y is the mean of applications for 1997 to 2006, β is the 
coefficient estimated in column 3 of Table 8.2, and p is the policy index for a particular year.
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So what were the effects of policy over the whole period from 1997? Figure 8.1 
shows total applications for all countries and the effect of policy in absolute 
numbers, all measured as the deviations from the first quarter of 1997. 
The effects of policy are calculated in the same way as for Table 8.3. Total 
applications rose by over 200,000 before falling to 120,000 below the level 
at the beginning of 1997. As is clear from the graph, policy contributed very 
little to the year-to-year variation in applications. Thus in the years from 1997 
to 2001 asylum applications rose strongly despite some tightening of policy. 
Over the decade as a whole, access and processing policies each contributed 
about equally to the decline. And although policy accounts for only around 
a third of the fall in applications on the downswing between 2001 to 2006, if 
the comparison is made from 1997 to 2006, then it more than accounts for the 
the decrease in the numbers over the decade as a whole.
9 Shock Tactics: An Australian 
Case Study74
Policies often come in packages and they often represent major shifts in 
a country’s policy stance. Such ‘natural experiments’ provide a unique 
opportunity to examine the effect of policy, free of other effects. And they can 
offer deeper insights into what mattered and why. Several studies have focused 
on the impact of key policy shifts in individual countries. For Switzerland 
Holzer et al (2000b) found that the major reform of 1990 sharply reduced 
applications especially from the Lebanon and Sri Lanka, but not as a result 
of the change in the recognition rate. For Germany, Vogler and Rotte (2000) 
found a large negative effect for a dummy representing the 1993 policy reform 
(the revision of the Basic Law) but weaker effects for other reforms in 1987 
and 1991.
Here I examine some unique events that occurred in Australia. On 26 August 
2001 a Norwegian freighter, the MV Tampa, rescued 433 asylum seekers from 
their vessel the KM Palapa 1 that was in distress in the stretch of ocean between 
the coast of Indonesia and the Australian territory of Christmas Island. At 
the insistence of the rescued passengers, the captain of the Tampa asked the 
Australian government for permission to land them on Christmas Island – 
a request that was refused. There followed a week-long stand-off while the 
world watched the drama unfold. Eventually a settlement was reached under 
which a third of the passengers were taken to New Zealand and the remainder 
to the impoverished pacific island of Nauru, in exchange for a generous aid 
package for Nauru from the Australian government. There followed a dramatic 
tightening in Australian asylum policy, which was intended to send a strong 
signal that would prevent such events occurring again.
74 This chapter draws heavily on Hatton and Lim, 2005.
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9.1 Australian asylum policy
For decades Australia has operated a programme for accepting refugees through 
organised resettlement programmes overseen by the UNHCR. In 1981 a Special 
Humanitarian Programme was added for those whose persecution would 
not qualify them as refugees under the Convention and in 1991 a Special 
Assistance Category was established for those escaping civil disorder. For these 
three categories – known as ‘offshore refugees’ – an annual 12,000 was set, 
which continued through the 1990s. The other category is ‘onshore refugees’ – 
spontaneous asylum seekers arriving by air or by sea, either legally or illegally, 
who claimed asylum and were granted refugee status. Onshore refugees were 
only ever a minority in the humanitarian programme as a whole but their 
share rose from 12.5% in 1995/6–1997/8 to 28.6% in 1998/9–2000/1.75
From the time of the Vietnam War there were episodic arrivals of boat 
people. The policy of mandatory detention for unauthorised boat arrivals, 
which had existed since 1958, was increasingly enforced and it was extended 
to all unlawful arrivals in the Migration Reform Act of 1992.76 The gradual 
toughening of policy on detention and deportation was largely a response 
to periodic increases in the number of unauthorised arrivals. From 1996/7 
onwards onshore grants of asylum were included in the overall target so that 
they would effectively reduce the numbers accepted through the offshore 
programmes.
In response to a further surge of arrivals, legislation was passed in 1999 that 
created three-year Temporary Protection Visas (TPVs), with much reduced 
rights, for unauthorised arrivals who qualified for protection. TPVs confer the 
right to work and to certain benefits, including Medicare, but a TPV holder 
is not entitled to re-enter Australia, once having left, and is not entitled to 
bring other family members to Australia. TPV holders were eligible to apply 
for permanent protection after 30 months, a status that could only be granted 
where the need for protection was ongoing. The introduction of TPVs was 
followed by legislation that imposed sanctions on people smugglers and 
provided for the boarding, searching and detention of ships suspected of 
carrying unauthorised asylum seekers.
In 2001, just one month after the Tampa incident, the Australian Senate 
passed six new bills into law to toughen the asylum regime further. The first 
two involved the excision of Christmas Island, Ashmore Reef and some other 
small islands from Australian territory for the purposes of establishing claims 
to asylum in Australia, and they provided for such arrivals to be processed 
elsewhere. Applicants who had spent at least seven days in a ‘safe’ country 
75 For a chronology of Australian policies in both refugee categories, see Karlsen et al, 2010.
76 The first remote detention facility was established at Port Hedland in 1991.
Shock Tactics: An Australian Case Study  79
prior to arriving in Australia were denied eligibility for a permanent protection 
visa. Another Act significantly narrowed the definition of a refugee used in 
the status determination procedure to the minimum required by the Refugee 
Convention. Further provisions included introducing harsher penalties for 
people-smuggling offences and limiting access to judicial review of migration 
decisions. With these new regulations in place, Australia’s ‘Pacific Solution’ 
was complete, and by some accounts it helped Prime Minister John Howard’s 
government to win the election held on 10 November 2001.
Since 2001 there have been two important developments. The first relates 
to processing and detention. In 2005 time limits were introduced on the 
processing of asylum claims, and in 2007 offshore processing at Nauru and 
Manus was terminated (about 70% of those located there were resettled in 
Australia). There was also a gradual softening of the detention regime and in 
2009 the government announced its intention to use detention only as a last 
resort. As a result the numbers in detention halved between 2001 and 2010. 
The second is the use of TPVs. In 2004 TPV holders were allowed to apply 
for permanent visas. But the most important development was in 2008 when 
TPVs were abolished, so that all those granted protection received permanent 
visas. These measures have been seen by some as a substantial retreat from the 
tough policy stance of 2001.
9.2 Asylum applications in Australia
As shown in Figure 9.1, onshore asylum applications peaked at over 13,000 
in 1989/90 and then fell off, subsequently rising again to similar levels in 
1999/2000 and 2001/02. The earlier peak is associated with applications 
from places like China (following Tiananmen Square) and Cambodia, while 
the increase from the early 1990s came from a more diverse range of source 
countries. The lower graph shows the number of unauthorised applicants 
arriving by boat. This figure increased to sharply from 1997/8 to over 4,000 in 
each of the years 1999/2000 and 2000/1 The sharp fall in boat arrival coincides 
with the much more restrictive post-Tampa environment. But it is also notable 
that the total number of asylum applications declined by a far larger number – 
from 13,000 in 2000/1 down to 5,000 in 2002/3, and only 3,000 in 2003/4. It 
is also worth noting that after a period of low applications the number shifted 
up again after 2008, a point to which we shall return.
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Unauthorised  boat arrivals 
Source: Asylum applications from UNHCR, 2001 a, Table 1, and UNHCR, 2001–9 , Table 1; Unauthorised 
boat arrivals from Phillips and Spinks, 2010, Appendix A.
The exact timing of the post-Tampa decline in applications can be seen more 
clearly in the monthly data for asylum applications plotted in Figure 9.2. The 
monthly figures are a little volatile but they averaged around 1,000 a month 
up to September 2001 and then fell to a relatively stable figure of around 
500 a month thereafter. The timing of the fall in late 2001 suggests that the 
discontinuity was associated with the Tampa incident and the raft of legislation 
that followed. However, part of the decline could have been due to worldwide 
trends, particularly in the wake of the 9/11 attacks in the United States. But 
Australian applications declined more sharply than those of other countries. 
On an annual basis, asylum applications to Australia fell by 51% between 2001 
and 2002 while those to the United States fell by 6% and those to Canada by 
22%. Applications to the EU-15 remained roughly constant between these two 
years.
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Source: UNHCR, 2001-9, Table 3 (for 2001 and 2002).
The effect of the policy shift is estimated using quarterly data on applications to 
selected countries. In order to focus on the period around the Tampa incident, 
the period analysed is from 2000q1 (the earliest available on a quarterly basis) 
up to 2004q3. The log of total applications is taken as the dependent variable 
and the regressions include a dummy for each destination. The regressions 
also include fixed effects for each quarter in order to capture changes in the 
conditions that affect asylum applications worldwide. The inclusion of the 
period dummies has little effect on the estimated effects of policy.
In this analysis, Australian policy is captured with a dummy variable for 
the period from the 2001q4 onwards. As we have seen, a number of other 
countries also introduced measures to toughen their asylum regimes in the 
years following 2001 and so it is important also to take these into account. 
Australia’s neighbour New Zealand introduced detention for undocumented 
arrivals and strengthened its policy in deportation from the end of 2001.77 
In the UK, legislation in 2002 marked the beginning of Prime Minister Tony 
Blair’s purge of asylum seekers, and it included toughening the criterion for 
manifestly unfounded claims. France and Germany both toughened their 
policies from the beginning of 2002, with the latter sharply restricting access 
to subsidiary status. Finally the United States and Canada introduced tougher 
border protection measures in the wake of 9/11, as well as more stringent 
77 New Zealand’s Immigration Amendment Act, 1999, provided that undocumented arrivals could 
be placed in a detention centre, rather than being granted a temporary visa, and it strengthened 
the right to deport them without right of appeal. But it was not until after 9/11 that this was 
enforced on the bulk of undocumented arrivals.
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screening of asylum applicants. In the regressions, these countries are taken 
as the benchmark so that policy in the other countries is relative to policies 
implemented in North America.
Table 9.1 Estimates of policy effects on quarterly data (fixed effects regression; 
dependent variable: log applications)
(1) (2) (3) (4)










































R2 (between) 0.89 0.89 0.82 0.83
No of observations 95 95 133 133
Country dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Period fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Note: ‘t’ statistics in parentheses.
The regressions in the first two columns of Table 9.1 include only the English 
speaking destination countries. Column (1) shows that the policy dummies 
have statistically significant negative effects for New Zealand from the 
beginning of 2002 and for the UK from the beginning of 2003. For Australia 
the coefficient on the dummy that represents the ‘Tampa effect’ is large and 
highly significant. The coefficient implies a drop in asylum applications of 
55.5% compared with 28.8% for New Zealand and 24.4% for the UK from 
2003. Surprisingly the unemployment rate is not significant when introduced 
in column (2). This is probably due to the fact that period dummies capture 
common fluctuations in unemployment as well as source country effects. 
When France and Germany are added to the dataset in columns (3) and (4) 
the policy dummy for Germany is negative, as expected, while that for France 
is positive.
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It is possible that the results are influenced by the very different source country 
compositions of asylum applications among these destinations. However an 
analysis of annual data by source country, similar to that of Tables 8.1 and 
8.2, produced very similar coefficients to those for quarterly data (Hatton and 
Lim, 2005, p. 127). Similarly, extending the quarterly data to the end of the 
decade also produced roughly the same results (Rutherford, 2009). Thus all 
the available evidence points to that fact that Australian policy was highly 
effective in reducing the number of asylum applications and more so than the 
policy packages introduced in other countries at around the same time. Right 
or wrong, that was the goal of policy and the government apparently reaped 
its reward at the ballot box.78
9.3 Lessons from Australian experience
 The results of Australia’s ‘natural experiment’ are clear and several lessons 
can be drawn from them. The first is that there are three ingredients to the 
‘success’ of policy in driving down the number of asylum applicants. One is 
the policy stance itself, which had a number of components, to which we shall 
return below. The second is the enforcement of those policies. Policies that 
look tough but are easy to circumvent are unlikely to be an effective deterrent. 
And third, there is the effective communication of the country’s policy stance 
to the outside world and to potential asylum seekers in particular. These three 
elements – tough policies, credible enforcement, and effective communication 
– are standard criteria for policy effectiveness.
It is worth dwelling on the third of these. In the late 1990s Australia’s efforts 
to persuade countries such as Malaysia and Indonesia to tighten up on asylum 
seekers transiting on their way to Australia met with little success. In October 
1999 the Australian government initiated an ‘overseas information campaign’ 
aimed at discouraging unauthorised boat arrivals. It included posters, videos 
and media clips that were targeted at countries of origin and transit and 
distributed in local languages. This campaign was seen as largely ineffective. 
But the arrival of the MV Tampa on the scene was to change all that: it provided 
the kind of publicity that media campaigns could not buy at any price. During 
the week-long stand-off the world’s press feasted on the plight of the asylum 
seekers and the government’s hard line in refusing to allow them to land.79 
78 McAllister (2003) shows that border protection was the single most important issue in the 2001 
election and that this won the election for the Liberal/National coalition. However, there was 
no major divide between the parties on policy towards asylum seekers and he argues that the 
coalition’s advantage owed more to the concern about terrorism following the 9/11 attacks in the 
United States.
79 The ‘wrongs’ are described by Marr and Wilkinson (2003) in a damning blow-by-blow account 
of the political intrigue surrounding these events. For a somewhat wider perspective see Mares, 
2002. The legal issues involved are discussed by Willheim, 2003.
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Another wave of publicity followed when some of the asylum seekers who 
were taken on an Australian naval ship to the island of Nauru refused to 
disembark. And the publicity continued with the arrival of a further six boats 
in the next month, several of which were ‘pushed’ back out to sea.80 By that 
time the whole world knew about Australia’s ‘Pacific Solution’.
From that time the number of applications fell almost immediately, so the 
message clearly did get across. And it is notable that the number of asylum 
applications fell by more than the number previously arriving by boat. Both 
the publicity and the raft of legislation that followed evidently deterred many 
of those who would otherwise have arrived by air. It is notable also that the 
effects of policy estimated here is substantially larger than the effect that was 
estimated in Table 8.3  for Australia on the basis of the policy changes alone 
(about one-third). It seems likely that this is accounted for by the blaze of 
publicity followed by the tough enforcement of policy producing a larger 
effect than the legislative changes alone.
That also raises the question of which policies were the most effective. The 
results in Chapter 8 suggested that policies on access to territory and on the 
processing of asylum claims had strong deterrent effects while welfare policies 
did not. An obvious interpretation is that the probability of gaining permanent 
settlement matters more to asylum seekers than the discomfort suffered in 
order to achieve that goal. The key policies put in place in 2001 related to 
access but this was in combination with other policies enacted at the time and 
the introduction of TPVs two years earlier. As noted earlier, from 2007 a new 
Australian government reversed some of the existing policies by abolishing 
offshore processing and TPVs. In February 2008 the ‘Pacific Solution’ was 
formally ended with the closing of the detention centre on Nauru, and TPVs 
were abolished in August 2008. The number arriving on boats increased from 
25 in 2007–8 to 1,033 in 2008–9 and 5,609 in 2009–10. It seems likely that the 
abolition of TPVs had some effect as it would be interpreted as an increase in 
the probability of gaining permanent residency.81 But it is also important that 
the new government was generally perceived as less tough on asylum than its 
predecessor, something that amplified the effect of what, after all, was only a 
partial relaxation in policy.82
80 One of these, carrying 187 Iraqis, was boarded by naval personnel from the Australian naval ship 
HMAS Adelaide. The Prime Minister reported to the media that some of these asylum seekers had 
reacted by throwing their children overboard – a claim that was later denied by senior naval 
officials.
81 It is also notable that around 90% of those processed on Christmas Island in 2009–10 gained 
refugee status (Karlsen et al, 2010, p. 19).
82 Crock and Ghezelbash (2010) suggest that ‘loose lips’ might have been a factor in the recent 
increase in boat arrivals but they argue against any effect for the abolition of TPVs.
10 What Happens to Asylum 
Seekers?
Most of the discussion about asylum seekers has focused on whether or not 
they should be admitted as refugees, and if so, on what terms. But, given that 
many of them become permanent residents in the host countries, there are also 
growing concerns about how well they integrate, along which dimensions, 
and how long that process takes. It is sometimes argued that lack of integration 
makes refugees a burden; an unwarranted cost to taxpayers and a source of 
social cleavage. Such arguments filter into public attitudes and underpin calls 
for more exclusionary policies. On the other hand, host societies are under 
an obligation to ensure that those who gain permanent residence are treated 
in a manner that provides the same opportunities that are enjoyed by other 
immigrants and by the host population. If refugees are disadvantaged then 
there are arguments for policies that support, or at least do not hinder, the 
process of integration. Whichever is the case, it is important to get the facts 
straight.
There is a large literature on immigrants (not focusing specifically on refugees) 
that examines and assesses the degree to which they assimilate or integrate 
along various economic and social dimensions. But despite these common 
concerns, there is comparatively little quantitative research examining if 
similar patterns apply to refugees. There are reasons to think that the outcomes 
for refugees will be different from those of other immigrants. The very fact 
that they come from different origins, under different circumstances, that they 
are admitted under different criteria and that they are sometimes subjected to 
a protracted processing period would suggest that their outcomes might differ. 
This chapter examines some of the available evidence to assess if widely held 
views about the integration of refugees and their economic status are true, and 
if policy has helped or hindered that process.
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10.1 Assimilation experience: income and employment
Much of the immigration assimilation literature has been preoccupied with 
assessing the post-arrival trajectories of income earnings and employment, 
but there are other dimensions too, such as education, housing tenure, use 
of health and welfare benefits and the education of children. The empirical 
literature typically finds that immigrants are at a disadvantage in the early 
years after arrival but that over time they assimilate towards the status of the 
non-immigrant population. However, that process varies between different 
groups according to origin and personal characteristics. The standard model 
stresses that immigrants may be positively or negatively selected – something 
that depends on differences in economic incentives, on the costs of migration, 
and on the selectivity of immigration policies (Borjas, 1987). One view is that 
the costs, the risks and the barriers that asylum seekers face make it more likely 
that they would be positively selected.82 If they are among the fittest and most 
enterprising then they should do well in the host society once they become 
accepted as refugees. On the other hand, refugees are not selected principally 
on labour market criteria, either through self-selection or by asylum policy, 
and as a result they might be negatively selected. Whichever is the case, it must 
be stressed that their economic outcomes depend not just on their personal 
characteristics but also on the conditions that they face in the host country. 
This would include elements of policy as well as the prevailing labour market 
conditions and the receptiveness of the host society.
So how do refugees do? A few studies have used datasets that make it possible 
to compare refugees with other immigrants. Cobb-Clark (2006) examined 
the employment status of immigrants to Australia by visa class in the 1990s. 
Immigrants from all visa classes were observed 18 months after arrival. In 
general, independent migrants (assessed through the points system), employer-
nominated immigrants and business migrants were much more likely to have 
gained employment than either family class migrants  or refugees. For refugees, 
employment rates were only 20–30% for men and even lower for women, and 
their unemployment rates were two to three times as high as those of family 
migrants. Much of the refugee disadvantage remains even after controlling 
for education and a variety of other personal characteristics. Interestingly, 
the employment rates of refugees declined between the cohort arriving in the 
early 1990s and those arriving in the late 1990s, despite the improvement 
in domestic labour market conditions. Thus, even in an immigrant-friendly 
country like Australia, refugees seem to have suffered deep disadvantage.
82 In his analysis Borjas (1987) predicts that, for given characteristics (and leaving aside other 
disadvantages that they may face), refugees would have higher than average earning power in the 
host country but lower than average earning power in the source country. This was motivated by 
the idea that in communist countries the reward system was not strongly correlated with that in 
the West; thus the most economically able were more likely to suffer suppression or expropriation 
and were therefore most likely to migrate.
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For Canada, Aydemir (2011) examined a cohort of immigrants arriving in 
2000/1 over the subsequent two years. He found that refugees initially had 
substantially lower participation rates and earnings than family migrants, with 
little evidence of catching up. Taking a longer term perspective, DeVoretz et 
al (2004) studied refugees who arrived in Canada between 1980 and 2000. By 
combining immigration and tax records they were able to track immigrants’ 
incomes according to their visa status. After seven years in Canada, those who 
had arrived as refugees had incomes that were about 40% lower than those 
arriving through the employment/skills stream, but were about the same as 
those who had arrived through the family stream. As compared with family 
migrants, refugees had higher levels of education on average but were less 
likely to be fluent in English or French. Although their human capital was 
similar overall to family migrants, refugees were twice as likely to depend on 
welfare benefits as family migrants. Overall only 52% of refugees aged 20–64 
had moved into employment after seven years in Canada.
If refugees suffered substantial (and increasing) disadvantage in immigrant-
friendly countries such as Australia and Canada, it seems likely they would fare 
even worse in Europe. A study of refugees using population register data for 
the Netherlands finds that refugees’ employment rates rose from 15% after one 
year to one-third after five years (Hartog and Zorlu, 2009, p. 233). The authors 
also investigated the effects of education on the probability of employment 
and on the earnings of those who had gained employment. The results show 
that having a basic education helps on both dimensions, but any additional 
education beyond this level counts for almost nothing. It is well known that 
the returns to pre-migration education tend to be low for all immigrants, as 
compared with education acquired in the host country. But refugees seem 
to suffer more than other immigrants, perhaps because their migration was 
unplanned. Thus refugees’ skills may not be as easily transferrable to the host 
country as is the case for other migrants, for whom the decision whether or 
not to migrate is likely to depend, at least in part, on the transferability of their 
skills.83
The most comprehensive and detailed information on refugee assimilation 
comes from Sweden. This provides a longer term perspective, as well as 
distinguishing between refugees who came under resettlement programmes 
and those who arrived as ‘spontaneous’ asylum seekers. Figure 10.1  is taken 
from Bevelander’s (2009) analysis of these data. It shows the profiles of 
employment rates for those aged 20–64 in three immigrant groups by number 
of years in Sweden. Two features stand out. One is that over the long term – ten 
years or more – employment probabilities rise steeply. This paints a somewhat 
more optimistic picture of refugee assimilation than if the focus is solely on 
83 This is the reverse of what the Borjas (1987) model predicts.
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the first few years. But it is a long haul and refugees never quite attain the level 
of native Swedes.
The second feature is that resettled refugees have lower employment rates 
than those who arrived spontaneously, although both groups eventually catch 
up with family reunification migrants. This reflects two factors. One is that 
resettled refugees, who are typically selected from the camps, are likely to be 
less positively selected than those who migrate to the destination on their 
own initiative.84 Hence their initial employability is particularly low. The other 
is that those who were resettled are the least likely to have networks to help 
them gain employment. As we have seen in Chapter 8 (Tables 8.2 and 8.3), pre-
existing networks (as reflected by the migrant stock) have a sizeable effect on 
the flow of asylum applications. Family reunification migrants are networked 
by definition and hence they are more likely to gain employment early on, 
even though they are not selected on employment criteria.
Analysing the Swedish micro-data, Bevelander and Pendakur (2009) confirm 
the patterns seen in Figure 10.1  and also the discrete effect of basic education 
on employment that was observed for the Netherlands. Interestingly they find 
that, for those who claimed asylum after arrival in Sweden, the time spent 
prior to obtaining a residence permit had a positive effect on the probability of 
employment. But this effect is smaller than time spent since obtaining status – 
a result that is also found for the Netherlands (Hartog and Zorlu, 2009, p. 237). 
It seems likely the weaker pre-status effect was due to time spent in limbo, 
without the right to work. Thus, long processing periods serve to retard the 
pace of assimilation but do not bring it to a halt.
84 Resettled refugees are typically selected by the UNHCR and then ‘offered’ to the receiving country. 
As Thomson (2009, pp. 37–42) illustrates, this can create a conflict of interest. While the UNHCR 
wishes to protect those who are most vulnerable and in need of assistance and support, the 
receiving country wishes to select those who are most employable and least likely to be a burden 
to the state (see also Rönnqvist, 2009, p. 139).
What Happens to Asylum Seekers?   89























Source: Bevelander, 2009, Figure 3.18; data kindly provided by Pieter Bevelander.























Source: Bevelander, 2009, Figure 3.23; data kindly provided by Pieter Bevelander.
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Once having gained the right to work there are many impediments still to 
be overcome. A small sample of refugees in the UK found that only 29% 
had employment compared with 60% of ethnic minorities generally (Bloch, 
2002, p. 88). This is partly because, as new immigrants, they lack contacts 
and information to access the labour market. But while refugees generally had 
lower employment rates than others of the same ethnic group, the variation 
across ethnic groups followed the same pattern as that of non-refugees.85 Of 
those in employment nearly two-thirds had gained it through kinship and 
ethnic networks. Apart from lack of contacts, the most important barriers 
to employment were lack of education, or lack of recognition of skills, and, 
above all, lack of language proficiency (Bloch, 2002, p. 114). In these respects 
refugees are not dissimilar to other recent immigrants, especially those from 
the poorer parts of the world. But they do seem to suffer some additional 
penalty. So while refugees may be positively selected on energy and initiative, 
these qualities are more than offset by the relatively poor match in terms 
of employability. The latter would account for their early disadvantage, the 
former for their eventual recovery.
It is sometimes argued that the dispersal of refugees adds a negative twist to 
their economic progress. Dispersal policies have been introduced in an effort 
to reduce clustering in gateway cities and to avoid the creation of ghettos, 
but in practice they have often been driven by the need to find suitable 
accommodation.86 For decades Germany has distributed asylum seekers across 
its Länder in proportion to population, and dispersal systems of various 
kinds have been introduced in Austria, Belgium, Denmark, the Netherlands, 
Sweden, and the UK. The Swedish policy, introduced in 1985, dispersed 
resettled refugees throughout the country, sometimes to remote areas. One 
study reports that non-employment increased by a third, earnings declined 
by a quarter, and welfare dependency increased by a half (Edin et al, 2004). 
Most of this effect was not directly due to dispersal, but rather to the shift in 
policy focus away from labour market integration towards welfare support.87 
However, dispersal to an initial location with poor employment prospects also 
had direct negative effects on the employment probabilities of refugees. And 
these were still visible after five years, despite considerable onward mobility 
(Åslund and Rooth, 2007).
85 Similar patterns of ethnic disadvantage can be found all across Europe, see Kahanec and 
Zimmermann, 2011.
86 For an outline and assessment of the earlier dispersal policies in Sweden, the Netherlands and the 
UK, see Robinson et al, 2003.
87 The dispersal policy was introduced at the same time that the responsibility for refugees was 
transferred from the Swedish Labour Market Board to the Swedish Immigration Board. Before the 
reform, refugees were shifted quickly into work or training. After the reform they were provided 
with welfare support, initially for 18 months and possibly longer, with less emphasis on training 
and employment (Edin et al, 2004).
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In Denmark a dispersal policy was introduced in 1986. In contrast to the 
Swedish case, the evidence suggests that this had modest effects on the job 
finding rate (Damm and Rosholm, 2010). Refugees often moved to more urban 
locations where there are larger numbers of co-nationals. For the low-skilled, 
locating in ethnic enclaves led to increased wage rates with only very marginal 
effects on employment rates (Damm, 2009). Thus the effects of initial dispersal 
per se seem to be modest. What matters more is restrictions on seeking work 
or limited opportunities for mobility, in combination with generous welfare 
benefit and housing provisions.
10.2 Rehabilitation and integration of refugees
Labour market assimilation is just one (albeit important) aspect of refugee 
assimilation. There is a variety of other features of the socioeconomic 
experience of refugees that govern their welfare and also the degree to which 
they integrate into the host society. These processes have been a matter for 
concern among refugee advocates and supporters. There are two important 
elements that influence the economic progress that refugees make and the 
degree to which they integrate. One is the characteristics of refugees on arrival 
in the host country. The other is the conditions that they face during and after 
the refugees status determination process.
One important characteristic is the health of refugees. Some studies have found 
that immigrants are typically healthier than the host population, perhaps as 
a result of positive selection (Razum et al, 2000; Kennedy et al, 2006). But the 
evidence suggests that this is less true for refugees. In Australia those who 
arrived on humanitarian visas were twice as likely to self-report less than good 
health than other immigrants (Chiswick et al, 2008). Among refugees in the 
UK, one in six suffered from a physical health condition that was serious 
enough to require treatment, and which potentially affected their activity 
(Burnett and Peel, 2001). Such conditions include tuberculosis, HIV/AIDS, 
and respiratory and gastrointestinal disorders, and their incidence is strongly 
associated with the health environment of the source country. Although much 
of the attention has been on women and children, it is far from clear that they 
suffer the greatest health deficits (Iglesias et al, 2003).
A key difference between refugees and other immigrants is that the former 
have often been traumatised. Some have suffered physical injuries as a result 
of war and those who are victims of rape or other human rights abuses may 
be severely traumatised. Many have witnessed killings, sometimes of close 
relatives, or have been parted from their family members who have been 
abducted or imprisoned. A meta-analysis of nearly 7,000 refugees in seven 
OECD countries concluded that 1 in 10 suffered from post-traumatic stress 
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disorder (PTSD), and 1 in 20 suffered major depression (Fazel et al, 2005). For 
those involved in the Balkan wars the incidence of PSTD was 20% (Priebe et 
al, 2010). Thus, although mental health disorders among refugees are lower 
than is sometimes suggested, nevertheless they are 10 to 20 times the rate of 
the rest of the population.
These conditions can be exacerbated by their experiences after arrival in 
the host country.88 A particular concern is access to health care. A survey 
of European countries found that while almost all countries offer initial 
screening for certain medical conditions such as tuberculosis, HIV, and other 
conditions, these are sometimes only voluntary and sometimes only available 
for those held in reception centres (Norredam et al, 2005). Even after receiving 
some form of status, refugees’ access to healthcare was found to be the same 
as for citizens in only 10 out of 23 countries. In some cases treatment was 
only available for emergencies or for vulnerable groups such as children and 
pregnant women. In Germany, for example, full access is available only after 
three years. Other studies have also drawn attention to the fact that effective 
access to treatment is limited by administrative barriers and sometimes by its 
cost.
Perhaps the most important single element in the integration of refugee is to 
gain fluency in the host country language. Studies of immigrant assimilation 
find that language fluency is strongly associated with a higher probability of 
employment and with higher earnings (Chiswick and Miller, 1995; Dustmann, 
1994) as well as with social integration. For immigrants with limited pre-
existing labour market skills, fluency is a necessary condition for gaining 
education and training, while for others it provides a means of adapting 
existing skills to the host country context. The acquisition of language skills 
itself depends on three elements: the economic incentives for doing so, the 
ease with which fluency can be acquired, and on exposure in the host country. 
For refugees who are likely to settle permanently the incentives are strong but 
there are also serous impediments that include health problems and lack of 
institutional knowledge, limited resources and lack of residential stability.89
88 Studies of refugees placed in Australia’s detention centres (a practice now abolished) find that they 
suffered from a wide range of trauma events, before and during incarceration, leading to despair 
and depression and sometimes attempted suicide (Steel and Silove, 2001). In part, these disorders 
were the result of a harsh detention regime – and the longer the detention the worse they became 
(Green and Eagar, 2010). Those who had experienced detention suffered more mental health 
problems than those who had received permanent protection, partly because of the uncertainty 
about their future (Momartin et al, 2006). Although these cases are somewhat extreme, they serve 
to illustrate that post-arrival experiences can exacerbate or prolong the incidence of trauma-
related disorders which retard the process of rehabilitation.
89 One study for the United States finds that soon after arrival refugees earned less and worked fewer 
hours than other immigrants but ten years later they had overtaken other immigrants on both 
these dimensions and had also improved their English skills by more (Cortes, 2004). However, 
refugees are identified only by country of origin and not by entry visa status.
What Happens to Asylum Seekers?   93
A recent longitudinal survey of refugees in the UK studied their progress 
from the time of gaining status in 2005 onwards. About half of the refugees 
had been in employment or self-employment before migration but less than 
half had any educational qualifications and 27% had less than six years of 
education. Interestingly, at the time of gaining residency about half had been 
in the country for more than a year, during which time some had improved 
their English. This probably accounts for the fact noted above that time before 
gaining status contributes modestly to subsequent employability (Daniel et al, 
2010). In the following 21 months the proportion with a good command of 
English increased from 26% to 38%, while the proportion with a very low level 
of English decreased from 38% to 15%. In the ensuing year or so the proportion 
employed increased from 34% to 40%. Not surprisingly those with the higher 
skills and language proficiency were most likely to gain employment, although 
this was typically in jobs that undervalued their qualifications (Cebulla et al, 
2010).
Although we lack specific studies of language acquisition for refugees over a 
range of countries, it seems likely that their patterns will be similar to those for 
immigrants as a whole. Econometric studies uniformly find that fluency in the 
host country language is higher the more educated the migrant and the longer 
the period of residence in the host country. On the other hand, the greater 
the linguistic distance between the source and destination countries, the more 
difficult or costly it is to learn the language. Those from Indo-European language 
origins, and especially from the same Germanic or Romance language group as 
the host country, generally do best. All these findings are supported in a study 
of immigrant language proficiency in nine Western countries (Van Tubergen 
and Kalmijn, 2005). Interestingly the authors also found that immigrants from 
politically suppressed societies did less well – an indication that refugees face 
greater disadvantage than other migrants as a result of selection and stress. 
They also found differences among destinations: notably that immigrant 
fluency was lower where host country attitudes were more anti-immigrant.
Thus existing evidence suggests that the integration and economic 
assimilation of refugees presents challenges for integration policies in host 
countries. Perhaps not surprisingly, the last decade has seen an expansion 
of integration programmes in countries such as Denmark, Sweden, Norway 
and the Netherlands, followed by Austria, France, Germany and the UK.90 
These programmes apply to immigrants generally and they have increasingly 
introduced language requirements as a condition of permanent residency or 
citizenship (Carrera, 2006). There has also been an expansion in language 
training for refugees, often coupled with programmes on the host country 
culture as well as vocational support and mentoring. In some countries such 
90 Policy developments in a variety of countries are discussed in a special issue of the Journal of 
Refugee Studies (2010).
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as Denmark these have been customised to the individual’s specific needs. 
Efforts to provide vocational skills have been more limited and apparently 
less successful, although there has been little formal programme evaluation. 
And while governments often grant the right to work sooner than the one 
year required by EU regulations, the period is often extended by bureaucratic 
delays. More problematic still is the status of those who are not recognised 
as refugees but have some form of ‘tolerated’ status and who often face strict 
limitations on the right to work .
10.3 Persistence and disappearance
If we are interested in the fate of those who enter the asylum process then we 
must be concerned not only with those who eventually receive permission to 
stay but also with those who are rejected. As we have seen, the total recognition 
rate (Convention plus humanitarian as a share of all decisions) fell from over 
a half in the early 1980s to about a quarter in recent years. Even if we take 
account of those who are successful on appeal and those who gain status on 
other grounds, around two-thirds of all applicants do not obtain the right to 
remain in the country.
What happens to them is a rather vexed question. Some are repatriated 
voluntarily, with or without official assistance, and an increasing proportion 
are forcibly deported. In the UK removals and voluntary departures increased 
as a percentage of claims rejected from less than 20% in 1997–2001 to just 
over a third in 2002–6. In 2006 the UK Home Office reached its target of the 
number of removals equalling the number of unfounded claims. Nevertheless 
it is hard to escape the conclusion that, especially in the earlier years, a large 
proportion of rejected asylum seekers simply stayed on illegally.91 The National 
Audit Office (2005) estimated that between 1997 and 2004 the number of 
rejected applicants who were not known to have left the country was between 
155,000 and 283,000. An even larger number of cases (about 400,000) were still 
‘unresolved’ and it was taking over a year to remove those who were rejected 
on appeal. In a subsequent report the National Audit Office (2009) found that a 
significant backlog remained and that policy on removals had met with limited 
success.92 Around 60,000 of these were still unaccounted for in 2011. In 2009 
a little over 17,000 principal applicants for asylum were rejected while about 
91 One source estimates that in the EU-15 there were between 1.8 and 3.3 million illegals in 2008, 
down from 3.1–5.3 million in 2002 (Clandestino, 2009). This seems a somewhat conservative 
estimate and is substantially lower than the 5–8 million that was widely canvassed earlier in the 
decade.
92 The National Audit Office (2009, p. 9) noted that delays in processing and limited detention 
facilities made it difficult to keep track of rejected asylum seekers. In a minority of cases external 
factors made removal impossible, while in others the process had been aborted by administrative 
delays, because individuals had absconded or travel documents had expired.
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10,000 were either removed or left voluntarily.93 It seems likely that many of 
the lost asylum seekers have moved into the underground economy, adding to 
the existing UK stock of around half a million undocumented migrants.
The pattern in other EU countries has been similar. In the surge of asylum 
applications in the early 1990s the authorities in most countries failed to keep 
track of rejected asylum seekers. Towards the end of the decade some countries, 
such as France, the Netherlands and Switzerland, embarked on repatriation 
programmes in cooperation with source country governments (Khoser, 
2001). But the numbers involved were small. More generally, governments 
increased their surveillance of, and control over, rejected asylum seekers and 
strengthened their deportation procedures. Some of these measures have met 
with limited success. In 2005 the Dutch Immigration Service identified 26,000 
applicants whose claims had been rejected prior to 2001 but who were still 
present. Of these, 41% were given residence permits, but of the remainder, 61% 
absconded to avoid being removed (ECRE, 2005a, p. 226). In the Netherlands 
and elsewhere a further tightening of policy in recent years has led to fewer 
rejected asylum seekers being ‘lost’.
This process has been aided by the speeding up of status determination 
procedures so that there is less opportunity for asylum seekers to disappear 
while awaiting a decision. It has also been helped by the expansion of detention 
facilities and by the general decline in asylum claims since 2002. Reforms 
have occurred in different countries at different times and are still ongoing. 
In countries where there is a multistage process, the time to first decision has 
fallen more dramatically than the time to final decision. But waiting time 
overall has declined. In Denmark the average waiting time to a decision fell 
from an average of 146 days in 2009 to 41 days in 2010.94 Similarly in Finland 
the process has been shortened to four months instead of extending for years. 
One side-effect of increasing the probability of removal is that some potential 
asylum seekers may now not apply for asylum at all, fearing that if they are 
rejected they will not be able to avoid removal.95
By their very nature we know much less about rejected asylum seekers who 
have simply become undocumented migrants. Once lost from official view it 
is very difficult to know how rejected asylum seekers fare as illegal stayers. It 
seems likely that their employment rates are no lower than those who have 
been recognised as refugees. A 2008 survey of 1,100 undocumented adults in 
93 Of those, over 6,000 were forcibly removed, see http://rds.homeoffice.gov.uk/rds/pdfs10/hosb1510.
pdf, p. 31.
94 See www.denmark.dk/en/servicemenu/news/generalnews/bigdropinasylumapplicationwaitingtimes . htm
95 According to ECRE, ‘Overly restrictive measures may also cause some refugees to lose faith in 
the ability of asylum systems to guarantee a fair examination and lead them to reside and work 
illegally in European states rather than formally lodge a protection claim’ (2005b, p. 10). However, 
a large number still do apply for asylum. It is estimated that about three-quarters of irregular 
migrants to Italy in 2008 applied for asylum, and of those, half were accepted as refugees.
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11 European countries found that about a fifth were in regular employment, 
while a third had occasional work (Médecins du Monde, 2009, p. 64). On the 
one hand, their employment options are limited, but on the other hand in the 
absence of other sources of income such as welfare benefits, they have even 
greater incentives to gain an independent income. As a result they are likely to 
seek work in the illegal market at low wages, typically as cleaners or labourers 
and in sectors such as agriculture, construction, catering and domestic service. 
Evidence on illegal Mexican immigrants in the United States indicates that 
they earn around 12–22% less than those who are legal (Kossoudji and Cobb-
Clark, 2002; Schluter and Wahba, 2009). Although there is no hard evidence 
for illegals in Europe, casual empiricism suggests that the situation would be 
similar, if not worse.
In the survey of illegal immigrants in Europe (Médecins du Monde, 2009), 
more than a quarter of respondents claimed to be victims of persecution 
in their home country and, despite their illegal status in the host country, 
more than 80% intended to stay. Less than half were with their families and 
40% were living alone, often in destitution.96 Less than half of them had 
secure accommodation: 8% were sleeping rough and a similar number slept 
in shelters; two-thirds of the rest lived in overcrowded conditions. While a 
third of men and a quarter of women were in poor health, only around a 
fifth had effective access to health care. Even where they had the right to 
health services the majority did not avail themselves of it, either because of 
the cost and administrative complexity or because of fear of being reported to 
the immigration authorities (see also PICUM, 2007).
It is doubtful that we shall ever have a full picture of illegal immigrants. 
Nevertheless it is clear that, while their characteristics seem very much like 
those of recognised refugees, they are even more disadvantaged by the fact 
of their social exclusion. It is important to stress, however, that not all illegal 
immigrants are rejected asylum seekers or individuals who have fled from 
persecution but never entered the asylum process. In the United States, for 
example, there are an estimated 11 million undocumented migrants, two-
thirds of whom are from Mexico and only a small proportion of whom could 
potentially claim asylum (and hence they are not discussed in detail here). 
By contrast, in Europe there is a much greater overlap between the asylum 
system and illegal immigration. As a result the two have become inextricably 
linked and thus the issue of illegal immigration has become an integral part 
of asylum policy.
96 Amnesty International (2006) has documented cases of destitution among rejected asylum 
seekers, arguing that this was a deliberate policy to make them leave the country.
11 A New Start for Policy?
The rise in asylum applications to a peak in the 1990s started a long process 
of soul-searching about the policies that were allowing this to happen. As we 
have seen, there was increasing disquiet and political clamour in a number of 
countries that led directly or indirectly to a dramatic toughening of national 
asylum policies – something that has been well described as a policy backlash. 
But it also raised much broader questions about the international refugee 
regime itself. In particular there are three questions. The first is whether or not 
the fundamental underpinning for asylum policy, the Refugee Convention, 
remains an adequate basis for policy, and whether instead it should be 
reformed or perhaps scrapped altogether. The second is to ask if there is scope, 
within this framework, for greater regional cooperation between receiving 
countries, notably within the European Union. The third focuses on how to 
reform specific branches of policy towards asylum seekers and refugees. This 
chapter discusses these three issues.
Before proceeding it is important to note two considerations that must be at 
the core of any evaluation of asylum policies. The first is that any reform to 
policy must bear in mind the likely effect on the numbers of applicants. We 
have seen that policy is important in determining the numbers. So there is 
simply no credibility to policy recommendations that are based on throwaway 
lines to the effect that, because asylum seekers are fleeing conflict, they will 
not be deterred by tougher policy. A second and related issue is that, whatever 
policies are recommended, they must be acceptable to the governments 
concerned and to the broad majority of voters who elect them. Recognising 
the political realities is an important first step in framing realistic proposals for 
policy reform.
98 Seeking Asylum: Trends and Policies in the OECD
11.1 Scrap the Convention?
Critics have often argued that the Refugee Convention was a product of its time 
that has outlived its useful life.97 They argue that it is not well suited to the sorts 
of refugee surges that have been observed in the last three decades. In an age 
when access to travel by air and by sea has increased, when people smuggling 
has become a multinational industry and when there are enormous incentives 
for economic migration, it has become something of an anachronism. Some 
observers have blamed the Convention for governments’ inability to control 
unwanted migration, something that it was never designed for. Yet, in relation 
to the growth in population and the capacity of developed countries to assist 
refugees, the refugee burden in recent years does not seem disproportionate as 
compared with the early postwar years when the refugee regime was created. 
Rather, the issue is one of decreased tolerance for accepting refugees who 
arrive spontaneously, often illegally, and who are often suspected of not being 
genuine.
Perhaps the acid test is whether or not people and governments actually 
continue to support the Convention. Clearly one option available to sceptical 
governments would simply be to withdraw from the Convention and 
introduce policies more suited to their own national needs and values. On 
the Convention’s 50th anniversary in 2001, British Prime Minister Tony Blair 
insisted that ‘its values are timeless but we should stand back and consider 
its application in today’s world’. He went on to argue for ‘reform, not of 
the Convention’s values, but of how it operates’ (quoted in Achiron, 2001). 
But at a meeting in Geneva in 2001 attended by the representatives of 140 
governments the Convention was reaffirmed by all its signatories. In the 
global consultations that followed, its strengths and weaknesses were widely 
debated, and although a range of initiatives were agreed under the rubric of 
an ‘Agenda for Protection’, the Convention itself survives unchanged. Much 
of the frustration has to do with the Convention’s vagueness on key issues, 
such as the terms of entry to asylum procedures and the determination of 
refugee status, which, some observers would claim, have allowed governments 
to progressively undermine its key principles. Yet this can also be seen as a 
source of strength: providing room for manoeuvre has insured the Convention 
against defections that might otherwise have led to its ultimate collapse.
As we have seen in Chapter 2, the Convention’s main provisions were shaped 
by historical circumstances. But that mere fact does not mean that it is 
now obsolete. Among the most important of its provisions is the definition 
of a refugee (Article 1). Some have criticised this clause for its focus on the 
individual’s fear of persecution. Yet it is difficult to see how blanket protection 
could be afforded for groups or classes of people (as was done in the 1940s 
97 See for example Millbank, 2001.
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and in acute situations ever since) without unleashing even greater criticism 
that it opens the door to people who are not genuine refugees. Others have 
argued that the definition should be extended to explicitly cover issues such 
as persecution on the grounds of gender or sexual orientation, persecution 
by non-state agents, and (as in the OAU Convention and the Cartagena 
Declaration) in the event of generalised violence or conflict. In fact, those 
persecuted for reasons not covered by the Convention are often given some 
form of asylum. However, policy towards those fleeing generalised violence or 
conflict tends to be less generous and less uniform across countries (see further 
below).
One of the most controversial issues concerns what many see as the pivotal 
clause of the Convention, the non-refoulement requirement of Article 33. Some 
critics argue that it is this, above all, that has forced Western governments to 
open their doors to all comers. But the Convention is unclear about whether 
non-refoulement kicks in only when an asylum seeker arrives on the country’s 
territory or if it applies at or outside the border.98 Since at least the 1990s the 
practice of many governments has been to grant entry to asylum procedures 
only to those who are on the territory. At the same time they have interdicted 
boats (as in the United States and elsewhere), excised outlying territories 
(as in Australia) or established special airport zones (as in much of Europe), 
tightened visa requirements and introduced departure inspections in order to 
prevent the arrival of potential asylum seekers.99 As the evidence of chapters 
8 and 9 shows, this has been effective in reducing asylum applications to 
levels that governments and their voters will tolerate. While this can be seen 
as undermining the spirit of the Convention, it is difficult to see how else to 
limit the numbers to acceptable levels without making other radical changes.
Nevertheless these practices have been severely criticised on the grounds that, 
while they may help to deter or deflect those who are not genuine refugees 
as defined under the Convention, they inevitably have the effect of denying 
the right to asylum to many who are genuine refugees. Gibney (2006) has 
argued that one solution is to allow asylum seekers to apply at embassies and 
98 One view is that it applies at the border because the origin of the clause is in Article 3 of the 
1933 Refugee Convention (Hathaway, 2005, p. 315). But this applied specifically to refugees who 
had already been issued with Nansen certificates and so the application is not straightforward. 
Furthermore, as the 1933 Convention was ratified by only eight countries, the force of precedent 
appears to be rather weak.
99 These practices have typically been supported by the courts. Thus in 1994 the US Supreme Court 
found that interdicting boats from Haiti was not in contravention of the Convention. In the 
UK Court of Appeal the British government successfully defended the screening by its officials 
of airline passengers embarking in the Czech Republic. (However this was later reversed by the 
House of Lords, not under asylum law, but on the grounds of discrimination against a specific 
class of people (the Roma) relative to other Czech citizens.) On the legality of interdiction, see 
Hathaway, 2005, pp. 308 and 336–40.
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consulates in the countries to which refugees escape in the first instance.100 Some 
governments did offer that possibility up to the 1990s but most subsequently 
abolished or restricted it, and it is hard to envisage that they would reverse it. 
Such a policy would multiply the number of applications without helping to 
eliminate unfounded claims. In any case, identifying eligible refugees would 
be better done by organisations such as the UNHCR or the International 
Organization for Migration, which have the relevant expertise. As it stands, 
these organisations select far more refugees for resettlement programmes 
than developed countries are willing to take.101 And it is clear (as in the case 
of Australia) that the arrival of spontaneous asylum seekers has reduced the 
willingness of governments to accept programme refugees. Thus it is not 
feasible to offer easier access to asylum without restricting the demand for it 
through some other means.
One possibility is the greater use of temporary protection, a status that would 
last until the conditions in the source country have improved and the risk of 
persecution has declined. As we have seen, the Refugee Convention was enacted 
against the background of the Cold War and in the decades that followed 
it was used as a basis to provide permanent resettlement for those fleeing 
communism. However, those conditions have gradually changed. Although 
some civil wars still lead to protracted refugee situations, the fall of communism 
has brought a decline in the proxy wars which fuelled their persistence. And 
as we saw in Chapter 4 (Table 4.1) there has been a sharp increase since 1990 
in the number of conflicts that have been contained or resolved. Some would 
argue that temporary protection is inconsistent with the spirit, if not with 
the letter, of the Convention. However, the text of the Convention does not 
require the host country to provide permanent protection to refugees, and it 
specifically provides for a change of status when source country conditions 
change.102 Nevertheless, it takes the resettlement and integration of refugees 
as the norm – something that reflected the circumstances of the time. But it 
is surely reasonable to argue that the true spirit of the Convention is that of 
protection from persecution rather than that of permanent resettlement.
Temporary protection has been used in the case of sudden influxes (such as that 
from Kosovo) and it could be a route to permanent settlement if conditions 
in the source country do not improve within a few years. From the point of 
view of host countries there are two major advantages. One is that offering 
100 Noll (2005) discusses the legal basis for applications (protected entry procedures) at embassies. He 
finds that there is no requirement under the Refugee Convention and that any obligation under 
other human rights legislation is weak.
101 In 2008 the UNHCR submitted 121,000 refugees for resettlement, while the number resettled 
with UNHCR assistance was 67,000 (UNHCR, Statistical Yearbook 2008, p. 10).
102 Article 1C(5) provides that a person may cease to be a refugee as defined by the Convention if ‘He 
can no longer, because the circumstances in connexion with which he has been recognized as a 
refugee have ceased to exist, continue to refuse to avail himself of the protection of the country 
of his nationality.’
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only temporary protection in the first instance would limit the numbers 
applying, as was illustrated in Chapters 8 and 9. It would probably also 
decrease the incentive to apply for asylum as a route to permanent migration. 
More important, limiting the right to resettlement could potentially lead to 
a greater number being protected from persecution. By curtailing the right 
to permanent resettlement, governments (and their electorates) might be 
persuaded to accept larger numbers of those in genuine need. The more that 
refugees can be seen to return when source country conditions have improved, 
the more places could be opened up to those with current and pressing needs 
for protection. But such proposals can be criticised on two grounds. One is 
that it leads to a two-tier system, where one set of refugees gain permanent 
protection and another set does not. But this feature already exists, where 
some asylum applicants gain Convention status while others receive the lesser 
rights of humanitarian protection. A second issue is the obvious difficulty of 
returning refugees once the immediate risk of persecution has abated and the 
likely risk of refoulement.
Critics of the current refugee regime often argue that, rather than limiting 
access and toughening asylum procedures, developed countries should pay 
more attention to improving conditions in source regions as a means of 
stemming the flow of applicants for asylum. This should not be interpreted as a 
shortcoming of the Convention, but rather as a call for a set of complementary 
strategies. One argument is that the considerable resources ploughed into 
asylum could be better used in finding ways to prevent or mediate in civil 
wars or to provide source country governments with incentives for reducing 
human rights abuses. The only thing worth saying about this is that, if 
such cost-effective ways of peacemaking were available, they would surely 
have been adopted long ago. Another variant on this theme is to put more 
resources into improving living conditions in source countries. Perhaps the 
best way to illustrate the effect of such policies is to refer to the effects of 
living standards on asylum flows that were estimated in Chapter 5. They show 
that a $1,000 increase in the GDP per capita of source countries would reduce 
asylum claims by around 20% (Table 5.2). These effects are not negligible, 
but even if development aid could be shown to work, it would require a vast 
input of resources to lift source country living standards by enough to make 
a significant dent on the number of applications.103 Highly commendable 
though such polices might be, on any realistic scale they would do little to 
relieve the need for tough asylum polices.
103 For a critical evaluation of the literature on the relationship between development aid and 
economic growth in poor countries see Easterly, 2003, and Easterly and Pfutze, 2008. Easterly 
concludes: ‘In virtually no other field of economics do economists and policymakers promise 
such large welfare benefits for modest policy interventions as “we” do in aid and growth. The 
macroeconomic evidence does not support these claims. There is no Next Big Idea that will make 
the small amount of foreign aid the catalyst for economic growth of the world’s poor nations’ 
(2003, p. 40).
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Another theme is to augment the international refugee regime through 
enhanced cooperation between source and destination regions and countries, 
and in particular through North–South cooperation. Two initiatives launched 
by the UNHCR are worth noting. The first of these, Agenda for Protection, grew 
out of the Global Consultations programme that led up to the 50th anniversary 
of the Convention, and its first aim was to strengthen the implementation 
of the Convention. It also laid out an ambitious programme that called for 
North–South collaboration in a number of areas including burden sharing 
among receiving countries, building refugee reception capacities, addressing 
security concerns and protecting women and children.104 However, this 
programme yielded very little fruit. One reason is that the recommendations 
were broad in scope and non-binding in practice. Like other such plans, there 
was no mechanism to make it happen. Another reason is that this particular 
initiative was rapidly overtaken by another UNHCR-sponsored plan (Loescher 
et al, 2008, pp. 62–3).
An initiative entitled Convention Plus was launched in 2003 and again it 
called for strengthening adherence to the principles of the Convention.105 
The ‘Plus’ included a range of general issues as well as programmes targeted 
to specific refugee situations. The emphasis was on finding durable solutions 
to refugee situations through enhanced cooperation over resettlement and 
repatriation, and there was also a focus on development aid and capacity 
building in countries of first asylum. The main thrust of the programme was 
on international burden sharing, both in terms of the distribution of refugees 
and financial assistance. But, as before, there were no mechanisms to make 
it happen, and thus it was ‘doomed to fail from the outset’ (Zieck, 2009). 
According to one set of observers: ‘this was due to the polarisation of positions 
between Northern and Southern States on migration and development’ 
(Loescher et al, 2008, p. 64).106
Although North–South cooperation lay at the heart of Convention Plus the 
UNHCR called for cooperation under three distinct strands (or prongs) of 
asylum policy. These included developing durable solutions within source 
regions and improving asylum procedures. But one of them, the so-called EU 
104 A revised version of this programme can be found at www.unhcr.org/3e637b194.html.
105 This was initiated by incoming High Commissioner Ruud Lubbers and first developed in 2002.
106 They go on to explain that: ‘In the development debates, Southern states were left disillusioned 
by both the reluctance of donor states to offer significant additional assistance and the exclusion 
of host states from many of the “donor-only” discussions. Meanwhile, Northern states were 
left disillusioned by the apparent unwillingness of Southern host states to countenance local 
integration or self-sufficiency opportunities for refugees on their territories. In the irregular 
migration debate, Northern states wanted a definition of “effective protection” that would make 
return and readmission of refugees to regions of origin easier. For their part, Southern states 
wanted a definition that would ensure greater financial commitment by donors to strengthen 
the refugee protection capacity of host states without this being related to readmission’ (Loescher 
et al, 2008, p. 64). Betts (2011) argues that the failure of Convention Plus was due to the lack of 
issue linkage between its different strands, something that might otherwise have fostered greater 
cooperation.
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prong, envisaged a deeper integration of asylum policies in receiving countries, 
including the establishment of centrally managed closed reception centres for 
processing certain types of applications. This topic is explored further below.
11.2 The political economy of cooperation
As noted in the previous section, governments around the world have 
demonstrated that they have little appetite for scrapping the Refugee 
Convention or replacing it with something radically different. We have also 
seen that there is a degree of genuine compassion for refugees among the 
populations of developed countries – at least up to a point. But the fact is 
that the number of refugees who could potentially be resettled far exceeds 
the number that it is politically possible to admit and therefore some form of 
rationing is inevitable. Acting individually, governments have been obliged to 
respond to swings in public opinion, and particularly to the ebb and flow of 
extreme right-wing populism, with ever tougher policies in order to maintain 
the numbers at ‘acceptable’ levels. Given that the provisions of the Convention 
are fairly elastic, they have managed to stay largely within the letter of the 
Convention, if not within its spirit.
The question here is whether or not, in the light of these realities, there are 
potential gains to cooperation among refugee receiving countries. The focus 
is principally on the countries of the EU, which after all receive more than 
two-thirds of all applications to industrialised countries. And it is here, above 
all, that cooperation is politically possible. As we have seen, a process of 
harmonisation of asylum policies has been underway for more than a decade 
under the banner of the CEAS. That invites the question of what types of 
policy coordination could and should be adopted in its further development.
Here I outline in words the findings from a relatively simple theoretical 
model, the details of which are presented in the appendix to this chapter. 
In the model, the populations of two countries place a value on providing 
a safe haven for refugees, but the marginal benefit declines as the number 
admitted increases. Each country’s citizens place a value on the refugees that 
their own country admits but they also put some weight on the refugees that 
are accepted by the other country. Because the benefits from refugees do not 
flow exclusively to the citizens of the country that accommodates them, 
refugees have the characteristic of a public good. It is worth stressing that the 
benefits considered here are those of the populations of the host countries, 
not the refugees themselves. This reflects the fact that these are the citizens 
who ultimately determine policy. The gains to the refugees from escaping 
persecution matter in this model only insofar as they are transformed into the 
humanitarian motives of the host country population. There is also a positive 
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cost of refugees that depends on the number of refugees admitted and that 
falls only on the host country. So the net benefit from refugees to the citizens 
of one country depends positively on the refugees admitted to their country, 
positively on the number admitted to the other country, and negatively on the 
host country cost.
The two countries face different levels of demand for asylum places, reflecting 
differences in the preferences of those seeking asylum or the proximity of one 
destination compared with another. Each country’s government has a single 
policy tool, such that a tougher policy reduces the number of refugees admitted. 
Tougher policy in one country reduces its total applications but deflects 
some of them to the other country. In this setting, each country chooses its 
asylum policy taking the other country’s policy as given. This produces a Nash 
equilibrium in policies, where the greater is the cost of refugees, the tougher 
is policy. The country that faces the higher demand for asylum chooses a 
tougher policy than the country facing the lower demand. In this framework, 
where the countries are identical except for the asylum demand that they face, 
they choose different policies in order to achieve the same number of refugees. 
If the countries were allowed to differ in other respects then both the policies 
and the outcomes would differ.
Because countries acting individually do not take account of the value of their 
refugees to people in other countries, they do not maximise the total social 
welfare from refugees. Put differently, because there is a public good element, 
refugee places are underprovided as compared with the social optimum that 
would be prescribed by a social planner. If, instead of the non-cooperative 
outcome, we maximise the sum of (net) welfare for the two countries jointly, 
then policy is less tough and more refugees are admitted. Two points are worth 
emphasising. The first is that the difference between the social optimum and 
the Nash equilibrium outcome emerges only in the presence of the public 
good element, although that difference is magnified if there are deflection 
effects. The second point is that the social optimum does not imply that the 
two countries have the same policies. Policy in each country is more generous 
to refugees than in the Nash equilibrium but the country that faces the higher 
demand for asylum still has the tougher policies.
During the 1990s it was often argued that some form of burden sharing could 
have been used to achieve better outcomes. One way of characterising this 
would be to introduce a common financial pool, to which countries contribute 
(as a lump sum), and then to redistribute this to countries according to the 
number of refugees that they take. What this does is to raise the total number 
of refugees that are admitted by reducing the marginal cost of refugees. 
Lowering the cost per refugee essentially compensates for the fact that 
policies that are chosen non-cooperatively are too tough. The establishment 
of the European Refugee Fund set up in 2000 can be interpreted in this light, 
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although the amounts redistributed were relatively modest.107 One advantage 
of this approach is that it involves negotiating a common formula for both 
countries, whereas setting optimal policies in the absence of burden sharing 
would involve agreeing on a different policy for each country. Nevertheless 
serious reservations have been expressed about the political feasibility of such 
a policy (see further below).
As we have seen, the main focus of EU policy since the Treaty of Amsterdam 
has been on harmonising asylum policies rather than on burden sharing. 
That raises the question of whether or not welfare could be improved by 
harmonisation. One way of assessing this is to maximise joint welfare subject 
to a common asylum policy. The effect is that the country with the larger 
demand for asylum becomes more generous but the policy of the other 
country could change either way. An alternative scenario would reflect the 
often-repeated criticism that harmonisation has been a process of levelling 
down to the toughest policies. If the country with the toughest policies chooses 
the joint policy, then it would be tougher (and welfare would be lower) than 
if harmonisation took place cooperatively. Tougher policies under levelling 
down could be ameliorated through a lump sum payment/subsidy per refugee 
scheme, but would still fall short of the social optimum.
What this analysis reveals is that there are essentially two issues. One is 
that, in the presence of public good effects, the overall number of refugees 
admitted is too low. The other is that the optimal policy will differ between 
countries, so that the social optimum cannot be reached with harmonised 
policies. One possibility would be to have a much more integrated policy – 
a truly centralised policy – that would include the redistribution of refugees 
across countries. Such redistribution would compensate for the constraint 
imposed by a common asylum policy between countries facing different levels 
of demand for asylum. This would be the equivalent, at the EU level, of the 
dispersal schemes that have been adopted by individual EU countries. In an 
integrated asylum system, both forms of burden sharing could be used to 
reach the optimum. Dispersal across countries would address the problem of 
the uneven distribution of refugees that is implied by harmonised policies, 
107 The European Refugee Fund was originally provided with a budget of €216 million over the 
five years 2000–4, about a third distributed as a lump sum to member states and two-thirds 
according to the number applying or receiving some form of refugee status. While this represents 
a significant step forward, it does not seem to have led to any easing of asylum policies. But in 
the words of one observer: ‘Given the total costs of reception in the Member States and the share 
guaranteed to each Member State, the redistributive effects of the ERF are but a drop in the ocean. 
It must be praised as a dam-breaker construction with regard to the many dilemmas of fiscal 
burden-sharing, but its practical role in creating predictability and reducing resort to restrictive 
migration and asylum policies is rather negligible’ (Noll, 2003, p. 245). An enhanced version of 
the European Refugee fund was established for the years 2005–10 to the value of €604 million, 
over four-fifths of which is allocated between member states according to the number of asylum 
seekers and refugees. This was superseded for 2008–13 by a new allocation of €614 million. Unlike 
its predecessor, this version included the possibility of distributing to a member state €4,000 per 
refugee for resettlement under certain circumstances.
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while financial burden sharing could be used to attain the ‘right’ number of 
refugees in total. Of course there are many pitfalls to agreeing on a policy that 
goes substantially beyond what has been envisaged for the CEAS so far.
A further issue is whether or not any of these outcomes could be achieved 
through the political process. In an important paper, Facchini et al (2006) 
analyse how the outcome will be affected when voters in each country delegate 
to an elected representative the authority to negotiate international policy on 
their behalf. In the presence of a public good effect the median voter in one 
country will choose a representative with a lower preference for refugees in the 
knowledge that the choice of a tougher policy would increase the number of 
refugees taken by the other country.108 As a result, the non-cooperative (Nash) 
outcome is less generous than that described above. Joint welfare is increased 
when the representatives of each country bargain over the policy settings for 
both countries but, because of strategic delegation, it still falls short of the 
social optimum. In this setting, introducing a financial burden sharing scheme 
does not help because it exacerbates the effect of strategic delegation. Thus, 
even without the complication of harmonising policies, the political process 
may limit the possibility of reaching a more desirable outcome through joint 
decision-making.
What is the likely outcome in terms of practical politics? In the EU the issue 
is not one of country representatives jointly setting policies that differ among 
countries, but rather, of ceding the authority to make policy to a supranational 
body, in this case the European Commission. Clearly that body could be more 
or less conservative than the direct representatives would be but it would 
surely attenuate the effects of strategic delegation. However, if governments 
believed that EU policy would be too generous to refugees they might not be 
willing to cede the power to make asylum policy to a centralised authority 
in the first place. This effect can perhaps been seen in the opt-outs from EU-
wide immigration and asylum policies that have been negotiated by Britain, 
Denmark and Ireland.
There are two reasons for thinking that EU governments would be willing 
to go further in ceding control over immigration and asylum policies than 
is sometimes supposed. One is the threat of far right political parties. As we 
saw in Chapter 7, far right parties seem to have a disproportionate influence 
over asylum policies. And mainstream parties have often felt obliged to adopt 
tougher policies than they would wish in order to fend off or accommodate 
the political challenge from the extreme right, something that is often 
amplified by the press. Thus, in addition to the public good argument set 
out above, there is also a political argument for centralising authority over 
asylum. Ceding asylum (and immigration) policy to a centralised authority 
108 In the jargon, refugees at home and abroad are strategic substitutes.
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would take it out of domestic politics, something that both centre-left and 
centre-right parties would probably be glad of. While at first sight this might 
seem to be anti-democratic, it can be justified on the grounds of reducing the 
weight given to racism and xenophobia in determining asylum policies.
The second reason relates to the attitudes of the average EU voter. Are European 
citizens willing to see immigration and asylum policies taken out of the hands 
of their directly elected representative and passed to what many see as faceless 
bureaucrats in Brussels? It is useful to look again at the European Social Survey 
of 2002. The survey asked respondents if they would prefer immigration and 
asylum policies to be decided at the international level, at the European level, at 
the national level or at the subnational (regional or local) level. The responses 
by country are summarised in Table 11.1 . Somewhat surprisingly, 57.5% of all 
those polled wanted to see decisions on immigration and asylum policy made 
at the supranational level, while those preferring to keep it under national 
or local control were in a minority. In Belgium, Switzerland, Spain, France, 
the Netherlands, Poland and Portugal more than two-thirds of respondents 
wanted to see immigration and asylum policies decided at the European or 
international level. Only in the Nordic countries, Finland, Norway and Sweden 
were less than 40% in favour of deciding immigration and refugee policy at 
the European or international level.










Austria 58.1 42 Luxembourg 63.6 36.3
Belgium 73.8 26.2 Netherlands 72.4 27.6
Czech Republic 61.8 38.2 Norway 39.6 60.4
Denmark 47.5 52.6 Poland 72.6 27.3
Finland 31.6 68.4 Portugal 71.1 28.9
France 70.8 29.2 Slovenia 60.7 39.3
Germany 55.6 44.4 Spain 66.5 33.4
Greece 63.2 36.9 Sweden 38.8 61.2
Hungary 47 53 Switzerland 66.7 33.2
Ireland 44.5 55.5 United Kingdom 47.7 52.3
Italy 61.9 38.1 Total 57.5 42.5
Source: ESS Round 1, edition 6.2 from Norwegian Social Science Data Services at: http://ess.nsd.uib.no/.
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It is possible that such opinions do not reflect genuine support for EU policies. 
Respondents might instead have interpreted the question as meaning that 
immigrants and refugees would no longer be the responsibility of their 
particular country, and that instead they would be taken by other countries. 
That would seem consistent with the results from the ESS in Table 7.1 which 
showed that more than 60% of respondents agreed or strongly agreed that 
their country was taking more than its fair share of applicants for asylum. 
In other words, they may have thought that if policy was decided on a 
supranational level their country would bear less of the burden. However, 
across countries, the correlation between that opinion and the preference for 
policy to be decided at the international or European level is only 0.08. Across 
all the individuals in the survey it is a shade lower at 0.07. Hence it does not 
appear that those who favoured supranational decision-making did so simply 
to reduce what they saw as an inequitable burden.109
Attitudes that favour international cooperation over immigration and 
asylum can be compared with the responses to questions about international 
coordination in other policy areas where the ESS asked the same question. 
In three areas – environmental protection, the fight against organised crime, 
and aid to developing countries – an even larger percentage of respondents 
wanted to see policy decided at the international or EU level. The percentages 
who agreed or strongly agreed were 63.2, 73.2 and 75.7 respectively, compared 
with 57.5% for immigration and asylum. And defence was a little lower at 
53.6%. These are all arguably policy areas where there are significant social 
gains (in the sense outlined above) to setting policy at the international level. 
By contrast, the percentage who wanted to see social welfare policies decided 
at the international level was a mere 27%. But perhaps most striking is the fact 
that support for supranational policy on immigration and asylum exceeds that 
for agriculture and for interest rates (40.4% and 44.9%). These are both areas 
where policy is already set at the EU level despite the fact that the social gains 
from centralisation are far from obvious.
To summarise, there are a number of key elements that together favour deeper 
integration of asylum policies. The first is that there is genuine support for 
providing a safe haven to genuine refugees, something that is reflected in 
public attitudes and in official support for the Convention. And given that 
refugee protection has the characteristic of a public good, there is a strong 
presumption that it will be underprovided unless there is coordination across 
receiving countries. While concerns about greater equity and uniformity in the 
treatment of asylum seekers have provided the momentum for harmonisation 
109 Neither does it seem to be a result of the particular way that the question was asked in the ESS. 
The World Values Survey for 2005–8 asked if policy on refugees should be decided by national 
governments, regional organizations, the United Nations, or by national governments with UN 
coordination. In none of the countries that are represented in the ESS was there a majority in 
favour of national governments alone deciding.
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of asylum policies, this in turn requires greater centralisation in order to 
achieve socially superior outcomes. And within the EU deeper integration 
seems to be both politically desirable and politically feasible.
11.3 Reforming EU asylum policy
There is a strong argument for further centralising European asylum policies 
by transferring the authority for asylum policy to a centralised body that is 
independent of local politics and that can impose uniform standards across the 
EU. Such ideas have been widely canvassed over the last decade but progress 
towards a genuinely integrated system has been slow. As an illustration, two 
proposals were made to the European Council in 2003. A proposal by the UK 
government concentrated on establishing asylum processing centres outside 
the EU, but this received little support. 110 Another was made by the UNHCR as 
part of the Agenda for Protection and Convention Plus initiatives noted above. 
Under this scheme, one or more closed asylum processing centres would be 
set up within the borders of the EU to act as community-wide clearing houses 
to which asylum applicants would be transferred for processing. Successful 
applicants would then be redistributed to member states according to ‘agreed 
criteria’ for burden sharing. The scheme also envisaged cooperation between 
member states on returning failed asylum seekers and financial burden sharing 
through an enhanced European Refugee Fund.
As we have seen, the principal focus in developing the CEAS over the last decade 
has been on the deeper harmonisation of asylum policies and specifically 
on the setting of minimum standards in areas such as status determination 
procedures and reception conditions. But it has also included the setting 
up of an integrated border control system (Frontex) and the establishment 
of the European Refugee Fund.111 The most recent step is the setting up of 
a European Asylum Support Office (EASO), which is located in Malta and 
began operations at the end of 2010.112 This office is tasked with fostering 
the exchange of information and the dissemination of best practice methods 
as well as establishing an early warning system and mechanisms for assisting 
states that are under ‘particular pressure’. Interestingly it is also expected to 
110 This and other proposals for processing centres that were made around the same time are 
discussed and evaluated by Schuster, 2005.
111 Frontex is far from completely integrated. As Georgiev (2010) points out, Frontex is weaker in 
some countries on the external boundaries of the EU than the internal pre-Schengen border 
controls that it has partially replaced.
112 This was set up under regulation 439/2010 of the European Parliament and of the Council, 
see  http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2010:132:0011:0028:EN:PDF. It is 
interesting to note (para. 21) that the UK and Ireland (but not Denmark) have agreed to be 
covered by this regulation.
110 Seeking Asylum: Trends and Policies in the OECD
assist in the relocation of recognised refugees, but only on an ‘agreed basis’ 
between member states and with the consent of the individuals concerned.
While these are important steps forward, the control of asylum systems still 
resides with the member states. Providing assistance, advice and logistical 
support does not constitute taking control over asylum policies.113 In order 
to exert more influence the EU needs to establish a presence, not just in one 
location, but in all the major countries. One model would be to establish in 
each country a partnership where policy is determined by the central authority 
but is carried out by local officials through the administrative systems of 
the host country.114 This would allow the implementation of a centrally 
determined policy to be carried out in a way that would be adapted to local 
institutional structures. Such an arrangement would have to be underpinned 
by mechanisms for redistribution and by financial burden sharing.115 Only 
then would it be possible to implement a truly EU-wide asylum system. A 
question immediately follows: if a more centralised system were established, 
then what should it do?
One important step that is envisaged by the establishment of EASO is the 
further harmonisation of the refugee status determination procedures.116 
Critics have often called for greater expertise and professionalism in judging 
asylum claims fairly, efficiently and with the minimum of delay, something 
that EASO aims to further advance though its training programmes. But, 
even with greater expertise, decisions can and do vary substantially between 
countries, notwithstanding the progress that has been made under the 
processing directives. Even within countries there are wide variations in the 
way in which decisions are made, as in the case of the Swiss cantons noted 
in Chapter 7. An even more striking example comes from the United States, 
where wide variations in recognition rates have been found across regions 
and jurisdictions, as well as between individual immigration officers and 
immigration judges (Ramli-Nogales et al, 2007).117 Thus, even where there is a 
common legal framework, outcomes can differ widely when decisions are made 
quasi-independently and without full and clear guidelines. Hence centralised 
control over the implementation of asylum policy is a minimum requirement 
for implementing fully harmonised refugee recognition procedures.
113 According to Article 1 (6) of Regulation 439/2010: ‘The Support Office shall have no powers in 
relation to the taking of decisions by Member States’ asylum authorities on individual applications 
for international protection.’
114 This opens a possible principal–agent problem, which is a further reason to have EU officials 
‘embedded’ in local institutions rather than steering policy at arm’s length.
115 Processing asylum applications locally would seem vastly superior to the proposals made in 2003 
of first shipping asylum seekers to a central location and then shipping those who were successful 
back or onwards to another destination.
116 This requirement has been reaffirmed under Article 78 of the Lisbon Treaty.
117 Ramli-Nogales et al (2007) found that first instance recognition rates in the years 1999 to 2005 
ranged between 26% and 62% across different regional asylum offices. They also found wide 
variations at each level up to the Boards of Immigration Appeals, even for applicants from the 
same source country.
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One important issue is to establish not only a common definition of a refugee 
in more detail than is provided by the Convention, but to ensure that common 
guidelines are used in the way that it is applied. Linked to this is gaining more 
uniformity in the treatment of asylum seekers from the same source country 
in different EU states, through centralised intelligence on source country 
conditions (something that EASO aims to address). This would also be an 
important precondition for harmonising the criteria for determining which 
claims could be treated as manifestly unfounded. In addition, greater uniformity 
should be imposed in the stages through which an appeal can be made and 
the conditions under which leave to appeal is given. One possibility would be 
that the highest level of appeals should be dealt with by a devolved branch of 
the European Court of Justice. Overall, revisions to the status determination 
procedures should aim to partially reverse the severe toughening of policy that 
has taken place since the early 1990s. Given that asylum applications are now 
lower than at any time since the 1980s, a significant easing of policy on status 
determination would be both practicable and, for the reasons outlined in the 
previous section, desirable.
It would also be feasible to ease some elements relating to the reception 
conditions faced by asylum seekers. One of the key findings of Chapter 8 is 
that the number of asylum claims is influenced by policy towards access and 
processing, but not by policy towards the welfare of asylum seekers. Although 
there are strong views to the contrary, it appears that plunging asylum seekers 
into poverty and destitution, and thus limiting their capabilities, has very 
little effect on the volume of applications. But while a minimum standard 
of welfare is important, the key issue is access to employment, as we saw in 
Chapter 10. Thus the waiting period before acquiring the right to employment 
should be reduced to no more than three months, perhaps even less. And 
this needs to be supported by furthering the efforts noted in Chapter 10 of 
providing training and assistance in order to access the job market. It is worth 
remembering as well that, despite considerable debate over this issue, public 
opinion is strongly in favour of allowing asylum seekers to work while their 
claims are being processed (see Table 7.1).
One of the most contentious issues is policy on detention. Here too the 
deterrent effect of relaxing harsh detention regimes is likely to be weak. But the 
more pressing question is that if detention is not used, then how is it possible 
to avoid the past experience of asylum seekers simply disappearing while 
their claims are being decided, and especially when they have been rejected? 
Electronic tagging would be a possibility in cases where there are grounds for 
believing that an asylum seeker is likely to abscond, and it has been used in the 
UK since 2006. Other, less intrusive, methods such as reporting requirements, 
release on bail or bond, and release under supervision by caseworkers, family 
or the community have been shown to work well in certain cases, even among 
failed asylum seekers facing deportation. Most countries already have in place 
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a spectrum of methods, representing differing degrees of enforcement, for 
keeping track of asylum seekers, although some are rarely used.118 The evidence 
suggests that the stronger surveillance and enforcement methods (such as 
tagging) are normally required only after removal orders have been issued.
There is also the key question of temporary protection versus permanent 
settlement. In contrast to policies on welfare, those relating to the outcomes 
of the status determination process do seem to have significant effects on 
the number of applications. Temporary protection has been seen in the EU 
principally as a response to exceptional events such as a sudden influx of 
refugees rather than as a normal outcome of asylum procedures (see further 
below). Yet, as noted above, the greater use of temporary protection could 
underpin some expansion of the system. But it would have to take the form 
of subsidiary protection rather than full Convention status, and it would 
last only until the causes of displacement have receded.119 If conditions have 
not improved sufficiently after a period of, say, two years the case would 
be automatically reviewed for permanent settlement. Such an arrangement 
is similar to provisions for subsidiary protection that have long existed in a 
number of countries. It is therefore vital that subsidiary forms of protection 
are fully harmonised and the Temporary Protection Directive of 2001 is an 
important step in that direction. It also points to the key role for EASO in 
determining where and when conditions in source countries have improved.
As we have seen, further harmonisation of asylum processing and reception 
policies is inconsistent with improved burden sharing where the demand for 
asylum differs systematically between countries. The previous section suggested 
that a system of refugee transfers would be necessary to attain an optimal 
allocation. A recent report for the European Commission (2010) considered 
two options. One is to create a relocation mechanism for transferring asylum 
seekers or refugees from countries receiving greater than proportionate shares 
to those receiving lower shares. Each country’s share could be determined on 
a formula based on its population, per capita income, population density and 
perhaps other criteria.120 The other alternative is to redistribute on a voluntary 
118 Field (2006) provides a survey of alternative methods and an evaluation of their effectiveness.  The 
study found that non-coercive methods were less successful in transit countries than in countries 
of final destination and that they tended to be more successful when combined with positive 
incentives such as access to welfare services and legal aid. The success of community supervision 
was demonstrated in the late 1990s by trials in New York conducted by the Vera Institute of 
Justice, see www.vera.org/download?file=615/finalreport.pdf. For a discussion of the community-
based alternatives to mandatory detention in Australia, see Commonwealth of Australia (2009).
119 Clearly that would mean a limited form of status with fewer rights, such as the right to family 
reunification. This is consistent with Article 3 (2b) of Council Directive 2003/86/EC of 2003 on 
the right to family reunification.
120 Such a formula was proposed by Germany during its EU presidency in 1994, in the wake of 
the mass influx from Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union. Applying the formulae in 
the Commission’s report to the 2008 pattern of asylum applications or to the number granted 
some form of status produces results that imply substantial relocation from older EU members to 
newer members (except for Malta and Cyprus).  In my view the formulae applied puts insufficient 
weight on overall size.
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basis ‘through an open pledging mechanism’. This alternative will not work 
for the reasons outlined in the previous section: individual countries have 
little incentive to offer more places if they know that other countries will bear 
the burden if they do not.
A second question is whether relocation should apply only to refugees and 
those granted subsidiary protection in the country where they applied or 
whether it should apply at the application stage. The report suggests only the 
former, partly because this is what the government officials surveyed said they 
would prefer, and partly because the redistribution of asylum seekers would 
clash with the Dublin II Regulation. This regulation provides for the relocation 
of applicants according to a set of criteria, particularly where the applicant 
first entered the EU. While the Dublin Regulation provides some precedent 
for relocation it has proved costly and bureaucratic.121 Rather than finding a 
way of reconciling a new mechanism with the Dublin Regulation, it would be 
preferable to scrap the latter and replace it with a new and more comprehensive 
formula for redistribution. Another reason for preferring relocation of asylum 
seekers is that, insofar as processing takes time, those who are successful can at 
least begin their orientation in the host country rather than being transferred 
at a later stage in the process.122
Such an arrangement would require a stronger role for EASO. While EASO’s 
existing remit allows it to advise and offer technical assistance on relocation, a 
more proactive role would be necessary to apply whatever formula was agreed 
and act as a clearing house for relocation. For this reason too it would need to 
have an active presence in each of the major recipient countries. Such a process 
of quota filling would be cumbersome and would need to be underpinned 
by sufficient financial resources to effect the transfers.123 However, it would 
involve fewer transfers than would be the case under the more centralised 
clearing house schemes that have been previously proposed. Also there is the 
problem of fixing country quotas in the face of year to year fluctuations in the 
total number of applications. A partial solution to both these problems would 
be to set individual country quotas to add up to significantly more than the 
121 It was originally feared by the states on the eastern borders of the EU that the Dublin Regulation 
would mean significant net transfers to countries that were already facing a disproportionate 
burden. However, owing to its bureaucratic operation the numbers transferred have been 
smaller than originally expected. More recently (in 2008) the regulation was criticised by refugee 
advocates on the grounds that returning asylum seekers to face the unsafe asylum process in 
Greece was tantamount to refoulement.
122 Another misgiving about transferring refugees after the recognition process is that individual 
states would have a greater incentive to grant recognition knowing that any surplus over their 
refugee quota would be transferred elsewhere. In that case there would be yet another reason for 
imposing a common refugee status determination procedure.
123 Evidence from a pilot study of transfers from Malta to France suggests that the transfer cost would 
be about €1,000, while the total cost including processing and reception is much larger, at around 
€10,000 (European Commission, 2010, p. 63). The report suggests that the European Refugee 
Fund should provide financial support for transfers of refugees at a higher rate than the €4,000 
currently provided for resettlement programmes.
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expected total.124 Thus transfers would only take place from countries where 
applications were expected to exceed this upper bound.125
Following the Kosovo crisis in 1999, there was much discussion of burden 
sharing in situations of a sudden influx of refugees.126 In light of the perceived 
inadequacies of the response at that time, the EU issued the Temporary 
Protection Directive (2001), which called for relocation from places or 
countries where facilities for determining individual refugee status would 
be overwhelmed by the force of numbers. However, while the Temporary 
Protection Directive calls for solidarity in achieving a balance of effort 
between member states, and EASO is tasked with assisting in relocation on 
an ‘agreed basis’, there is no formal guideline for redistribution. Thus the 
existing arrangements rely on a process of wrangling and negotiation that 
inevitably leads to delay in responding to urgent situations. An obvious way 
to redistribute those in need of temporary protection would be to apply a 
formula as suggested above. Thus those countries falling furthest below their 
quota would be first in line to receive transfers of asylum seekers in the event 
of a sudden influx. Such arrangements are all the more pressing in the light of 
the developing refugee crisis in North Africa and the difficulty that Italy and 
other Mediterranean countries have experienced in gaining the cooperation of 
other member states.127
To summarise, while there has been significant progress in developing the 
Common European Asylum System, the policy still falls some way short of 
what is required. It is worth repeating that the case for further integration 
124 It would also be possible to build in an element of intertemporal equalization through periodic 
adjustment of the quotas.
125 There are, of course, many issues of a practical nature about who would be chosen for relocation 
and these are discussed in European Commission, 2010. They include issues such as the handling 
of families and unaccompanied minors, as well as the question of gaining the consent of those 
to be relocated (something that would be more of a concern if transfers took place after the 
recognition process). There is also the question of whether sufficient legal basis is provided under 
Articles 78 and 80 of the Lisbon Treaty (2008). While further legislation may be necessary, these 
problems are not insurmountable in principle.
126 Barutciski and Suhrke (2001) discuss the issues that arose when, following the NATO air strikes, 
tens of thousands of refugees gathered at the Blace border crossing into Macedonia at the end 
of March 1999.  In particular they discuss the question of whether halting the displaced persons 
at the Macedonian border prior to the launch of the Humanitarian Evacuation Programme 
amounted to refoulement.
127 As the Libyan crisis developed in February 2011, the Italian government sought EU assistance 
on three fronts. First, it has asked for upwards of €100 million to help stabilise the situation on 
Lampedusa. Second, it has urged the Frontex, the EU border agency, to strengthen its surveillance 
of the North African coast to avert the surge of boat people. And third, it has asked for other 
countries to share the burden through an orderly redistribution of asylum seekers throughout 
the EU. Amid warnings of an influx of over a quarter of a million asylum seekers, Italy was joined 
by the interior ministers of France, Spain, Malta and Cyprus in calling for assistance from the 
EU. At the time of writing, the EU has brought forward Joint Operation Hermes, an Italian-led 
Frontex operation to beef up sea patrols to detect and prevent illegal landings on the coasts and 
outlying islands, and it has received financial support from the European Refugee Fund. But 
cooperation on redistribution of those issued with temporary residence permits has been more 
limited – something that was reflected by the temporary blocking at the border in April 2011 of a 
train carrying displaced Tunisians from Italy to France.
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is underpinned both by economic arguments that see refugees as a form of 
public good and by the political imperatives underlying policy in individual 
member states. While there is much to be said for further harmonisation 
in the treatment of asylum claims across the countries of the EU, this also 
implies further effort to provide a more effective burden sharing system, and 
in particular on developing a mechanism for redistributing applicants for 
asylum. The theory also implies that neither of these goals will be effectively 
attained without developing a truly European-level asylum system.
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Appendix to Chapter 11: A Model of Asylum Policy
This appendix describes a basic model where refugees are characterised as a 
public good. The key ingredient is the assumption that societies have some 
compassion for refugees and hence they gain utility from satisfying these 
humanitarian motives. Such benefit flowing to one individual does not 
preclude the same benefit accruing to others and hence providing a safe haven 
to refugees may be thought of as analogous to a public good. This in turn implies 
that individuals in one receiving country might be expected to gain some 
benefit from the knowledge that refugees also find safety in countries other 
than their own. The second element is that tougher policy in one country may 
‘deflect’ asylum seekers to other countries. These elements can be captured in 
a two-country model following the framework set out in Hatton (2005). The 
focus here is on possible gains from different modes of cooperation.
The basic framework
The net benefit from refugees accruing to the citizens in each of the refugee-











V bb −+=  (1)
where country 1’s valuation V1 depends on the number that are received in 
country 1, r1, and the number that are accepted in country 2, r2, minus country 
1’s cost of refugees, cr1. The parameter 0 < λ <1 reflects a lower valuation for 
refugees accommodated abroad while 0 < b < 1 reflects diminishing marginal 
utility for (or diminishing tolerance of) refugees.
The number of refugees accepted in each country depends on overall ‘demand’ 
for refugee places, on the generosity of asylum policy, and on deflection effects 
from policy in the other country:
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where A is total ‘demand’ for asylum, 0 < s < 1 represents the share of asylum 
seekers with a preference for country 1 and (1 − s) is the share preferring 
country 2. γ1 is an index of the ‘generosity’ of country 1’s asylum policy; the 
greater is γ1 more asylum seekers country 1 admits for a given level of demand. 
The parameter 0< β <1 captures the deflection of asylum seekers from one 
country to another resulting from policy differences weighted by country 
shares. Thus, for a given level of overall demand for asylum, country 1 accepts 
more asylum seekers as refugees the more generous is country 1’s policy (the 
larger is γ1) and the less generous is that of country 2 (the smaller is γ2). In 
this set-up, the number of refugees accepted by both countries combined, R, 
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does not depend on the deflection effects, but only on total demand and the 
weighted average of policy:128
])1([ 2121 γγ ssArrR −+=+=  (3)
Non-cooperative policy setting
Here policy is characterised as a Nash equilibrium where there is no joint policy, 
reflecting the situation that prevailed up to the end of the 1990s. Combining 
(1) and (2) gives country 1’s valuation as:







If both countries set policy to maximize their respective valuations, taking the 


























In the Nash equilibrium, country 1’s policy is tougher (γ1 is lower) the greater 
is the cost, c, the greater is total demand for asylum, A, and the larger is its 
‘share’, s. Thus the destination most favoured by asylum seekers has tougher 
policies. Note also that, in the presence of a public good spillover (λ > 0), policy 
is tougher the greater is the deflection effect, β. This provides some support for 
the argument that the presence of deflection effects makes policy tougher than 
it would have been in their absence. And in the presence of a deflection effect 
(β > 0) policy is tougher the greater is the public good spillover.
As the two countries differ only by the demand for asylum that they face, in 
the Nash equilibrium, policy adjusts to produce the same number of refugees, 























The number of refugees is also decreasing in the cost per refugee, in the 
deflection effect, and in the public good spillover. Note that in this setting the 
‘burden’, as reflected by refugee numbers, is equally shared, but policy differs 
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between the two countries. Note also that an equal distribution of refugees 
does not imply that these policies are in some sense optimal.
The social optimum and burden sharing
Here, the social optimum is obtained by maximizing the sum of the valuations 
of the two countries, V1 + V2. This gives the socially optimal policies denoted 
γ* as:


















Note that optimal policy is independent of deflection effects but the ratio of 
country 1’s policy to country 2’s policy parameter is the same as in the non-
cooperative case. In the social optimum, total welfare is maximised, policy 
is more generous, and the number of refugees is higher (and by the same 


































The reason for this is straightforward. Because countries acting individually 
do not take account of the value of their refugees to people in other countries, 
they fail to maximize the social surplus from refugees. Policy is tougher, 
refugees admitted are fewer, and welfare is lower in the Nash equilibrium. 
Notice that this is entirely due to the public good spillover. For λ = 0, the 
ratio in (8) is 1 and the non-cooperative outcome is the same as the social 
optimum. However, in the presence of a public good spillover, the greater is 
the deflection effect, β, the more the non-cooperative outcomes fall below the 
social optimum. Hence deflection effects do make things worse relative to the 
social optimum, and the more so the greater is the public good spillover.
During the 1990s it was often suggested that better outcomes could have been 
achieved through some form of financial burden sharing. In this model, the 
social optimum can be achieved by reducing the marginal cost of refugees. In 
order to mimic the social optimum, marginal cost must be reduced to a level, 











Feasible reductions to marginal cost could be achieved through a common 
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where r* is the socially optimal number of refugees, and each receives back 
a subsidy per refugee that reduces marginal cost to c^. While there is ex ante 
burden sharing, ex post each country takes out what it puts in.
Cooperative harmonisation
Most of the focus of EU asylum policy since the Treaty of Amsterdam has been 
on policy harmonisation, rather than on finding socially optimal policies that 
differ for each country. So what are the implications of adopting a common 
policy that is set cooperatively? Suppose that the harmonisation process 
involves maximising the sum of welfare, V1 + V2, for a common ‘cooperatively 
harmonised’ policy parameter γHC.
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where ββ )1()1( ssz −−+= . Note that when s = 0.5, z = 0.5, and that the whole 
expression reaches a maximum value when s = 0.5.
This can be compared with the social optimum policy for country 1 when 











This ratio is equal to one when s = 0.5 and is greater than one when s > 0.5. As 
compared with the unconstrained social optimum, policy is not tough enough 
for country 1 and too tough for country 2.129 If policy is constrained to be the 
same for both countries, then there is no scope for financial burden sharing to 
bring the outcome closer to the social optimum.
However, policy under cooperative harmonisation could dominate the Nash 




























This is simply the ratio in (11) divided by the ratio in (8). Given s > 0.5, country 
1’s policy under cooperative harmonisation is unambiguously more generous 
to asylum seekers than in the unconstrained Nash equilibrium since both parts 
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of this expression are greater than one. But for country 2, policy could be more 
or less generous than in the unconstrained Nash equilibrium because, in the 
expression equivalent to (12) for country 2, the first term is less than one and 
the second term is greater than one. The greater is λ, the greater is β, and the 
closer is s to 0.5, the more likely that policy will be more generous and welfare 
will be higher for both countries than in the unconstrained Nash equilibrium.
Levelling down
Under harmonisation, countries are forced to agree on common asylum 
policies, and it has sometimes been suggested that this process has been one of 
levelling down to the toughest policies. Rather than constructing bargaining 
situations for which we have little supporting evidence, consider instead the 
extreme case where the country with the preference for the toughest policy 
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Policy under this extreme case of ‘non-cooperative harmonisation’ can be 

































This ratio is greater than one for s > 0.5 but it collapses to one if s = 0.5. Thus 
for each country, policy is more generous and total welfare is higher under 
cooperative harmonisation than under non-cooperative harmonisation. 
Although the number of refugees differs between countries it is higher by 
the same proportion for both countries under cooperative harmonisation. As 
before, country 2 could be better or worse off than in the unconstrained Nash 
equilibrium.
While it is not possible to achieve the unconstrained social optimum, there 
is scope for a financial burden-sharing scheme to obtain the same outcome as 
under cooperative harmonisation. This would involve reducing the marginal 















Here the burden-sharing marginal cost is decreasing in λ and (for s > 0.5) also 
decreasing in β and in s. Under the lump sum payment/subsidy per refugee 
scheme, where both countries contribute the same amount, there is a cross-
subsidy to country 1 (which has more refugees) from country 2 of:
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If s is sufficiently large, this could make country 2 worse off than in the absence 
of the burden-sharing scheme. Thus country 2 might be willing to accede to 
the dominant role of country 1 in selecting the harmonised policy setting, 
since it too could be made better off. But it might be less willing to agree to 
financial burden sharing that involved transfers to country 1 in order to get to 
the cooperatively harmonised outcome.
An integrated asylum system?
It is useful to consider a case where asylum seekers are distributed between 
countries by a central authority. In this case there would be no deflection 
effects since, for asylum seekers, there would be no particular advantage in 
applying to one country rather than another. Removing deflection effects 
alone would bring policy closer to the social optimum as illustrated by setting 
β to zero in (12). Policy could then be set at the level that produces a total 
number of refugees equal to that generated by the social planner. That gives 
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Some proportion of refugees would then be redirected from their initially 
preferred country (as represented by s) so that each country gets the same 











An integrated system could do better than harmonisation alone, partly by 
removing deflection effects and partly by introducing another form of burden 
sharing – shifting some refugees away from their preferred country. Thus there 
could be scope for both types of burden sharing. The reallocation of refugees 
would compensate for the uneven distribution of refugees across countries 
imposed by the constraint of a common policy, while a financial burden-
sharing scheme would compensate for the failure to agree on the socially 
optimal number of refugees in total.

12 Summary and Conclusion
Asylum has been an important social and political challenge for most countries 
of the OECD for the last 20 years. It has proved to be more divisive than almost 
any other domestic issue as it pits humanitarian ideals and compassion for 
those who are persecuted against concerns about floods of illegal immigrants 
and cynical abuses of the asylum system. As a result there has been a passionate 
debate about the current asylum system and how to reform it. A major goal of 
this report has been to provide an account that is based on an objective analysis 
of the facts combined with a realistic view of the political and economic issues 
involved.
In order to fully appreciate the dilemmas of the present we must understand the 
past. The cornerstone of policy, the Refugee Convention, grew out of the mass 
displacements in Europe during the first half of the 20th century. It was crafted 
against the backdrop of Cold War geopolitics with what were to be enduring 
consequences. These circumstances led to an asylum regime with three key 
features. One is that applications for refugee status are individually assessed 
against the criterion of a ‘well founded fear of persecution’, something that 
was once much clearer and easier to apply than it is now. The second is the non-
refoulement requirement, which essentially means that those claiming asylum 
within a country’s jurisdiction must be admitted to the status determination 
procedures, potentially without limit to the numbers involved. And third, 
illegal entry does not in principle prohibit access to asylum procedures or 
prejudice the outcome of those procedures.
With the Convention as its foundation, the international refugee regime 
underwent more than 30 years of expansion. An important step was extending 
its provisions to new situations beyond those arising from the Second World 
War, and equally importantly, extending its reach to countries and regions 
outside Europe. In parallel with this, the focus shifted from providing sanctuary 
for victims of the Cold War to those affected by colonial struggles and post-
colonial conflicts and to those fleeing repressive dictatorships. The expansion 
of the refugee regime was fostered by the momentum of the human rights 
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and civil rights movements and also by a growing public awareness of conflict 
and suffering provided by the media, particularly television. These underlying 
ideological trends, coupled with the involvement of Western countries in a 
variety of conflicts around the world, led to an expansion in the willingness to 
accept refugees for resettlement, which reached its apogee in the 1980s.
Within a decade it was followed by the first great surge of asylum seekers, 
increasingly moving spontaneously and outside the agency of governments 
and non-governmental organisations. This trend was underpinned by the 
continuing growth in global conflict and human rights abuse. But it was also 
fuelled by greater freedom of movement and above all by greater access to the 
means of escape, sometimes by boat but more often by land and increasingly 
by air. The surge that began in the 1980s peaked in the aftermath of the fall of 
the Berlin Wall and the dissolution of the Soviet Union. These events sparked a 
wave of asylum migration from former communist countries. They also opened 
Europe’s back door to asylum migrants from much further afield. The rising 
stock of migrants from strife-prone countries combined with the widening 
and deepening of people-smuggling networks led to a level of persistence in 
asylum-migration streams that would prove hard to break.
As the numbers mounted, the demand for asylum in the developed world 
outstripped the supply. The latter was reflected by the diminishing tolerance 
for accepting ever larger numbers of refugees and a growing conflation of 
asylum applications with migration for reasons other than persecution and 
with illegal entry. This led to the first great policy backlash during the 1990s. 
This produced enhanced border controls and visa regulations, more restrictive 
refugee status determination procedures and tougher regimes for the welfare 
and living conditions of asylum seekers. When the number of applications rose 
again at the end of the 20th century a second round of restrictive measures 
was enacted, even tougher than the first, enhanced this time by the threat of 
terrorism.
In the first great surge of asylum applications, tougher policies seemed to 
have little effect on the numbers, leading some observers to think either that 
the deterrent effect of tougher policies was weak or that it simply deflected 
asylum seekers from one country to another. But other effects were at work 
in source countries and closer analysis reveals that policy tightening did 
have a significant negative effect on applications. The fall in applications in 
a wide range of counties after 2001 owed quite a bit to policy, although not as 
much as some policymakers claimed. The evidence suggests that it was policy 
on access to territory and the status determination process that were most 
effective rather than policies on asylum seeker welfare. In the case of Australia, 
the dramatic fall in applications also owed something to the reputation effect 
of the Tampa incident and the events that followed it.
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While much of the debate has been about the deterrent effects of policy, it 
is important not to lose sight of the plight of asylum seekers themselves. 
Those who do gain refugee status are among the most disadvantaged of all 
migrants and only in the last few years have concerted efforts been made to 
integrate them into host country societies and above all to help them acquire 
the means to gain economic independence. Such efforts are unlikely to undo 
the deterrent effects of tougher policies on access and processing. But perhaps 
more serious is the loss of confidence among voters, especially in Europe, that 
governments are selecting only those with a genuine fear of persecution and 
that they are keeping track of those whose claims have been rejected. Mixed 
migration flows pose a challenge that governments have struggled with long 
and hard, and to which there are no easy solutions.
On the 60th anniversary of the Refugee Convention there are continuing 
doubts about its relevance to modern conditions. Yet it represents a symbolic 
humanitarian commitment that few would want to see abolished. In terms 
of its specific provisions, the Convention has proved to be both flexible and 
robust and it has been assimilated by most nations of the world. Thus the 
challenge is to build on the Convention rather than to replace it. But efforts 
to enhance it through North–South cooperation have proved singularly 
unsuccessful. However there are economic and political gains to cooperation 
between the rich countries that receive asylum seekers. The greatest potential 
is in Europe, where cooperation has evolved in a decade-long process that 
is still far from complete. Yet the potential for an integrated asylum regime 
that is more compassionate and generous, while at the same time gaining the 
approbation of the vast majority of citizens, is within reach.
Finally, it is important to stress that this report concentrates only on those who 
seek asylum in the rich countries of the OECD. Even the most disadvantaged of 
refugees in the West – those who have been traumatised, impoverished or have 
been rejected as refugees and drifted into the informal economy – are typically 
far better off than they would be had they ended up facing the destitution and 
insecurity, often for decades, in the cross-border refugee camps of Africa and 
parts of Asia. It is true that the numbers in the camps have decreased in the last 
decade, but still they far exceed those that, one way or another, manage to gain 
access to the developed world. It is worth reiterating that although improving 
the refugee regime in the developed world is a commendable endeavour, it is 
still only the tip of the iceberg.
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Seeking Asylum 
Trends and Policies in the OECD
Asylum seekers are at the forefront of policy debate in the developed world and 
are likely to remain so. Tim Hatton’s timely new book provides a concise narrative 
and fresh analysis of the number and composition of asylum seekers, the political 
and social reaction to them, and the evolution of policy in the OECD. The historical 
development of international asylum policies is traced from the 1951 Refugee 
Convention right up to the present. Hatton investigates forces determining the 
number of asylum applicants, including war and terror in poor source countries, and 
evaluates the effects of the increasingly restrictive deterrence policies used by the 
developed world. The book explains how public opinion and politics have led to a 
backlash against asylum seekers, and studies the effects on those who are admitted 
as refugees as well as those who are rejected. The key findings are that tougher 
policies do reduce the number of applicants, and that the choice of asylum policy is 
constrained by popular opinion as well as by trends in national politics. With these 
realities in mind, Hatton examines feasible policy options. Highlighting European 
policy, he argues that a more integrated EU-wide strategy would better serve the 
interests both of its citizens and of refugees.
 
“This is an excellent, timely book on an understudied facet of international 
migration, by one of the leading scholars of the subject. It covers all the main 
aspects of the debate on asylum seeking, from its causes, to its consequences 
and to the policies to govern the phenomenon. It will be a must read for anyone 
interested in understanding the present and the future of asylum seeking.” 
Professor Giovanni Facchini, Erasmus University Rotterdam and University of Milan.
 
“A pragmatic discussion of asylum policies in the OECD, as well as a feasible reform 
agenda which builds on the Refugee Convention. It is compulsory reading for those 
who want to address one of the most pressing challenges of the 21st Century.”
Professor Tito Boeri, Bocconi University, Director of the Fondazione Rodolfo 
Debenedetti. 
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